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of papers and rmde arrangementS for their presentation The follo .... ing people .... en: 
m charge: 
Frank Miller, Chairman 
J ulian H. Atkinson 
J ohn H. Bondurant 
Elton B. Hill 
Virgil L. Hurlburt (Agricultural Resean:h Sc:rvice) . 
Laurel D. l.oflsgard 
Fnnklin). Reiss 
William A. Wayt 
FOREWORD 
Approximarely 20.5 percent of the farm operators in the 48 contiguous 
mainland states and 21 percent of those in the 13 North Centr:al States includ· 
ing Kentucky are tenanrs, an additional 21.9 percem in the country as a whole 
and 24.7 pet(ent in the North Central Region 1re paft owners. 
The conditions under which tenants rent entire limns and part·owners Ot 
renants rent fields for specific crops or for pasture arc highly variable. Some 
operating unirs are well I!<juipped with modern d",dlin~, barns, paved feed lOlli, 
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'Naler suppl~', fenus. tcrr:Jccs ..... ,uerways, and other fa<:ili.ies esstnrial 10 the: 
comfOr< of a family and 10 effie; .. n! opcrcarion of a business; otbers hnc few of 
these items. Some uniu ue l:ug .. enough and/or sufficicndy "'ell equipped ~ 
Hvcslc.ck cnrerprises (or tcnants 10 lIke advantage of rhc «onomics of Kale; 
others are small or poorly equippe<l1eaving labor and capital only parrial ly em· 
played. /l.bny of [he fields rented by part-own .. rt or by renan,s who have more 
than one landlord h.ve nv buildings Of fences on them. Some bnd o~m~ Shl~ 
the \':Iriable roses of 8ro"";ng and h''''csring crops such as fertilizer, inse«ici<b. 
chemials for ,,-ecd control. ~ and C'USfOm charges for Jw.,·csting crops; ochcTs 
pay none of r~ .. xpenSt$. 
Th<: ,,-ide divasit)" of resources and services comribulro by p2.lIies Iv I~ 
lcads 10 ineffiei.:n. combinadons of factors and low r:iI{es of relurn 10 (arm busi· 
nesses. These conditions bring (0 farm managers and extension workers a (00. 
S(~nt $!ream of qucstions about the rights, duties and privikgcs of rhc eOntracl' 
ing panics. The people who advise Icnanls and land own<!rS u c not adequudy 
supplied "'ilh reiCueh findings nceded for obje.;livc anSwers. 
This shortage of buic information has long beoen r«ogniud by land «On' 
omisl$ and &rm management specialistS. However, droru to deal "'ith thoe pr0b-
lem ha"e been limited to prcpan.tion of lease forms. model busi~s ag'ccmcnu 
and procedures for determining thc equity of leases. 
In 19!i9. the Farm Tenancy Subcommil!cc of th" Nonh Ccntn.1 Lo.nd Ten· 
ure RCSC:l.rch Commirrce undertook Ihe task of developing " frameworlr of bui' 
theolY thaI could be used as a guide in sclling up research projects dealing with 
land renling problems and Pl'acticcs. Seven prominent Land Economisu were 
asked to prepare papers dealing wilh imporTant phases of renl theory and prac· 
rices and to present thcm to other Land EconomiSIS for discussion and debate 
at thc Farm Foundation Office in Chicago. minois. April iI. 1961. The papen. 
and formal discussions and pans of the dcbue at< conraincd in this bulletin. 
The}' seT up guide-lines ,.,.hich can be used by rCSC:l.1ch workers in the develop-
ment c.f informa<ion Thar can be used in preparing equit:ilble leases. 
Then: '''is lubstantial agrccmcnt that marginal \'JI;iuc product contributed by 
a faeror under specific conditions of soil. climate. market, scale of opcl'adons and 
fi.C!or mix in farm firms is the key to C<{uirable diStribution of income. 
T here ",as also agreement that the rcscarchcr has the rask of dcrcrmining 
this value $0 Ihe people "'ho advise "ith land owners and rcmers can use it in 
preparing leases. 
As ,",ould be expected in a discunion of this t)PC. there '"'ere diJfcrcnces of 
opinion as to how economic thCQr)' should be ~pplied to land renting problems. 
Some at the seminar in$;"ed that theory should be used as a scncraJ guide in 
anontinS resources to individual firms and equity in division of income .... ould 
be raken care of automatically through competilion in the rent:ill market. OIhcn 
felt th~t thc differences in bargaining positions of bnd owners and renten were 
IQO widc for equiry to be achieved in the market place. Still others ,",ould go K) 
far u to keep 1and o"'tlenhip within rhc reach of all users thfQ\.lgh judicious usc 
of Ihe ad valotem propcrry !l.J<. 
, 
RC5c.lrch workers will find in the bulletin suggestions for m~ny cYpe5 of in-
quiry !hu, if pursued, will Iud 10 mOle nearly optimum U~ of reroufecs by 
farmers :1$ ",·<:11 as 10 socially desir::tblc diStribution of ,",orne. 
RENT DETERMINATION WITHIN THE 
FARM FlRi\I 
Vi rgil L H u rl bu n 
Farm Economics Research Division, ARS 
USDA, Ames, loWII' 
I. T H E FRAME Of REFERENCE 
This thesis is that thtory of economics, and morc s}>«ifi<:ally theory of the 
firm, un serve as I guide in delermining the contrlC! ren.'" paymem for any 
(tn;lnt operlm:d farm. Any landlord and lenam an apply theory of the firm 10 
the nsk of determining shares, cash payment, or a combination of shall: and 
cuh, and achieve more effective resulrs than they can do by any other method. 
Appiicl.lion of principles of economiC'S 10 the t:lsk of determining fellf offers an 
effiacious solulion [0 this major and ubiquitouS problem of ten~ncy. 
The objective in ~ leasing arr.ngement for ~ny twO puties cannot be ntis· 
&.ction alone, devoid of econom ic analysis. Lack of knowledge as 10 tcchnical re-
larions can and docs create opponunit), COSts of which either or both landlord 
and tenant an: unawate, There is individual and Koial WIste if givtn JetS of reo 
sources produce significantly tess than rhe quantity of output of ",'hich they :uc 
apable, or if I specified OUtpUt is produced at .... ell above minimum COSt "Ihc: 
fWO parties and society benefit from effickncy in UK of l'CSOun:cs. 
The problem of determining the rent for any &.rm may be defined u a prcb-
lcm in economic analysis, This problem is to determine trn: form and amount of 
payment fot uSC of t(sourees in a fum firm, for a specified JX'riod of rime, so {ml 
the terms and conditions of paymen t themselves encourage uSC of the quantities 
and combinations of inpu ts fC<Juircd for efficiency and the resource o",'ner reo 
ceives the marginal value products contributed by the resoun:es he supplies 10 
the firm. 
I have excluded other problems in rcnancy and tenure purposely, to con-
centrate on contract rem determination within me firm. Essentially, this assumes 
that two partics, each with control of specific rcsDurces, :are negotiating. Other 
' I .,. potti<ub'''7 i.deb"d." Mr. ),1> ..... 11 Ham.: iii •• ",,",hl <OfI~;b.,.;"n., ho" inAuen<ed "1Oo1jI)11100 
_""'. of <h;' ""p«. App-uo.ion ;. .... «p""'" .0: Dr. Gm< W ......... "'h and W,lle< II.. au ....... allIoo 
FItIII Eo:ot.omia ~b Oi ....... ' Dr. ,'*"-" J,l;!Je<, Uru ..... 'I' alNi...-i, Dr. Arnold PI ..... I ... Sa", 
Un;""';.,.: Idd Dr. ),l"wi« !>(, Kobo, U ... <f>i.,. of on ....... koJ"'l'l'4biU.,. 100- ,iii> p«S<I!".ion ..... ... 
die _. --...... no. ........ f"'O'I"l<io _ ........nt, ..,....... die JIOO'''''' cI die ApiculNtO! ~ 
_ 0< die l:.s. n.p....,...". 01 ~
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papo:n in the seminar ""ill dol "'j,h a!ioc:acion of rewurces bc".un firll'l5. In. 
exogcnou~ inHu= on ,he gcnenl lc:,-d of .cnn. and particubrl)' .• he implica-
lions and con~uenccs of [he probkm of seleclion of partics." 
I ha,-c also;. dispcmd of a pt"rv:lding phase of [he problem by muming some 
knowledge of input·QuII'U! .cbrions by .he conlr:ming po.rtic,_ This second u· 
sumprion rna}' no! be tOO unfeltis!'c. for technical knowledge. LlILlall)' sufficient 
[0 the purpo:st". is ~\'1i11bl .. through public and pri'-llle SvUKCS. 10 those who do 
no! ha,"e il. The reference here is <0 the outpUt rcsp<msO"S in ranges thar an: 
known n.> proJucc ~SIll!S " .. hich 11 kasl begin [0 app.aaeh optimum combina-
tions-such ali niles of fenilizer applicllion. required amoLlnt Qf machin~·. 
amuun. and kind of fud per animal. and rhe like. Ir is unforrunare [har dlt 
ume ClInn{){ be gid for kno" .. ledgc of [he economia of leasing. This paper and 
rh is kmin2r would be unneces~ary if le:lSC'S .... ere mlde in accordance "'irh per. 
(inomf principl('S. 
Landlords and fenanrs e:lnnQ[ be eX»«led fO appl)" technical kno .... ledge be--
yond fhal offered to them by specialists and technicians. In shorr, no smlll part 
d the faults in presem mcrhods of defermining rem is mribunble 10 the 5pe· 
cialisn. including agricul!uul economists, "'ho have been doing resC""lreh on 
tenancy and advising landlords and [enlnU. I make this :u an assation rather 
Ihan IJking il :u an ilSsumprion. Technicians simply ha\"e nOI come [0 grips 
" 'ilh Ihe problem nor hl'-e [he)" made usc of rhe practioolguicks that Iheocy 
offers. 
The Nha specific ~uumpli"ru for the following discussion ue: 
L Farm finns ue in business for profits; 
2, They openllc ,,-i,h limited capital 111d under unCCfl:linty; 
3. ElIch party O"TlS 0( controls selccred fixed inputS-land, buildings, machinet)', 
tools. cquipmomr; and, for Ihe purpo:se here, opct'uO( labor is a fixed input; 
4. Lcuing;$ a form of finn c.r,pniurion and finJncing; share and cub Jc:ue,s :an: 
simpl~' ('<\'0 diltc-renr methods of P"1'met1[; 
5. The functions of the le:lse ue (0 provide J bilSis for combining ~ in 
production and to disrribulC firm income 10 [he owners of Ihe resources used.' 
' AU ""i:m>«>" ""'. m> .. 1 por .. m" >nd .,," _,...tiO<I in <hill"'i"'""""' ""', .... "''''. llIiI diI· 
fen from ... of"., '<"'" in ,h ...... of 0<""""';< """ cI 10"<1 (.luI;':'I). ~ • .,.;."","" owpiu ... I .. ( ....... 
c\u .... I). 0' '"I",'"",n, . '0 .. y loa .. of p«>O",no-. '"'hleh doco "'" 1>1 ..... pn-f=lr ."''';c "'pply" (bid. 
;n5' konorni< A","pi>. ltd Ed." lUI. 
·AmaU)'. ,be« V< ",'I'nl .-. '".,"po;''''''' "'FIr ;"'pl;..l --. A, leu< po.,.;", .. k<r ..... w..Id b. 
....M !O ,Ioe<n,. ... "''''' ... 1"""""'" '" d .. ~k .. hanoi. "'" ~ ,lo<m .... y ..... 1< ;., &;~&< di_ 
...... "I>KII ~" ."..-, """ Ih< <cmraI itouco im'Olv<d ;. .- .......... __ fo< """pi<. pII'~. """" 
...,. ;, ... ou_ ........ p ..... " b.n _ -.I .- JO ;'''0 ""o.il cI ~ .. ,-ice of "'" .. _, 01 _ ..... 
a...t tor JO'=-- ...... poi ... JI"'P<"J. Likf'OiK • • ~-1 ;, --.J. ";,b ..... ,.m;o.. and 
.""""""1', "'" Ih< • • .a.1>ili<y 01 _b aM odua,"", ':";~boo. In il>«<. I .... dio<uw.., ,I>< poobIaoI 
of ... , <IooomUn>,.", . itbin do< &n. "'" ;~ ,II< f"<'I<'" .... iIonnoom 01 ,II< ____ , "" !be Uni"" _ 
No! " ;, ""'" ., _. dw . pptoci"ioo fa< .".; undcmllodiol ""'-" ol ,1>< lim! ;, .. ....dod bf _ 
«lac of !be co"«", of ,..,.,.1 ............ "'<0<)". Thi. i.dod<> ,booty ol o.mo.nd. '"pplY. 1"' ...... ~. 
;0<0"", di",ibuoion. "pi .. 1 f",,,,,,ion. equilibrium. ,1><"""') r .. _ of imp<rf«t <o"'p<I;,; ....... d weir... 
.. onom;'~ Ahbouah undm .. ndi", 01 .. Io<~ p<incipl .. ""1 ,ullicc /or • lar.dIo<d 1M • ,..,.", '" -" OIl, 
,h. do<&ilo oM coo,,", of , .... I ..... ,1>< ,o<hnki ....... , "lr on •• <><1 mol« u .. of, • "loch I" .... .....,. cI 
l<ncrw.'lodt< ., to. ol>lo ., e<pIo.in ,110 oipikan« .".; .ppliat:i<lo 01_ odocoed principia. 
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Litde need be said here about the existing situ.tiun :lnd how rent is deter· 
mined in pl1lctice. Othet papC'cs will bring OUI many of the relevant points, and 
particularly how pl1lcrice diffecs from the procedUle presented below, We likely 
will differ litde as to opinions about the characteristics of the present siruarion-
but will differ much as to how theory of the firm on be applied effectively ro 
improve it. There may "Isu be difl"ercn= of opinion as to how much and what 
kind of theory is now being applied, 
Suffice it for the purpose to enumer.ue that: payments are determined lillgt. 
ly by CUStOm; sImes ille m.ndar<lized over large "=, and shue rentals predomi. 
nate as the form of payment. Important prin<iples arc overlooked in the dercmll. 
nati"n. There is seldom separation of consumpTion and production facers; little 
attention is given to rhe distinction betWeen fix('(\ and variable COStS; overbead 
firm costs which do not conrribute to Output arc troted the same as other costS, 
and often the same as variable COStS; and shares of expenses and returnS arc 
l2ken as givens !1lther than determined by calculation. It is to correction of these 
errors of omission and commission that theory of the firm can contribute in 
problem solution. T heory offers tbe simplifying fl1lmework by which the com· 
plexities of evet)·.day reality can be reduced to understandable, mC"Olningful, and 
relevant rebtions. 
II. T H E THEORY FRAM EW O RK 
There should be no need for lengthy discussion of theory of the firm as 10 
irs COntent and mC"Olning. Rather, the task here is to explain the applic:uion :lnd 
co demonstl1lre how the necessary and sufficient conditions of the Hicksian model 
specify the requirements for organization of the tenant opentcd firm. From these 
requirements one c;!n deduce the procedure for determining rent, whether shate 
or cash. 
The relevant economic model is th.t of a firm maximizing its net income. 
It should Ix noted, further, that there is need for a qU:lntity of resources suf-
ficient to provide a flow of income large enough for some such purpose as sup-
porting a family. But, capital is limited, so that only th~ I1Itios of marginal re-
turns to marginal costs are C<juated.' 
The owner-oper:lted firm cannOt serve lS " model for organil~tion of the 
tenant operated farm firm or suffice for testing between ,enure groups as ro d-
ficiency in use of resources. Owner-operators depat! ftom the efficiency condi· 
tions. Two samplcs of farms may tCSt the same Ot significantly differ~nt, and the 
analyst has no idea whether one or the other deparrs further from optimum 
combination unless optimum combinations arc ClIlculat~d for each group. But 
the concept of the owner·operated farm, debt fte~, is useful in that it has none 
of the built·in errors which may arise fr()m terms within a lease. 
'fat cm.il .", H;cks. V,l"" HId Cspiw; .,peci>.ll, Ot.p'" VI. H<tdy. &0""";00 of Agriculrun! Pr0-
d"","", oru! Rc>OW« u .. , p." II: Put Ill: Inc Chop<cn:ro 1.,1 11, lvIs<, Pri<c F1<>rbi).<y ond emplo:>yrr __ 
W.;"lnub, Pri« Th«><y; (hoP'"" 1.0<14. l<rr.icb. n.. f,ic< s,-."", lIId ~ Alloation, 
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T~ o"'ner~perltcd firm, for example. s\lggesI' the b:lSis for de3ling .... ;,h 
problems of rhe di~ision in mana8C'mcnr ~[Wcen landlord and leNIn{. 1"he eff«t 
of mana8cmen( sho ... s up i,,! Ihe eo.rnings of faClOIS in combination. An owner· 
op=r:lfor (cnuq>reJ\cur ) bend;ll fro m and pays Ihe c()Sts vf his 0",'" d«isions. 
The problem of tenancy ;s to fe-ward Ihe tWO parries for the relative vaJ\lcs of 
Ihe managcmcru decisions they make, indcpendcnd)' andlor jointl)', Joint de-
ciJions crear<: no difficuh iej. opera'ionally. SO long II both pmies Ippr«iue d>e 
ea;.nomics of the pauicular d«is;on involved. (I ... ·O puties can agree upon an 
C'ITOf in reasoning). h ;s lugel)' {he indo/nden. decisions. and p:uticubrly I~ 
of the oper:lfor ,,'110 assumes entrepreneurship fot rhe tenam-op...,,,,,:d firm. IN! 
(aUK <rouble. Alfenrion is devoted r" Ih~ lall,", in ,he diKussion.> 
The full set o("re<:juired" conditions (or the tenam-opcrued firm simply 
sp«ifin rhe fl'luioru ",hieh olief landlord and !enan! <~ .,.me incentivn as an 
o"'ncr·opcrafor (i,e .• • n enl<eprencu<) "'ould have in running his business /Or 
profit. Beyond the efficienC)' and stability conditions (H ides), these arc, as enum· 
C1":Ire<!.nd diso1$$M in 10 ..... Ag<kulruf':ll Expc<iment St:lti"n Bullet;n 416: 
I. the shue or variable input muSt equal the shl<<: of outpm obt.inW from 
i,; 2, shues of all prodU(u m\l$< be <he same; 3, each rc5O\lrce o .... net mUSt ~ 
a:ivc: the fuU slu.rc of the product earned by each unil of reKourcc he ((lnnibur~; 
2nd, 4. 11K rcsoutCC owner must have opportunit}' 10 r~ive rentrn on invnlmcnr 
made in oroc: prodl)('(ion period b\lt nOl forthcoming \lmil 2 ~\lbs.cquem period. 
In :addilion, Heody and Egben have suUes.ed that s\lfficiem opiral to operarc 
ellm;,'Cly is one of rlu! neccsury tondirions_.nd one cannot but agrrc." 
Need of provisions for compensarion for imp<ovc:mcnts rhat arc unexhausrro 
. at termirut;on date arises (rom: 1. the defin;" time (overa.! by Ihe agreemcnI-
usually One crop year; Z. thc neceuity of inveSlmcn< inpurs on a continuing 
buis; .nd, 3. , m, faCI Ihu length of leose. !ength of production pctiod, length 
of ""'!pUt effect of selected inputs, and !englh of pbnning horizons for tm, f"'O 
panics wilh rcsp«1 to the agreemen< i<self do nO{ nccasarily coincide. Compen· 
sation provisions are a means CO achieve the ir'ICem;vc: condition numba 4 :Wove. 
Whether the COSI .,( a specific input is shared or is paid by One party ""ill in· 
IIllCf'ICe rm, amO\lnr of compensation needed. bur docs nOr change {he need for 
((lmpcns.tion provision. And the need ex!S1S .... hcther the input is fairly shorr· 
run such as fertilizer (b\l t lonser than the lease period) 0< is • longrun Orlc sucil 
as buildings or fences thn contribute to crop or livestock produclion. Theory 
mc:rcly specifies the re<:juirements <hat compenS:ltion provisions mUS! meet 10 
achieve psrticulsr r~uhs. Determining the content anu details of provisions is 
a compullltion·negc,t;at'on job, for rhe ume <csulu may ~ obuincd by differ· 
ent mcaru. 
' 10 brief. ,~."""'" 01 """"" '" ............... ;" ..... Ii..,.,.....;' on ........ mpcion rbi, ,10< .. ,..,........ 
f"O"idn ,he al"w,nd ,10< .''''''''.''''"'. ",d r«<i .... F"P"'''' in ,he pcoIi" d ,10< Iirm. 4bo< .. "'«<I.,. 
~~ ... I f """""' ..... , ........ .,., tu...J, ,...,. !OO .'" paid • ~~ ... ..wy. 
~, Heod) .nO E&b<", .... Joppl""tiotI d Li"", Progotomi"3 .. T<><;", Effi.:;.,.q of Lt:ui", S" ....... 
-[oo.~ St.t< CtoJI'F }<rJ:ruJ ol~. Vol. ,}. :-:" '. N~ 11. '9:19. P. ,,,·,60. "DiIW<tom "' otpia.! 
.ppesr to b< .. impo«'"'" I<.~ ... <On"",", in a"''''1 .. nOlO ""n",,,,.,,,. to b< ""'!lin"', .. ___ , 
bcfo, .... ,..,.", .nO _ " 
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from the efficiency, snbi1ity. and incentive conditions one an prOCeN di· 
r«tly to the basic relations to be achi~ved in sharf r<"tlla l$. In brid. thC$e are: 
The share of fix(d COStS = the shire of V1I.riablcs COSts = tM slure of retums. 
In fimber detail: Different fix(d COIiU :lIe paid by ClOch party; COSt ci land is bal· 
anced against COSt of Jabor and machinery, e.g., to :achieve sharing of total bed 
costs. BUI each variable COSt is shared; vatiable COS[$ are not balanced agai!t$1 
ClOch other, nor again'St a fixed COSt. Each sc:pa~le form of rerum (i.e., c:ach J>lO' 
duct) is shared the same, and all products arc shared. This follows because the 
efficiency and Stability conditions specify the rei1!ions in the optimum ptltClTl 
of resoun;:e combination for any firm , and the incentive conditions spedfy the 
rel;adons .... hich prompt maximi~arion of firm income t:lther rhan that of diller 
tenant or landlord alone. for emphasis and completeness of concept here I ad:! 
that in the equating of fixed , variables. and returns, the consumption faeces 
(especially and usually the rcsideocc) arc $Cparated and handled apart from the 
production facets, and those overh~d cosu which do not affcci outpUt arc ex· 
c1uded from the calculation of shne of fixed inpu ts.' 
Thus, determination of slure rent becomes a C1kulation in .... hieh pal"tles 10 
the agreement make estimates and judgments in a specified ft:lmework. This is 
the case of uncertainty, as conttaSted with the perfect knowledge assumption of 
tM striCt Hicksian model. Also, the supposoecllimitations of the static model are 
removed by using discounted values (whether single or multiple VlIlue expecta· 
tions) and designating as diffa<"tlt faCtors the unit of factors applied in different 
time periods. 
A number of observations may be made about the eqWlting of share of fum 
fixed with share of variables with share of returns-which equating is rcparod 
fat each production period: 
1. Each resou.rce owner receives the earnings of the rCS()urces he contributes, 
regatdle$S or the levcl of intensity of opetation$. llIat is, the resource Otllfla re-
ceives the marginal v,uue product of his resource whetha the farm is operated 
at its opfimum combination Ot a long WI)'S from it. So long as a good job is 
done in pricing the fixed inputs, and in selecting the <juatlrities of them to use 
in combination, each fWty receives the full benefit5 of both his fixed and vari· 
able inputs. There art no income transfers between parties. (This is subjeCt 10 
the limitation Stated in observation 2) , 
1. Adcqu1lc form of compensation arrangement must be made for resources 
which arc: unexhausrcd and immOVlble 11 termination. 
3, T .... o parries can arrive at the share they wish, by shifting ownership of fU<ed 
!e$Oun;:es, or by cash payment for use of fixed resources furnished by the other 
",,~. 
' Soor: ,.",....,. T"""...a """"- "-"' ..... ""'" eo...;. f<m'I v........,.. .. aad Rcnc1l Dnamino· 
....... J-ywJ 01 f<m'I ~ N<n, 1m. 
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4, The t~nanr or the bndlord can be rewarded for SUp<'rior management bi' 
l!nting management as a fixed input and pumng an opportunity cos( evahu· 
flon on i(. 
5. bch party h~ fixed resour<es that create prublems in ,·alu.tion. Bur at the 
same time, the division of these inpurs bel ween parties Set! up (he possibility 
for bargaining effe.:ri\"ely. in that ea<h Ius something to balance against the rCo-
sollrces of the other parry. 
6. Ag(eement can be made for one part )' to bur the mhe('s sha(e of specified 
product. at an agreed pri<e. "'ithout disturbing the economics of the whole ar· 
{angement 
7. Fixed inputs furnished by the landlord and contributing to OUfpllt of produCt 
in which he docs nOt share the returns-for example. the buildings furnished by 
the landloard for li"cs(ock owned by {he (ell1nt, rna)' and mUSt be handled by 
separate and distiru;t ~rulalion. These fixed cosu an: exdll<ied from the ",Icub· 
cion of shares of fi(m fixed COSIS. Essentiall)", Ihis 's the Same idea as IWO diff",· 
em plams making up a firm, or in other words, the opera lOr runs t":O separacc 
bUl rel~ted businesses. 
8. The sharC'l are independent of product prices .nd of vari.ble COSts . The shan: 
refie.:ts direcdy the portion of firm fixed costaS5umed by one P"rty. Effect of 
clunge in product prices and in COStS is taken are of by the lWO parriC'l Ihrough 
dedsion IS to (he 'luami,ies of variabks (0 usc: and (hus as to volume of outpUt. 
If adjustment Or ~clll ation of share of fi xed COSt is done for each production 
period, and agrttment is n:ached upon 'luamities for v:ui:lbles. the lease tenns:ue 
automalially adjusted to changing prices and COSts. 
The Cash Lease 
Re<:Juirem.ents for the ash le..se ~ the same as those for share leasc:s, :l5 to 
rhe efficiency. stability and incentiv~ conditions. Beyond these. the guide to rent 
derermiru.tion is for rhe ash n:nral to e'lual the marginal value product of the 
resource involved. Again, sep"tate calcularion should be mide for rhe consump" 
tion f:ac~u, and ou(pur.increo.sing overhead com should be disringuished from 
O"erhead firm CO.>tS which are no! outpUt increasing. 
Under cash rent the tenam pays 211 V'iriabk COStS, re(eiv~s all earnings of 
the firm. and pa)'S the COStS associated with the fi"ed resources he furnishes. 
Although it is feasible and possible for the ten~ nt to rent machinery and even 
livestock from the landlord, usually it is only land and buildings for which he 
pays a cash rental. I mention these others to indiate that there is nothing in 
theory to suggest that ash remi l musr be: limited to land and buildings. ~ 
principles .n: exactly (he same when applied to orher fixed inputs. HowC"Ver, dis--
cussion is confined to (he rental of land and buildings. 
The farm operated und~r cash (~m automatically meers the four incentive 
conditions. if rhe tent approximates the muginal value productS of land and 
buildings. Payments above or belo ... · rhe matginal value product wi]] result in 
income transfers bctv.-een p"!""1iC'l, or if seriously OUt of line from rhe cerunt's our· 
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look, may tn('OUL':lgc pnuices that knowingly result in resource depletion, Abo, 
t ile fact [hat cuh rem is a fi xed chuge for the (erunt, to be p::Iid reg:udlCSl of 
kvel of income (unless there is agreement to a sliding sak cuh rrot) putS the 
burden of risk on the telUnt. These arc merely characterisrics of the cuh 10K; 
ho ... 'C"'er, they do not inHuenee or change the basic requirements or the nUIlJ'l: 
of the problem in nlcubting a rental. They do sugge5t, ho ... cver, the necessiq> 
for the twO part iC'l to agr<:c upon a level of opcL':l tion for the firm, as a part of 
the rent ClIkuluion process. The reason for doing so, from a theory viewpoint, 
is thar the earning of any resource used in combination is a function of the orhcr 
resources combined wi th it. The marginal value product of land is known to 
vary with the intensity of irs opef'a rion. 
T he Share·Cash Lease 
The necessary and sufficient conditions arc the same :1$ those for the sh:m: 
lcuc and the c:ash lease. The basic relation 10 be achieved in the rrotal calcula· 
lion is a combination of rhose for the different types of lease. For the portion 
of the business tl\u is shared by the IWO p::Irries the share of fixed (OSI = the 
share of variable com = the share of reru.ms. For the portion of the business in 
which cash ren t is p::Iid for one or more fC$OUree, the cash rental muSI approxi. 
marc the marginal value producl of the resouree. There arc difficulties 01 esti· 
mation involved in the caJculation.ru:goti.uion ptOCCS$, and it nuy wdl be :ugual 
tlult there will be imperfccrions regardless of the care exercised. It nuy be aruga! 
further that the share·cash lease is an improvision in practice ro take arc of 
those instances in which one Or the other pany is unable or unwilling to par. 
ti(ipuC in all of the activities. Neverthelen, theory offers guides, which, if used 
and unde,.,tood, would serve to decrease many of the dissatisfactions now 0(. 
pressed by both landlords ~d tenants. Appreci~ tion for the economics of cash 
~nr::ab for buildings used in prodUCtion, scp::lt:ltC and distinct from land, for 0(. 
amplc, might serve to get mo~ investment in necessary buildings and dccrcuo: 
the cosNhifcing prlCli(e of "rUing care of buildings" by (buging ocessi~ rem 
on hlY and p::Isrure. 
Theory o f Faccor Valuation :IS Related to 
R ent Determination 
Ev1iuarion of v:lriable inputs causes no difficulties in rent determination. 
There are decisions to be made as to qUlntities and qualities, but prices are taken 
:1$ given in their markets. This refe'" to those inputs that are always Vcati1bles-
fertilizer, psoline, tL':lctor fuel, insecticides, and the like. All 1fe Output incre1.l· 
ing, and most of them arc used up within one produCtion period. Some variable 
inputs, :IS fcrtili~ct, for example, may have catry-over value. For these:, some dif· 
ficulties in valuation may arise at t ime of lease termination-or at the time the 
kasc is negotiated-but the difficulty as such stemS from lack of =hnial knowl· 
ed~ about arry-over. 
Nor should the flCt rh1t selccred YUiablC'l are often used in limited ranscs 
that hIve been found to be worbble by long pr:w:ri<e in 1 given :uea, be illow· 
" 
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ed to confuse: Ihe issue of the fixed_variable «>mplex. I refer, fOf cnmple, to {he 
practice of appl)'inS a sp«ified quami!}' of a (nee ckmen! in f,rtillzer, or 10 \lS-
ing a w~-spr.ay U 1 determined r2tc. In short, no vuiablc kromes a fixed in-
PUI simp!)' beausc ;1 is !imitro in quantity. 
u.nd, building~, operator hoot, and management arc the facton that ha'll: 
the more difficult evaluation problems associalt<i with them. Their evaluation i.I 
critical and croc;.] in .he rent dct<'1minat;on procc:ss, beause as srated above, the 
sharing of COSts of fi~ed resources is t he key to (his major problem in tenancy. 
From ,he ChCOl}' viewpoint, about all Inll nC'Cds to be said hcre IS 10 open;-
ror b.bor and ItUM8mlcm is Ihal the opponuni()' COSt concq>' provides a gWd: 
10 uSC in Ihe demminacion proem. The theory 1$ such auscs less difficulty than 
dOd the (uk of appl)'ing it. Admiltedl)', the opporlunitr COSt Qf a &Cto. is ~ao 
if rher~ is no ah~rnative use (or Ih~ rnources. And, rher~ ma)' be d~bare IS 10 
whether rhe wirhin fum environment, or wilhin (1rming, at rhe whok range of 
economic a1tenutives is rhe suit1ble n~~ l belr opportunity. H~rt rherc atc prob-
lcms in judgmcnr. Whlll. for e~ample, is Ihe buis for d~termining Ihe COSI of 
oper:llor labor in an HC. in ""hich there ar~ many off fum and nonfarm ",.00; 
opporrunities 11 "''1ge rates .,:~ll abov~ those being paid fOr hired farm IIboren~ 
Abo, ... ·hal is rhe line of dcm:lralion bcnr.-een b.bor as such in lhe performa.rott 
of IISks rhar mru~ Cl)nlin\lO\U e~ercise of judgmenr? Abour all rh .. C:lr1 be uid 
~ ,hat thc ,-:uuc 01 labor an be at neirher of .he extremes of a1.enurivC$ lvail· 
able. Th~ belr rlnr ean be done is to make rcaSOn:lbJ~ judgmenr as TO whal con-
stirutes an opporrunit), COst. Like""ise, Iher~ may be few alternuivt,'S to gi~ rca· 
sonabk ~slimare of the v:l lllc of rhe m1nagemenl input. None·rhe-less each of 
twO thinking parties should be able <0 urive at esrima<C$ of COSt of input of 
labor and of management .hrough Ihe opportunity COSt concept.' 
Valuation of buildings to dcterminc annual COSt has no knotty lheory as· 
pects. Thae are difficuhics of judgmenr. decisions as to rare of deprttiation, and 
the n«as;rr of distinguishing bc-r""cen depreciarion, annual upkeep, and ;m· 
prO"crncn! COSts. T here is nc<cuity for handling rhc probkm of valuuion o( 
rhe residence (a consumption good) scpararcly from the production faCt()f$. 
Further, one can note the nc<;asiry of Vllluation in terms of Ihe farm as I fum-
Ihe value !!l Ihis given business-rarher !hll n value in some orher firm. Here, 
parr of Ihe problem of valuation is tied up ""ilh Ihe problems of 111OC:lling Ie> 
50UKes between firms. For e~ample, a machine shed and shop Iha! is suitable 
(or combin:llion .... ith a 1000 acre spread is dc<idedly undcrutilize<l if combined 
... ·ith O'Iher rCSQur(CS on a l()().acre spra.d; and rhe owner of such building can· 
not expect the 1000 aen: valuation to apply in the loo-acrc unit. 
There ~ no poil\! in arguing as 10 which of the faaon has rhe leaSt pcrfca 
market; but the (onr(1St between mukct1 for mOSt of the fixed inpulS ':lnd mar· 
kers for {he variable inputs is at leasl to be mcndc.ned. The land market sWld$ 
our noticeably as one charac[~rize<l by rdatively low rate of rurnover, lack of 
'$«: S<4I<t. Tho n-r at ""'<. Clu.p<<< VII. 
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srandardizarion and graw-tion, buyer and seller familarity with mainly local con· 
ditions, overlapping of lack of recognized market are:lS, and the almost universal 
tendency of packaged deals-Ihar is, wilh farms sold as unilS combining land 
and other factors. 
Contr:ary to classic theory, I see no separate. crudal, or especially difficu lt 
valuation problem as such arising from the fact that land, no mmer ho"" de· 
fined, is immobile and oc<upies a given location on rhe earth's surface. This 
simply becomes one of ,he characleristics of the factvr; it is immobile. Part of 
'he troubles of the classic concept arise from defimlion alone. The cbssic and 
neo.dassic definition of land as space simply does not lend itself to mini pub.. 
tion in production economics. Particularly, the distinction between man·made 
and natUfll l char:acteristics side·tracks the valuation problem, if for no other good 
and sufficient renon than that no one can distinguish between what is man· 
made and what is a "gift of nature" in other than the space characteriStics. 
land must be defined in lerms which dC$C!ibe it as a faoor. This does nOt 
dCfly the neccssiry of or substirure for other definitions in other prvblem settings. 
There may be need, for eXimple, for a special definirion of land in rhe legal 
$O:tting, including inheritance and transfer. Bur, in production economic rerms, 
factors are disdnguishcd from each other on the basis of substirurability. Tech· 
niGllly, different qualiti<,!; or grades of bnd, within the same firm, are different 
factors-an acre of non·tillable pasture is not the same as an acre of rotation 
cropland. There is no conceptual problem here, but, of course, in practice thm 
is the necessilY of dassifiution in terms which make possible the working OUt 
of farm plans Ihat make full use of the different grules. And it follows that thc 
nurkct value of rbe land in the farm un it becomes the sum of the values of the 
quantities of the different gr~des. The "cost·pricing" in rhe rent derermin~tion 
process can lake comparable form. 
Estimates can be made of reasonable marker value for agricultural pu!p05CS, 
in terms of community judgments as to Iype and inten5ity of use. Such deci· 
sions are being made, daily, by others than real eHlue lIppraiseIS. And tWO parties 
should be able to agree upon an appropriate earning rare tCo rransbte the pres""! 
value into an annnua] 005'. 
What more might be said is spelled OUt in considerable detail in an avail. 
able publie:lrion, from which I quore a definition of {,,,,d. "For purposes of 
"",luation, farmland is defined here in rerms of unit arC1. It includes ,be natural 
resources (fertility, structure, and topography) and rhe added ph)"SiCli l inputs 
incorporared with and inseparable from it. It varies through time (between pro-
ducnon periods) wirh use and trC1tment. land is a genus, made of specie grasses 
or grades. land is distinct from such strucrural fe:ltures as buildings and fences, 
but is inseparable from such incorporated improvements as tile dr:ain or absorbed 
labor. Distinction must be made also between land and w:l.ter, at leaS! in surface 
arca5 of Streams and lakes, but nor in water coment or holding capacity of soiL 
The essemial distinctions are between land, re:ll CSrate, and other Glpit:al goods-
nOt between man·made characteriStics and phenomena of narure, because within 
" 
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limits man an (hange the characteriseics of land. In any signi/iC1lnt economic 
sense, land is a form of npiraJ." · 
This brief discussion of ehrol')" artempo fO bring together Ihe main and par-
ticularly ,de"lne points. A few rderences have been made Tv discussions in the 
r.:adill- 1,'aibbk Jircr1ture. I ha~'c been col1$cious of the advice of the Evalua-
rions Committee. November 10, 1960, rhal "Effons should be made to discour-
age lengthy treatment of ... ·idel)' accepted principles of lheory and research 
methodology ","hieh is available in rcxrbo<>ks and !csacch bullerins and w~ich 
has flu unique applinrion to the problem afeu being dixuSRd. Ob'-;ousi)', re-
ferences 10 rdC'\-am mUMais of this narure aro~ high1r d.esi .... b!e ... If I have tfrtti 
in either direclion it rna)" be attributable to m)" judgment-or this may be ~ ~. 
flenion of the he~lthy slifferences of profe$Sion~1 opinion reg~rding wh~t are 
rele~-:tnt mueri~b. For ex~mpJe, IS to the di$(V.ssion o f v:uue of fixed reSO\lrccs, 
I S\lggeSt that e~planltions of indifference, preference and taste, which are to be 
found in the Iirer:uure, Ire pertinent to rhe tuk ~l hand, for they do provide 
fO\lndation for the applicnion of theor}' of value in rhe pncrinl $CHing; b\l' 
these are sufficiently accepte<i. T hey nnd no ci tation. 
111. APPU CATlON OF THE THEORY 
Share Rent 
Taking share of fixed", share of variables", share of returns u the guide, 
determining the rental b«omes a problem in (1) pricing the fixed faCtors, and 
(2) deciding on quantities of them that each party will s\lpply. Attention musr 
also be gi,·en to necessary iUIlO\lntS of ,",riables ro apply to the fixed input$. The 
lease is incomplete without agr«ment on size of busineu, qu~nrities of s-elecred 
inputs s\I,h as fertilizer, and decision as to division of managemem responsi· 
biliry-. B\lt fur p\lrpose of explanation here, a$Sume thn t ..... o parries have s"u· 
ficienr a.pit:tJ to operare \lncler a Soet of pr::ao:ices which give returnS above COSts. ,. 
It is beside the point whether either must borrow fund$ fur the )·or's oper:llion 
-beca\lSC' interest on bono"·ed "pial reduces personal and ner income, but does 
nor affect gross. It is the gross rerums that are divided in the wne percenl1ge as 
fixed costs are shared. How do the IWO calculate the fixed costs? I shall discuss 
this in &idy b!"02<l rerms, with onl)· enough deail to indicate what is to be done 
regarding tbe inputs ,,·jth the most difficult valuation problems-land, build· 
ings, operator labor and management. 
Pricing t~ /..4,," Il1plll 
In the long·om and \lnder competition (which need nOt be perftet) the 
marginal Yllue product of land", value of marginal product of land ", the em-
'flOm: On Tho Th<ocr ofEvalw.<in. Formw.l 1». til< 1_ "'~ Un.i .... Su"" 0.".,. ...... , oJ 
"&ri<vl ...... "'~ K.....u s.mu. W......, ........ D.C.. "'''-;1 1m. 
" Th.;' ...... """ "' ...... ,he probI. ", oI .. 1<cbon at ponio<o. ! ... ""'" ..... , <h< .. Io<tion .... _ modo 
..... tlI\ar. """""'''''''' .....,.;.,., OIl cYcIobtitl. the _ 
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nomic rtn! "" fhe comract rem = rhe annual (OSt of I:lnd. TM prest nt aopital 
nlut " .. ould be tbe sum of rbe discounted annud earnings. In che short run, and 
under e!tisting conditions of the market there may be doubrs as to the actual 
figure for any and all of these va lues. The question is one of how an the best 
possible estima'cs be RUde. 
In spire of the many weaknesses of the land market, including the practice 
of pricing f:ums as whole units rather than pricing land by itself as one of the 
conSli tuents in a package, whal happens in the muket is one of the ,f.Iides ro 
pricing bnd in tile rt'nt determination process. Admilredl)' , Ihue is a dearth of 
information. One is nOI certain that quoted market nlues a~e a reflcction of 
1CtU11 sales, of ulcing, DC offering prices. Nonc-lhe·less, both landlords and !ell. 
anu have some .... orkable ideas on the level of exchange (marker ) values fOf 
land in a given community; there arc communiry judgments as to agriculrural 
vdues. Workable comparisons arc made be",'een !1.rrtU of different sizes, vary-
ing qualities, with differenr setS of buildings, 10e-:llions, and the like. 
Recourse to use of market nlues requires that the ['1,'0 p2-rties concerned in 
a rent)1 determination probe the situation and make a thoughtful anal ysis of the 
particul:u property, in terms of nlue for agriculrural purposes, uninlluenced by 
sa le possibility fo, urban development or such. From the framework of theory, 
tnc owncr who chooses to ICflI his land for agricultural purposes .... hen its sak 
nluc pocenw.1 far exceeds its VJluc for farming has )Irctdy made a choia: which 
says, in short, rlut he is willing to forgo the mort umlcrive money offer; and if 
he knows an)' economics ar 111, he should know that a given acre of land will 
produce the same niue or corn (when the land is combined with other produc, 
lion inpuu) ",'herher it is priced at one dollar DC a thousand, per acre. 
One solution to the problem of Jand p riCing, Ihcrtforc, becomes an analysis· 
negotiating procns in which the landlord and the tenant examinc the probable 
nw-kel value of the land in che given &rm, and agree upon a price which ... -ou1d 
rdlect willing buyer, will ing seller rclations. Admittedly th('r(: is a f:Udy broad 
n.nge .... ithin which the aCtual n lue may thus be determined; but it i$ ro be 
remembert'd that when translated in the annual CO$t terms, ... ·jth a discount n.tc 
of , percent, the estimated value ha$ 10 chan8e 20 dollars to eff«t one dollar 
in annual COSt pcr acre. 
Suppose that twO parties have a good set of £:arm rcco,<u, and that the level 
of operation for the firm is one in .... hich mention hu been given to the quanti-
ries of nriables to be: used, so thac the inpuu are in balance as to requirod 
amounU-and no fixed input such :u machinery is out of line. The twO would 
then be in a good position 10 perform the bnci pricing task. The), ... 'OUid already 
have made some estimale of the COSt of land, ot used $Orne valuation fi8ure to 
measure the land input. In short, it is impossible ro make a complete CQS[·re-
turns m,remem .... ithout fi8ures for e:ach input. There would be additional use-
value in rhe f:itm r«ords daa, ho .... ever, in that those data provide informacion 
for the two parties as to rlItC o f earning in the firm. 
In sum, about the best that any twO parties can do in estimating the CO$I 
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of the land mput is to explore quite full)' the implications of opportunity COSI. 
I have d<:$Cribed how rhe additional acre_additional_return estimating procedu~ 
can be used. in How Much for l-Iore L:and. lOll/a Farm Srima, Augusi. 1~8. The 
reasoning in it i5 the same a5 Ihat abov,.. 
What about the circularit)· of reasoning. in looking at market va lue and 
applying an arbitrary percentage ro estimate the C05t of the 1nnual land input> 
[s there any more circular reasoning on the land pricing than is involved in or 
.... ith other &.ctors? For the mputs wirh wdl orgmized markets (the variable in-
pUts). marker prices are raken as given and the quantities applied or uscd are a 
function vf rheir effecrs on earnings in the firm . The qucstion of price of the in_ 
PUt at the time of rhe input is subordinare to the quesTion of quantity. It mUSt 
be sccn. however. that for the variable inputs tOO, there is a relarion bet\\'<:a1 
the prices today and the costS of prodUCing them as faetors, and tha' their COStS 
are influenced br changes in rechnvlog)·. quantities demanded. supplies l v::lilable 
- in shon:. the ,,'otking of a competitive market situation. 
For rhe fixed !!Iput, bnd, theor)' of faCtor value 5lIj's that we look at the 
flo'" of income over a period of years and discC'>unt that fh,w (0 determine a 
prescnt value. W e kno'" that market prices differ from this "capitali2ed value" 
but arc supposedly related (0 the income flow_ For the variable input we look 
at the immediate and short.run effect and accept the current market prices-and, 
in doing so. assume an instantaneous ad justment of factor price, which assump-
tion is comp.rabk with the instlntane{>us adjustment assumed in the static 
equilibrium situaci<,n. It appears <0 me rhat the charge of circularity has been 
over.emphasi2ed for land and rhe existence of rhe same t)'pe of circularity for 
shorr-run inputs has nOt been recognized. Presumably there is no more circularity 
of reasoning in charging land at COSt ro the firm than in charging other inpurs 
at COSt. The t(\C.t of the problem rests in determining COSt to the firm. 
In the opportunity COSt sense, making use of reasonable market value for 
the specific f~rm does not quite complete the circle of reasoning. That is, one 
does nC'>{ gc, all the w:l)' through the proc,,"ss of cakulating a flow of income, dis-
counting that flow, determining a present marker value, and Then taking a per_ 
centage of it as an es<imat" of COSt _ Rather. one tll kes an atimate of reasonable 
value of this specific property. and applies a percent to it as an estim:He of C(,St . 
The nec~ssi r)' for doing so arises from the absence of a COSt figure for land as 
specific as is that of sn per tOn for a fertili~er of a particular mix. 
Admittedl)" usc of current estimates of market value of land, even with the 
cautions extended above as to v,!.lue for agricultural purpvses and value of this 
given fann, are subject to error. This results from current and past faults in the 
operarion of the land marker. It can be est:l.blished that CUrrent matket prices of 
fannland reflect more than land e:ilnings. Data on be assembled to demonstrate 
that some of the advanrages of technology have been and arc bcing capit:l.lized 
intO land v::llues. Therefore, use of curtent land values would give the landowner 
advantage in the negotiating process, and would bui ld into the lenral determi_ 
nacion process even more rhan exists currently the present faults in the Structure 
of land values. 
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With sufficient utcntion to the tuk of !:and pricing by the eomraeting 
panics, most of the dil&ulries call be overcome. The effcl::[s are Strongest in the 
short-om. Alld, remcmber that cosu are calc ... bled each year. By the time dUI 
mallY l1l1dlords alld tetull[$ do use the cllrul1rion procedure, abetted by thc faCt 
chat some of the ~mc problems are present with the (osting of the operator's 
I1bot, ... se of the ptocedure should telld to decrease the faultS of pricillg lalld, in 
practice. Tillt is, with carcfulattelltion to ((JJt of land U such, aw:ifeness of what 
happens [0 land prices calcubted with residual procedures, 21ld with careful 
balalleillg of inp ... ts ill the tellam.opcratC<l firm b ... sille$$, the major faults of 
pricing in the pn:seTlt land market could be alleviated and thus would CrettC flO 
special problem ill the relit delCrmining p1'ocess, 
P,.iri"g 1M BII;Id;ngJ and Olhtr SlnI(/lirallnpIIIJ 
Current pn ctices in real est1fe appraisal suggest usable procedures for de-
tcrmill,!!: "reasonable" values for b ... ilJings, Admittedly. the task is an applica· 
tion of judgment. CoSt of replacement millus deprcciarion is one g ... ide, Also, 
some of the rather standardiled tables which give squ:lte foot ",I ... es for differ· 
ellt SU\lCt ... res may s ... ffice to make the estimatc of present value. One questial 
(0 be allswered is that of adequacy for the farm b ... sincss-partic ... brly excess 
capacity, but abo on thc limitational side. The ctntt:ll ida is fOf the rwo panies 
to arrive at an estimate which refleCtS ",Iue to the firm. The pit-falls of extremes 
call be pointed out-e.g., value of a building to the firm is no! what the owner 
paid for it }O yeus :lgo, nor whu replacement would COSt today; the 'OIns""a 
ICStS in intelligellt judgment. Tr:.lnslating the present value into terms of annll1l 
COSt requires decision as to depre<iation, and attention 10 need for up-keep and 
repair. A careful estimue of repair COStS, with the expectation that such repairs 
will be ma<ic, may suhsritute fot and obviate the need of a <icpreciation figun:. 
Fences 1I1d other improvementS appear to offer no special Of difficult prob-
lems in pricing. Appraisal practices s"'Uest worbble guides to any twO parties 
who arc negotiating a lease. 
Pn'(il1g O,"alo, LAbor 
Li tlle more need be said th2n has bccn statcd in the theoty section. The 
tuk in determifling the Jabor input as a COSt is cssefltiaUy one of applying the 
opportunity COSt COflCCpt. For some, the level of w:ige rales in the community 
will suffice. For others, special consideration will need to be given 10 quality 
upecu-and the main diffie ... lty here would be in valuing the below.par labor 
inpUt, mha than that of the skilled worker. Some dill'irulty might arise in the 
j ... dgment process in disting ... ishiflg betweell quality performance of the labor 
input and the exercise of management as such, for timing is of the cssence in 
many operations and the selection of time is a management decision. But, sue· 
<tutUl farming practices in a community do carry some guides to labor require. 
mentS, including the q ... ality aspects. Operators arc known for their abiliries to 
get work dOlle, as well as (or their manilgement capabilities. T his knowledge 
can be applied in the tent determination process with corrections to be nude in 
it from yeu 10 )'CU. 
" 
MISSOUR! AGRICULTU RAL EXPERIMENT STATlO:-.r 
Obviously. evdu~tion of the bbor input is in terms of hOOr [0 be used-
no! nO:<:e55aril)' the: full lime: of an operonor. For the: crop-share: lea$(" pardculul)", this requ ires an esrimalc of the amount of time: <k-'ora:! [0 Or r«tuir~ for crop producdon-,,'hkh is a (l'2clion of the firm labor le<juirc:mcm ""hen the oper.!· lor !u.s livestock. NCSOI;1Iion betwC('n the rv,'O parties should be able to ('ncom-piSS the dct:l.ils such 2$ non-or olf· farm .. ,ork b}' the openlor. 
AddidolUl hi=! labor should o.U$C no problems. T IK: fUll·rime hired man 
can go in as a fisC'd COS! 11 his wage nHI: , for that portion of his lime develed 10 produ([$ .... hieh arc ,hued. Who pays Ihis fixed COSt is a <leduon 10 be mack 1»-the twO panin. II C:l.n be paid by either parr)", or shared. Tcmpor:u)' and dlY bbor is !O be treated as a variable, and rhus becomes a shared COSI. 
Priring fht M"n"gnnntl I"p" t 
The mod~J situation in leasing leaves (0 the opera tor moSt of (he day·to-d:ly decisions. An operator may also have quire complere decision making authority 
and be responsible for the firm :u a whole. At the olha extreme is the oper::I[OI" 
who curies Out the instructions of a landlord (usually a retired farmer). This difference in numbet of decisions b}· operators illustrates one facet of the man· 
agemenl input. Anorher is Ihe quality up«t. 
Treat ing management :u a fixed COS t has the effect of changing the sharing by changing the proponion of fixed cosu p:lid by one p:lrt)·. This is especially Ihe case for Ihe one pany in the agreement who supplies superior management. Thus, a c:tpable operator can be given a "high value" management input. This increases his share of fixed, his share of variables, and hi$ share of retUrns. If chc business is opa~ued 31 a profit. and is larger because of his management capacity, he is rC'l'-"lrdcd by the larger number of dollars of gross returns he receives. Like· 
wise:, if the rum operates at a l05s because of mOts in management dccisiOl'l, tRe dtcision maker suffers a luger pUt of the consequences (than if no "COUnt is 
taken of the management input) . 
The critical question is: Ho w do the twO parties pla(e a v:due on manage-
ment? Again, the ans"·er comes in terms of intelligent negotiations in which the m·o parties make use: of such informarion as: rates charged by farm manage· 
ment businesses: opponuniry COSt comparisons " 'i lh firms of the same size of business ,,·ith hired management; kno,,'ledge of community judgments of chc individuals involved. 
Pricing ,ht Input Df M.«hintry "nd Efllipmmt 
About aU th1t needs to be said additionally here is that a«ount should be 
made for both inadequa te and excess C2p:1city machines. The inadequa le IIl2' 
chiner}' si ruation, for special cases such as combining gnin or baling hay may be handled b )· machine!"}· hire as a variable COSI. An excess capacity machine, possibly u.sed by the Opcnoor to do custom work on Other farms, can be charged, pro-ran 10 me farm business for the time it is used. 
Replacement COSt minus depreciation, knowledge of sale values for u~ 
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.:<tuipment, plus ardUl sludy of nuchinery T<"quiremcncs for Ihe size, of busiMSS, 
should be suffieiem 10 handle mOSt of t he problems of mlChinery nluuion. 
The det:til of dccidinS upon a race of depreciation should Ix influenced by knowl. 
edge of us:tble life of the machine, and is a malter for negoliation. It should be 
nOted (hat this negotiation u well as the several other instances enUmer.lted 
above assumes that the tWO parries are actinB with knowledge and without par. 
ticubr Ixncfit of a;cessive bargaining po .... er. Estimates of rep;lir COStS are mctt 
difficul t than for buildings, bcnu5C of the unpredictability of breakage. But re-
pair costS might be estimated and enu:ted as a fixed cost, ",'ithout duplieating 
any of tnc deprecUtion (OSt. 
0,,," Fixn Com 
The remaining fixed inputs-largely o f the operating expense as vs. the in· 
vestment expense variety, should ouse no special problems. Kno .... ledge of the 
firm tequirements as to quantities, and .... ise use of information tha t js available 
on farming practices thaI pay in the community sllould serve as guides to nuke 
the necessary decisions. Further, it may be n6tcd that in a fe .... of {hel-( other 
fixed t;OSU there is opportuni ty for the t .... o Pl'rt1es to do 5()me Shifting and agltt· 
ing as to who furnishes parliculars, jf they wish to arrive at a given sharing It· 
nngement. 
Applic;aion of lime results in an OUtput effect lasting for sevenl years, and 
oftm Ix),ond the length of Irase. For one production period and (or rene deter· 
mination, there u e morc reasons to handle thi s as a fi xed than as a variable COSt. 
Obviously, both p;irties benefit from the input ... ·hen the outpUt is shared. Also, 
the whole input COSt is paid in year I, and the OUtpUt (return) is sprC\l.d over 
rnrs 1 to ,. Inrerest on tnc pro-rated charges for yeats 2 to 5 is cost. Lime COSt 
plus application COSt plus co mpound interest on be divided into .:<tual yearly 
amoun15. Tht pc:rtinent <jue$tion IS-Who Pays! 
The estimated COSt of bnd as an input 5uppo$edly does not include the 
periodic input of lime. W hen treated as a $epanle input. lime COSt can be p;iid 
by either parey, or shared. If shartd, the sharing. can be in any proportions de. 
sin:d, and this COSt then is the same :IS that of any other fixed inpu t in determin· 
ing the sharing of fixed inputs in the firm. If shared, tn' if paid eneirely by the 
opcnttn', there is need for compc:nsation provision. 
One easy and workable answet would be 10 lime a fifth of the land each 
)'nr (assuming lime hu a five ynr effccr and then mU5( be repelted). The same 
rcuoning applies to rock phosph2te. Htre .pin. as I undcnund the technology, 
some "minimwn" quan tit)' of phosphate avaib.bility is a necessity but additional 
amounts do not increase OUtpUt. 
What abou t conservation practices- the ones that eithtr incre;.sc outpUt (as 
water spre;.ding struCtures) or ptevent soil losses and thus prevent decline in 
produCtivity (or prevent inCteascd cost of production through use of more £cr. 
(ililer to ger the same OUtpUt)! These tOO become inscpatllbly associated with 
the land over. rime period. As a type, these can Ix handled the same as lime-
c~cept for the annual up-keep COSts. Installation on be handled as a fixed COSI, 
and up-keep :IS a variable. 
~hssoUli AGR[CULTURAL ExPl!l[WI!NT STAT[ON 
T he Sharing of V2ri~b]e Cost$ and Rerucns 
As alre..dy indica[~, assuming sufficiem di$C\lssion and agrttmem ~ 
[he [wo pani0:5 as [0 ]C"'el of oper:uions and size of busineu, md a cardul de-
termination and agreemenl of rhe shue of fix~ COSt thaI each is 10 pay, Ihe 
major problem of rem~1 determination is solved. The shue of fixed COSI b«om0:5 
[he sh1fe of variable COSIS Ihat each pays (respectively) and also becomes rhe-
share of relurns he receives. T his proportion o.n be whuever il ma)·. depending 
upon the kinds and amounts of fixed inpuTS that the t,,·o agrtt upon. Bul. in 
practice, it ",ill probabl}' suffice 10 work Wt Ihe pcranragcs in some round num· 
bers, in terms of 9' percenr :accurag·. 
The«: are elementS of bargaining in ,he process u desc:ribed. Each party has 
some fixed resource to balaocc against thaI of ,he olher. 1bcre are judgmmtS to 
be mllde. And miSlakes will be made in the process. But, a careful analysis by 
Ihe IWO panics should resul! in a workable arran~ment. If the twO appreciate 
the nature of the economic rcaroning involved, rhey should be hippie! wilh the 
results and :achieve beller ,0:51,1115 m:,ltl they can by any haphazard dependence on 
CUSlom. 
For cmphuii I add Ihal ~11 variabl~ COSIS 1Ssociarcd wirh Ihc product5 
which are shared mUSt be shared. Gnnr...! , th" twO p:lnies may Igrt( ,har one 
... ilI pa.y a gi"en number of dollars for one itcm, to balancc against a determined 
ouelar for anolhe. ",-riable, if and when .he amounlS are agrttd upon-nor thar 
one will par Ihe COSt of an input of a variable ""thout specifying the quanli!}, 
thereof. Sut Ihis has encely rhe same effccl as if each paid a share of e:ach va.i· 
able COSI. The point 10 be messed is Ihat variables cannOI be shared differential. 
ly, with no agrttmem on quantities. ,,·;thoul eff= on eilher Ihe level of opem. 
lion of the firm or income transfers between panies. 
Do:termining The Ouh Rent 
Much of ... ·ha, has btcn said above as ro del<:rmining rhe share renr applies 
as 'M:1l for ul""lation of (ash r~nl1l. The sIme problems in resource vah.arion 
are involved, if Ihe ash remll is to approximate lhe margin~1 value producE of 
the resource. 
One procedural rolulion is for th~ twO parlies to agree upon ~ level ~nd a 
program of operation for the farm. This would include sufficient derail to lake 
are of such items as upkeep and prevention of resouree deplerion. If the IWO 
agree on I level of opennion, lnd make (':Ireful estimltes of the grou ('lmings 
of the farm, rhey have a basis for cstimaring the ash rent for land and build-
ings. They can apply lhe alculued /inn rale of C'mIing 10 rhe C$timated (Osr of 
the fixed input and thus determine a cub tental value fot it. 
If there is more deni! of informalion on aClual ('lmings of different faCtors 
in the busin~-availablc from experience 0' research-these dala can be uK<!. 
It might be known, for example, lhal inv("Slmenn in m:achinery rerum only their 
COSI5; Ihat invcstmem in ferrililer gives high returns; or Ih~1 labor elfns I~ 
than its marginal COSI, If so, these data can be PUI 10 usc. High rerums on fer· 
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mean ,h~, the farm is fu from its optimum combination pa!!ern, ,hat labor is 
being misused, or even tha, ,he wrong products 2fe being produced. If so, a re-
combination of inputs is required_ 
The suggestion above ,ha, {he tWO panies use the oveNJl firm nte of earn-
mg as the best avai!~ble estimate of earning of fixed f:lcrors w;lS made on the 
assumption th~t the twO panies would nOt know the detail o f separate factor 
earnings. In the absence of such information, and if a good job has been done on 
combination of inputs, the oveHlI firm rate is definitely superior to any form of 
residual calculation. This follows from the theory. Under limited apital, if the 
marginal rerurn-rnlIrginal cost n tios arc equal and close to 1, the earning r:ates of 
variablcs and of fixed inputs approximate each other. 
In short, ash rent is determied by: I, agreeing upun ~ level of opention for 
the f:lrm and from th~t making an estimate of COstS and of returns; 2, calculat-
ing an ovcr-~ll r:ate of firm <":arning from the Clitimate of COStS and returns; and 
3, applying the fitm ratc of earning to the estimate of COSt of the fixed input. 
This becomCli the renr:al payment_ 
$evenl observations can be: made about this method of determining the ash 
rental: 
I. It will wotk equally well fot a tract of bnd or a complete and whole farm. 
The detail of difference between the two does not Change the nature of the «,la-
tions involved. In essence, this difference is only in size or complexity of the 
business. 
2. " tenant may use this same method with each of tWO or more landlords 
from whom he leases bnd or buildings. 
3. T he agreed-upon rental payment need not be binding upon {he opcntor in 
limiting him to an exact plan of operation. That is, it c-m be undetstood that the 
agreement is for the purpose of determining a renta l payment. If the operaror 
wishes to farm more intensively and thereby increase income above the estimated 
level, his cam rent can Stay the same. Specific clauses in the lease can take care of 
tm.tters of protection against depletion. ("dmittedly, this will result in income 
transfu between p~rt ies, for th~ tenant thereby gCtS the additional <":arnings of 
bnd. ) 
4. A sliding scale renral can be fitted to this plan, to rake care of unusual de-
p:urur~ in income resulting from weathet Ot prices of products_ 
5. As in shue rem, the overhead fitm COStS which arc not OUtput inctc-l.sing are 
excluded from the c:lIculation and remain as r~ponsibility of the resource o"'n-
er-namely, property tax~, interest, and insur:ance. Further, sepatate and distinct 
calculation should be made for the consumption goods if any are involved. 
The problems of fa(!or valuation - particularly for land and buildings-are 
exactly the same in am rental as in share rental. Inasmuch as boo and buildings 
(and other improvements on the land) arc usually the only resource that is hired 
in a cash rental, the problem of land pricing may be more of a stumbling block 
" 
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in lhe ok>.lla,;on P'~ for t:\sh ~nl. for .hc~ is less ;ncem;'oc md oppomrnif}' 
for barg:lining ber",e!n the pmies and rhe , " '0 may nO! K'e rhe neeelSi!)' for 
ord,,] l1tCnr;On [0 1 (ompie.c plan of o~r:l{ion (or lhe farm. This might be 
Ihe o.se, espe(ially if a sh,m-c .. ! method of calculation is used 2nd ,he 1"'0 ITy 
10 rach an agreement by .ppJ}'ing 1 rule of rhumb carn;ng /"lIe 10 ,he "Cosf' 
of 1M inp,,!, In $IIeh ase, Ihe ,cndmc~' might be fat 00'1" reliance 10 be plKtd 
on CUrtC1l! market \"lIUC' of .he proper'),_ " .. itOO", roo much question as [0 f>2<' 
ric\llon of forces Ihn cuau: non·agriculrunl "alues for the specific pro~q·. 
This tendency. ~nd other fauhs in the appliC2.ion of idCll5 uising from gcnen.J 
pr:l.Cficc or cuslOm. should nOI be .Han'cd 10 rcpbcc !C':I.soning from c(nnami< 
principles-rlla! is. If)'inS 10 appl)" appropri~re , hcor}' of ,he firm to ,he task at 
hand. 
Share·a"h Agr~menu 
T he more diflicu lr problems of dctcrminu ;on of ren tals in shire·O.lh ar· 
nngemenu involve busincs.!¢$ in which the landlord furnishes some (olm o( 
fi~ input but dOC$ not share in ,he OUTput of product to " 'hich that input con· 
tributes. Th is is !rue of ,he crop-share·osh los<:. especially on farms for which 
Jj"estock and li"cstock productS arc: the major source of income. The easy answer 
for such i<ems as ha)' or p"Slure i, 10 make .hI: calnabdon as if all rosn all<! re-
tUrns u e to be shlred as discuued above, and then the value of the landlord's 
share is bought br ,he renafl!. u cs.;mares o f price and quanriry .... hich can be 
agreed upon in ~nnce. The landlord thus rece;v" payment for his .llnre of the 
crop. PaymenT for use of build ings used by Ihe 'enant ;n his sepante livestock 
enterprise requi res another type o f ulcul1lion, bcouse income arises (rom .sale 
of lives.ock in "'hich ,he landlord docs nOt share. 
One solution ;, '0 proceed with the determinlt;on " pantely for thlt put 
of lhe business: which is shued, and ,0 calcula<e a tlIsh re<1ntl scpantely (or the 
additional item furnished by the landlord. This "'ould require an ~u.t!ion of 
,he cos. of .he input and a nrc of earning on it, as discussed in the (l.Jh rent 
$C<t;on, abo"c. If scvenl items of input ue supplied, however, a more derailr:<l 
calcula,ion procedure is needed. The t""O par,ies should s'Pan'e the shared and 
the cash renr:r.1 items distinctly. by estimating the portions of them ,hat con· 
trm... .e '0 outpll, ,,'hith is sh2n'd. All of he COSfS of producrs nOt shued b«ome 
COSTS of open.or. and he f'l'}'s a (aSh ren tal for f«torS supplied by ,he landlord. 
The der:r.i1 here is .I. ma!Ter of nego.iating and barpinins, .... i. h reasoning fn:m 
knowledge of production relllions. II is expla ined in detail in Ihe publication 
now in process- Farmer's BullClin- USDA- Your Farm Rent DClermination 
ProbiMn. 
O ther Provi.l;Oos of [he Lease 
The needs for agreement upon a level of open.ion, fOr tilTing ,he length of 
lease to the type of fuming enterprises, and for wmpenS20tion provisions ha,", 
been menTioned. Ho ... · these rhwrelically doinble comenTS of leases ue to be 
worked oul raises several p<:l(titlll problelI1$, but kno .... ledge of thwry and ope-
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cially of the use of economic analy'is of Ihc p:miculars offcrs guides 10 Iheir 
solution. Pm: of Ihe cxpbnllion of .. ,hy I1lO$t I~ a«: for one year, wilh nthcr 
indefinite provisions for rettcw:al. may be thu the pmies ha'~ no< rnlly 2I1al)~ 
the economic consequenc.:s of shorHerm planning, nOr the impact of the un-
certainty in continuity and the indefin iteness of levcl of operation on factor earn· 
ing' and, thus, on renral payments. 
RCSC':lrch and e~petimcntd data on these facets. and on the possibilities of 
different types of compensation provisions. if made avaibble fO negociatins 
parties should cJl(ounge use of more appropri:ue pnclices in leuing. Here I 
plaa somewh .. IC$S "mphasis on the neros for rnnrch as such, although ad· 
mi11edly some of In.: lIls",'en an come- onl)· through rnnoch. than on the neco::s-
sity of more rigid analpis of p<lrticubn by dle parties to the le:!.se. Also. p<lrt of 
the ''In,,,:er'' rests in the more careful selection ofp<lrties_in shorl. the applica. 
tion of economic analysis to that problem phase. 100. 
Onc further facct of the decision-making·operltions_comp!ex !Xlinls 10 the 
need for a~cment on how 10 handle the day·to-day denil,. induding the pay. 
menr of variable expen5e$. This is particularly e"ident in (rop-share leases, bur 
also for all share 1e:!.$C$ in which Ihe bndlotd is 1101 available fot frc<juenr «n-
s\llt:l.tion. The tenant is usually responsible fOI obcaining aoo applying Ihe vui. 
abies. He may pay the whole cosr, with eitl>cr periodic or one annual seltlemmt 
wilh the bndlord (in time, so mar each m:ty dose his books lOr iocome taX put. 
poses). The detail of how this is fO be handled an be a pa11 of the lcue. whe-
ther the lease is wriuen or onl. If either party arries the full CO$t of the "lri-
abIes for seyenl months, there is sufficient reason for payment of interest 1t time 
of settlement. Also. there may be need fot several other settlement paymentS. 
For eumple, if lhe estimates of IJI1chinery repair or building upkeep it the stm 
of the period differ s\lhsranrU.lly from lhe act\UJ COSts, ,he differences can be cor-
rected b). C2J!:h paymentS between parties it the end of the production year. 
IV. RECAPITULATION AND CONCLUSIO N 
In rhis papcT, I have tried to simplify the: details rh2t chan.cterize rent de· 
terminuion in prllCticc. This is done in the belid [har only through simpli&2. 
tion of these details, and r«Ogni rion of principles, ean Vl y rwo p1lties e:xpect 10 
n:ach 1 " 'orhb lc: ag=ent-one which achievcs thc ends of a bwinC$S :urangc. 
ment in "'hich the tesource owner receives the: m:llginal value produCl! of the 
resOUtees he supplies [01 farm firm. This does not deny in the leur thlt many 
judgmentS remain 10 be performed, even .... ith the: bat application of the-: reJc:-,'ln1 
thC'Ol'}'; but rhest: problems of judgment an ,t lcut be au into a fnm"","(l(~ 
which solution is rhe tC!\Ilt o f the use of lhe 8Ilides Ivaibble in theory. 
It /Ny be argued by some thar the theory is quite mC1llingless hecal.l5C: rhe 
information and kn01l/Icdge:lle lacking to make it applicable. But Ihis argummt 
limply avoids the issues involved. If the infotrmtion for solution of a problem is 
bcking, but there is adequate undef:S1Vlding of ,he naturc of the problem, then 
the solution comes :aboUt by doing tbe best po$Sible joob in obtllining and IUing 
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the needed informalion. For enmpk, Ihere is littlc informlllon available fOr 
acn'l"lIle me:uuccmenl of muginal value productS. We do no. have the tech· 
niques for mo:uuring m:ll"ginal value produCts in a farm firm 11 2 given ltvel of 
oper:lrion. Bur, both pr:l"ica l and experimcllIal data arc a"ailable for working 
our an oprimum combination for a given SCI of raQllrccs. Mo.c UK can be made 
of these dar:! . 
The nccessi.y for applying principles and making use of .hcory in the de-
u:rmination of both share and ash n:nnls suggCStS the need for some form of 
tcOl"IOmic counselling service. availabk at charge. for landlords and tenan <$. An)' 
fwO panics could rake .heir probkms of rcot determination to this service :mel 
receive advice on ho .. , to go .bour the nccessa')' calculation. This applics espe--
<iaU)' ro landlords and tenants who have little Wlderstanding of economics. How-
tvet, the counse:lling SC1Vice "'QuId differ from much of that available. The SCTV-
iee agem would nero ro know and appl)' rhe appropri~te <"Conomies. 
The rrearmenr and the discussion hecc has been lugel)' shartron, with em· 
phuis upon rhe productiOn period covered by a Icase-usually a year. If \"''0 
parties wish to work out the details of .. continuing oper:ltlon. the procedure 
may becorru: a se:ries of shontun applications. There arc advantages to both 
parries in examining the con$C(jucnces of a Ic-ue that 1$ exp:<;<ro '0 run foe man: 
than one year. The analysis b)' Joe Arroyo, using linear ptogn.mming to deter· 
mine optimum combinuions for a si" yeu period compared ·" .. ith three periods 
of twO years ... ~ch, shows significanrly greuer income for the onc long period 
plan." 
Although the emphasis has been upon the short·run, the implicr.rions an: 
definitel)' long run. Experience with rhe process of using tm: shares of fixed. COstS 
in the firm as .he dcrerminant of shares of vari.bles and of returns ... ·i11 likely 
demonstn.te dut some of the F..uhs of the land rides markers acc nken imo ac· 
coum, that land docs become pric.:d in relation to its prodocriviry, and that only 
bnd income (r:lthcr rhan farm income) is capitalized imo land values. Applying 
Ihe:ory to thc <uk of derermining rents should resul! in more specific 1!tenrion 
10 rtquirr:d inputs and levels of operating F..rm businGSeS. 
Tn this same line of thought, there are nume<ous iml"'c<s on both the ec0-
nomies of farm or8'"niution and operation and upon COIltent of lease:s from out· 
side rhc firm. For eumplc, F..ults in the pmpc"y tax system have impKtS on 
both the land tides markct and the rental market. One can suggest the basic 
procedure in handling ItXCS on real property in ,he rcntal determination pro-
cas, tegardless of these faults. In shorr, <he idea is .0 exclude property tues 
&om tnc rental alcularion-or 10 subtract property taxes from tm: gross of the 
firm, and distribute rhe remaining returns between the landlord and the tenant 
in the Slme proportion that fix.:d coses are shared. But the funher point of im· 
pomnce here is that these: othcr F..ules in the economic system should nOt be al· 
"Om-"'" I'tcpuoto .... Uodclo "" 1,;..,,,H'I<,,i«l ..... Meuumnonc of ~ '" leui"' ... ...".... 
-. ... Got-lo, l<* c. .......,... 0..-..1 ThcsU, low> Xu< u..........,.. '~p"bI~_ io ___ 
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IowN [0 foul Ihe proc~ure of rem d««minnion ; Ihe lase i~ nOI 2 device to 
(orrect «rOll in propctty taxcs. The full solution should rome from t«'atin! dle 
tax problems, and other~, 25 separate problems. Tenancy reform and improve--
mem as ~uch doc::s nor include the cure of tax problems. The~ is a I"oIX probkm 
and a tenancy problem. Thcy are reluN, but the $Olulions come separately. 
I have proposed above thu the solution of lhe major problems in It:lSing 
,hal Stem from :and are associatN with the bet of split in decision making rests 
in looking at the end re~ull 10 be achieved. For share rem Ihis is the equatin& 
of shares of fixed (OStS, variable C05lS and returns. The tenant or the bndlom 
(1I.n be- rewuded for his superior management input by trenin}; management as 
a fixN COSt and placing a value on Ihe input. One furcher interrelation should 
be- mentioned. The t<lJO partics decide upon a level of oper::l1ion u a pat! of the 
agre.:ment itself; 2nd lhey o.n come ro terms as to who makes Ihe decisions. 
Thus, the Ih·cstock·share 1\"2SC: "'hkh approachcs 2 part~rship in &ct. with both 
p1rtics sharing actively in all of the management decisions, handles the pro!> 
lems of d«ision rmking. The cro~$hare agreement in which the operator makes 
most o ( the day"lo-day decisions. likewise takes care of the mlMgement split by 
V31uing Ihe oper:ators management input. I do nOI deny that there are difficulties 
involved in making the judgment and coming 10 realistic values (or any Or>C 
2gre.:menr. But, the theory fnmework sers up the gllide for rhe 1"'0 panics 10 
rmke their judgmenrs.. 
The prO(edure discussN above differs subs[;(ntially (rom practice. The ex· 
lent of the difference itself may be sufficient barrier to causc man)' parties 10 
throw up their hands in disma)· and say "nothing doing'" T he question arises, 
therefore, 15 ro wh1f arnngements short of sharing all variables can b-t: worked 
OUt ro approximate Ihe necessary 2nd sufficient and incenrive condilions? What 
can any ""0 panics do ""00 do 1101 wish ro go all lhe W"~y ? Suppose the landlord 
1$ unabl~ or unwillin,!; to shue in the variable e~penscs? 
I think the answer in Ihis situation slill rests in knowttdge of the economics 
of lea~ing. One solution is that cash renrals be- worked OUI ro replace tho~ shar-
ing 3lr~ngemenrs thll depan so (ar from what rheory suggeSts 15 rhe proper 
!trms of the sha~ lase. Also, and again in Ihe longer run, as nllmbers of l:and· 
lords and tenant$ begin to apply the theory of the firm, th~re should be effect 
upon combinllions of resources, wilh mo~ atlention dcV()led 10 economic anal· 
ysis of the f:Jrm businesses. As IhC$C" aTe adopn:d by temnt-operared firms,:and if 
the advanraget can be seen (separated in some ""-y flom the impaCIS o( govern· 
ment plograms and all Ihe e ~ogeneous influences on Ihe firm). then owner· 
operators would supposedly adopl some of rhe management pr:lCliccs roo. In lhe 
longer run, improvemenl in the economics of oper:lrioo of lenanr-open.rN firms 
would affccr all brm firms. 
This di$CU$$ion emphasizes the ne.:d for firm analysis and attenlion to rt-
qllired inputs for a derermined level of operation. The same ntt<! exisls in the 
selection of products. Economics of production applies to all firms, whether 
lenant or owner Opc:r:lled. T his emphasis on required inpulS and selection o( pro-
" 
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ducts. for which the factor-factor , faCfor-product. and product-product rd~tio" in 
the ~'lui!;brium mood specify th~ n~essary and suffidcm conditions for ef· 
ficiency in production, selS up the disr;ncr;on be'''ttn I~se oriented problems 
and ,ho~ common to all firms. The problems of rrll! dercrmi"o<ion cannOt be 
soh-cd ..... id,oUl application of economic analysis to ,he lasks of organizing and 
running the firm as a business-the problems of the firm as a firm_nor "";11>001 
attention to the specific additional problems "'hieh are 1e:lS<: oricnred. 
The ra,k of obuining application of theory of (conomics [0 the problem of 
determining rcmals in practice is a formidable one. The firS! srcps in the acrual 
applic.r;on mus, come through behavior of !«hn;d~ns-<:<:onom;sr~ ~nd others 
who work w;lh I~ndlords and tenants. There .... ill need to be undemanding. ap-
preeiation. and use of 'he theory of econom;n b,' ,he ,<:<:hn;d ~ n~ rhemselves. 
And rhere is quite sufficient e"idence available that thert is littk . grcemt'nl 
among Ihem now, As " 'it ness, see ,he rev;e'O.' of ,his paper, and 'he discussion 
it scimul.,es. 
RE N T DETERMINATION WITHI N 
THE FARM FIRM '~ 
Loyd G lover 
South D akou Scale College 
In discussing the p~per b)' Dr. Hurlburt, , perhaps should h1ve remiaed 
myself to ,he question: "h the theory sound and is it rdeva'" ro the problem 
at hand?" However, b«. use the ddferences be1" .. een Dr, Hurlburt and myself 
are primaril)' differences in philosophy and nor differences in conSlruccion of 
Iheory. I have confined m)' remarks largely to Ihe issues growing oul of rhis dif-
ference in philosoph),. These issues concern primari ly definition of the problem. 
selC(tion of theory and rhe role of rheory. 
Dr. Hurlburt's paper is an impressive pl~ for mort use of C(onomic thcory 
in rhe dc,erminarion of co"'raa rem. He app~rcndy has been moved '0 make 
this plea because of a conviction thac rem negotia1ions based on cuStomS and 
ignoranee are resulring in a misuse of our agricultural resources and art bringing 
abou1 unbir imer·firm transfers . Society. in his opinion, is n01 gening the best 
use of resources employed on rented brmsbcause of ,his failure ,0 follow rules 
diccared by economic theory in farm.fen, negoriations . 
Hurlburt's problem (in my words, no! his) .pparendr is 10 obrain adoption 
of economically sound ren,al arrangemems which will avoid the individual and 
social waste assumed 10 occur when IheS<' arrangements are imperfecd)' devised. 
In other 'O.'ords, he is aflC!' the individually and sociallr perfect lease. 
"··R<.I D<1<Im i.,,;on Wilhin Ill< film F;,m" b)' Dr. v;'Sii L Hutl""". Ag,;cul,u",1 e.:""".,,,, . 
f.£'R.D .. S<.,nomi< R=h S<rvi«, U.S.D.I. .. Am<>. I ....... 
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Dr. Hurlburt spent liule dme defining rhe problem. This w:as nor nccasary 
in the apprD:lch he h:u taken. He has scl«red (rom our orrhodox body o( ec0-
nomic theory a modd which he fo:o:b is appropriato: (or use in dc-vising the ida! 
ro:nr:tl lI"l":Ingement. His problem, then, is simply to nuke the ro:al $iC\11tion oom. 
dde with the moclcl. 
Tho: $Olut;on to his problem will b.: the so-called pcrf<Xt lC1se. H~ defil"lCS 
it as one in which nrhe lelms and conditions of paymcot wi!! encoul"llge use of 
the quantiries and combin~tions of inputs required for efficienc)" and so that the 
resoulce owner will r«eive the malginal value producn of the r<!SOurces he sup-
plies to the firm·'. Thus the solution to the problem is narrowly aoo 
sharpl)" defined flom the bo:ginning. The only remaining role of the investi· 
garor is to ",·ork OUt the details of a lcasc which we[ds th~ two d<xision·makcrs 
-landlord and to:nant-into a single firm, or ~t leut makes them act like a 
single firm in the opcn.rion of tho: farm . 
Two iuues:ltt nised by Dr. H urlburt's definition of the problem and tnc 
$O[ution offered, and it is Ill<: diKuuion of these IWI) issuC$ tlu.t constitl,LtC$ the 
bod)" of my cririquo:. The issues arc these: 
I. Whu is the role of theory in problem $Olving? 
2. [s rent 1 price, and is it the same in a firm p:trtnership as in a &'rm [ease? 
Dr. Hurlburt's concern that moro: sound ewnomic analysis he usC<! in nu.n· 
agemenl decisions is a naluro.l one for an economist and I shale his concern. I 
think, however, thaI research economistS nco:d to be careful not co become the 
prisoru::rs of their thl'Ory . Theory is a useful tool ; il gives insight which we could 
nevo:r secure without it. But I have never fell th1l thcory "'""l.S intended to de-
$Crib.: whal ought to be. II is an abstraction or simplification which is useful in 
telling us whar Iho: results ",·ould be if certain actions were !:Iken under ccrrain 
"sumed conditions. II to:lIs us how to gCt from A 10 B but not that B is do:. 
sinb[e. 
To ddine 1Il «anomie problem in terms of closing the gap ~ fl>!: real 
silu1lion and tho: model drawn from theory is to accept an unneccssary mcnw 
restriction in working OU t a solution. Dr. Hurlburt, I bdievc, ad mits this re· 
striCtion and fco:[s it ktqls him on the stl"1light and nartOW path of economics. 
My own reaction hown-er, is to rt:scm such rcsuicrions. My own do:finition of 
the leasing problem ",·ould have to awail my invcstigation of goals or cnd$. 
Hurlburt's app!01ch rulcs Out any investigation of goa ls or cods 1Ild concemratc:s 
on means to achieve a goal which the theory conveniently is 1,sumed to havc 
supplied. 
For inStance, I might, al the beginning of my inves tigations hypothc:size 
that tl>!: landlords· goals include SCC\jrity of property and lCfIt. A [easc mUSI pro-
vide them with security in tho: matten of rent collection and maimo:nance of 
propert)' vdue. In invcstiguing the lenalllS' goab "'.0: might find one of these 
to be freedom of operation, including flO interference from {he brtdlord. If these 
1fe found to be import1lll goals. Iho:n tho: pedCcI lose is probably going 10 be 
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somcrhing qu i!e different from what Dr. Hurl burt dCKribcs. 
Suppose "'"C assume a .-elml arrangement ",·hieh gives a bnJlord rtnonabJe 
5CC\lfiry of rem and propeny 'hrough provisions for e;lhtt a cash r¢ntal paymtnl 
or a paym\"nr lied {O)Om<' f::.Clor "'hieh the lCfl2n{ c:l.nl1Or influence. The !(IUJ\I 
is then left free <0 OJXr:m, :IS h" ... ·ishes subject '0 provisions againsl dcpletiOO 
and supplemented with a pro"'ision for paJ'men! for unexhausted improvcmen f$. 
Un.xr this siruuion "Xlu!d "'c not .pproKimnc the same allO(':ltion of ~5OUrccs 
as under o'wlcr-operalorship! We rna)' have 1he u:nam scill p2.ring tOO high Of 
100 10"" a rent. but ,his shOl,Lld be laken care o f <:\"<:nlU111)" in the competition 
for renters or br renters for farms. 
W e kno,,· fh:1I custom frequently SCI! the rent;).[ share in • communi!)'. bu, 
(here is oft..., wrg.in ins; for other chings such as the furnishing of o<her in!""s. 
ThC$C nu)' olfKr a slure that is tOO h igh or tOO low p,.ft of the difficul~' nu)" 
be thac tenams arc s;cncl"iIll)" poor manas;en and thu they do nO! s;et fair m:,I.t, 
mem by 11ndlOfd~, 0< <h ey are noc 1ware of opportuniries. But is t1king him in· 
to full parcneuhip the solution for <his problem? ho't it ."he. a problem of 
eduarion? 
T he KCond issue I want to l"iIiK is .... herher the apPfOllch to rem d=im· 
(ion dcscribed in ehbor.l te decail by Dr. Hurlburt is morc appropriate '0 • pill:. 
nersh ip than to a farm 10K. This r.li!iCS the addicional question .... hether rCm is 
a price. and .... hether it i~ the same in 1 partnership as in a 10K. [ n n ft:l.dil)· 
visualize prospecdve panners usinS; the PfO«"Ss he describC's Ind can s« how his 
papt'< ... -auld be useful to ,hem. but it is very' di fficult for me to visualize a land· 
lord and tenant negotiating their remal 1ft1ngement in the ... ·ay he has outlined. 
A leiK is • oo'ice (or ronve)'ing or tl"ilnsfcrrins; rights of possession, uSl: :and m· 
jo}'mcnt of land (rom landlord to tenant fIX 1 specilkd time and c(>nsiJtt.,ion. 
In this mnsf"c-r rhere arc (""II."o indcpt'ncicnt <itti.sion·nuken involved, each Jerking 
his O ... ·n self intetest. The device can be: imptoved. I am ceruin. buc the dire("' 
tion Dr. Hurlburt has taken to find an imptovement has led him almost l ..... y 
from the I~ form, 
T1K exis!cncc of high risks in farming has r~lced in arnn~cntS CO<" $Jw. 
ing inpu!$ and Ou tpUts. ruher !han juS( paring a cuh I"l:nt Landlords have 
been ... ·iHing to go along ... ·ilh Ihis and it has bc.::n popular ,,·ith tenants ..... 1$0, 
sometimes the landlord has other resources in addition to bnd to contribufC". 
and sometimes he nuy desil"l: to rominuc participating in managemem decisions. 
Thus nun~' lcuing "r:lngemcnts border on bdng partnerships. But the question 
uises, il therc a basic difference in computing the shates in 1 partnership and 
computing the consideration in a leaK? The arr~n8ement in one eue is inti'll ' 
firm-Ihe di"ision of paymenl$ lmong panners .... ilI be inKd on [he rduive 
contribu tions of the panners. The arrangement in the other case is inter·firm. 
th:tt is. bct'\'cen buyer lnd Klier. Thc:sr: t .... o amangemems an bc.::ome relatively 
indi ltinguislllb!e 2t times. but arc they the ~m,, ) The plpc t by Dr. Hurlburt is 
primarily concemed .... ith inlnt·firm divisions o f the pie rathet than imer-finn 
nepi:nions for the bIIl'ing i OO Klliog of rightS to the us.. of lhe lind. 
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" According 10 Dr. Hurlburt the determination of rent is a mmer of follow· 
ing some precise rules and is nOt a maHer of negeriation. Is rem a price !IUt 
performs a function m the allocation of resources? Is it losing that funCtion 
when it is determined by rules of sharing and input va luation father than by 
negeriarion based on supply of and demand for remable bnd? 
Molt of our leases in the North Central region are share leases and it is 
probably true rhar there are (Ondition! in most of thoe leases to enCOUf1gc re-
source owners to maximize tbe returns from the resources they contribute, r::uher 
than try to maximize the returns on rhe combined resources in the farm firm. 
This expbins our natural inclination to suppose that share leases result in inef. 
ficiency and waste, although ,he studies wah which I 1m nmiliar have nor found 
much evidence of this. Because most share leases are of one )·ear duration. the 
landlord has conside!1lble coercive po""er to make the tenam f;lIm accordmg to 
certain rccognized s!1lndar,h 
In order to perfeCt this situation (rhat is, achieve maximized returns to the 
combined farm firm) most ,enure economists hn·e ~dvocated, as does Dr. Hurl-
burt, making rhe lease even more of a partnership than before-!1Ither dun mak-
ing it less of a partnership and more of a lease. If we invest igate the question, 
"why have landlotds no, moved further towards sharing (OStS and giving ten· 
ants seruriry of tenure?". ",·e might find such reasons as these: 1, the landlord's 
relucrance to underrake further involvement in nunagcmem; 2, his concern that 
increased sharing might open up fUffher confusion of rights, duties and liabili· 
ties; 3, [he landlord's desire to retain an lrl"" .. ngemenr which provides him secur· 
ity of rent and property. Hence, cm the lease really be perfected by turn ing it 
irHO a parmerShip? Will ,his be acceptable to either tenants Or landlords? Is 
this the onl)" way to solve the problem of alleged inefficient use of resources on 
tented land? 
It ,,·ould seem to me that the Slme rigorous use of theor)· could be made 
after bringing back into the picture some of the limiting institutions and hu· 
man v.lues which D r. Hurlburr has assumed away. My own approach "'ould be 
to invesrigare first the goals and concerns of landlords and r(nants. Then I 
would work from rhere in dev ising a lease, and I would not ovcrlook society'S 
interest in efficiency and other goals. 
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GROUND RENT AND THE ALLOCATION O F 
LAND AMONG FIRMS 
Muon GaffnC'y 
Uni,"crsiIY of Missouri 
Imtoduction 
This p~~r d~als "1th ground r~nt" not ~Ontr:lCI rC'nt. ThuC' arc seve",1 lea· 
$Ons for singling OUI ground r<:nt and !t~ting il K par:lld)". Ii is ground rem, 
nO( conu-act r<:nl. thai determines ell(: 11loc:tlion of land :among firms. It is ground 
r<:nl .hat dC'Ierminn Ihe op!im:Ll allocuion of land bclWttn prn.:nl and fun= 
us<:s, IhO! is 10 !lay Ihu delcrminc, Ihe oprimal liming of demolilion and Ie-
ne,,·aI, II is }!:round renl whkh I"=Idures. and eXIC'nds in anlicipalion into (he 
(emolc future, and is capinlized 1010 lanu '·alucs $0 high rda.ive '0 current in. 
come as ro pos<: .he financing problem " 'hich is IhC' llUIin lOOt of Icn:lIlC)·. I( is 
ground tenl ., .. hich pro,·ides .ne main ruion:ale for public OI.Idays on ptoje.:a 
tha. opm up nC'll· lands. and $0 guides the allocation of devclopmcnlal .eso>m:~ 
Some problems in ddining and imputing ground r<:nl 
In bu;( conceplion. ground renl i, a Slr:ligntfor .... 1Id and uncomplicated 
ida: it is InC' oc. produn of .he ground, .hl ;s (M gross product len tnc pri. 
vue C05~ of making the ground productive. It ""-U a conCC'pt Ihu commended 
its<:lf 10 our simple d~"j( forebcao and might lar some daim 10 having bern 
the foundation of classical economics. 
Yel as " ": all ha''': lc::uncd [0 our $OiTOW. in its appli("1tion the concept p<.lileS 
s<:\"cral pcrplex;Iies ,,·hich have even led lOme economists 10 lhra .. · up their 
hands and abandon i., 11 1("1$1 15 a pr:l"ical 1001. 
Lih,,·isc $Orne «onomisls have gi'·cn up the idn. of impuling pcoducu 10 
bbot, or olher specific inpuu. Yet if WC' cannot impUIC' r<:lUrns 10 specific inpuls 
we havC' 1011 a good deal of .he value of economic lnal)"si$-for much of our 
policy recommend1l;on is based on amibuI;ng ou'l'uu {O specific ;npu{~ . So I 
beliC\"C' ;1 is .... orrh making lhe e!forr '0 clarify the concept and kttp il in ",·ark· 
ing order. 
Ground rCnt as an income 
Ground rCnt is buiQ.lly an income. r«eiveC in r.:tutn fOt a flow of savi= 
from a rno= Ih1l is nO! depk.cd by UK. It doa not induOc p"ymen. in ~ 
turn for deple.ion of virgin fenilily, as some of .h.t! is not an incomc bu. a 
t~nsfer p"ymenl. Of couoe graund r<:n{ is also nct of depreciation and rumoVct 
of arrificial fertility, and of all other invemories and improvC'menu. 
Ground rene vs. r.he inCOlllC' of improvements 
$e\"Cr.l! «onomis~ ~,..: "'gu(etcd. difficull;e, in distinguishing ground "'"1 
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" from inrolll(: impur:Jblc to improv(Cmenrs. I be-lieve it is possible !O resoke most 
of thesl:' problems and .... iIl suggest ,,'h~t seem to me "'orhble solutions to $('\'er· 
at .... hich (omt" up frequently , proc~ing in ordet of increasing sophi!tieation. 
ImprolltmtnlJ physically mixtd uifh wi! 
The distinction of an improvement from the ground is nOt d(Cpendent 00 
tbe improvement'S being abo.-cground. Underground tiles arc economically qu ire 
( ompar:Jble to fences or barns: they ue products of hunan effon; ther increase 
OUtpUt ; they ~uitt: nuintenance; and they depreciate. EaS)- visibility is helpful 
in appraising, but not otherllo'isc veT)' relevant to economic analysis. 
The same is uv.e of soil amendments, exapt ttil, these are more analog<lO.l$ 
to inventories of r:a .... materials ,,'hich remain about constant in quantit), .... hik 
the individual components turn over. 
"Ptrmantnf" inlprwnnmlS 
Some improvemenn depreciate so slo .... lr !hat for praCtical purposC1 they 
nul' be r(Cgardcd as permanent, Examples arc filling in sMllo'" unde",'1ter si!~ 
~making" land·for urban use: or cutting a natural dike to dr:ain a s .... amp. But 
tbe (act thu the improvcm(Cnt and th(C sit(C 1Ie no .... inscpar:able for a very Ions 
tilll(: dor-s not prevent the economist from distinguishing th(C natur:al from the 
hunun contribution. 
The human contribution ean he no more than th(C COSt of the operation, and 
later the COSt of duplicating it. It can he less. if t h(C COStS ex((CedcJ rhe benefits, 
andl or if they cxc(Ceded available alrernuive COStS, or if the ra .... site, if available 
today, could be developed in a bener ~y b), some ne", method or for SOrt'I(C 
higher usc. The rest of their combined v:l.lu(Cs imputes !O the site, and ""QUid in 
b Ct be: its market value if it " 'ere srill unimproved.. 
Confusion nay arise because the unimproved site .... ould yield no income, 
.... hich leads the unw:ary to conclude it has no \'"II lu(. Man's propensity is to un· 
dersllltc his debt to Nature, and ovetcstimue his own <ontriburion. It is surpris. 
ing how often one meets the argum(Cnt. cven ftom economists .... ho should by 
training be s(Cnsitive to its irrelevance, that "land produces nothing until com· 
bined with other inputs". No inpl.lt produccs anything until combined with other 
inputs. But the point is often clarified "'hen one seeks to buy a raw "unproduc, 
tive" Site and learns the price. 
l"jiMma tI/ tlff'siu iltlf"PWI/lt'l1$ and tUt;"iry 
PhYJicall}', the thing __ call th(C "ground" is distinguisht:-d from other things 
in that it il Nature's contribution as opposcd. to man's. EconomiC':lUy, ho,,'eVCr, 
man contributes to irs ""Iue. EKrcrnal economies spill OV(Cr from improvements 
and activitiC1 on neighboring sites, both privat(C and public. The claresr contri· 
bution is from d(Cvelopmemal public works. Marken, affccted by .... orldwide: 
forces of suppl}' and demand, also affect "lIl.1e. 
These external human contributions differ from narur:a.l oncs in ccrraincy of 
permanence. Rmds may cktcriof'ate, for exampl(C, and with them the land values 
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to which they contrihure. However, this deterioution is h)' no mC':lns as cerWn 
as that of improvemenrs on private bnd, for in geneto l there is a presumptiOfl 
that the right of ""'-y dedicated to the public will be continuousl), maimained by 
,he public. In a progressive socie,y, continual improvement of transport . 00 
uri li r), services arc the ruk 
So long .5 ,,'e em disringuish the conttihurions of the aromisdc site·holder 
from thosc: of 50ciet), it is possible to disringuish the value and income of the 
ground from those: of rhe individual. Only where the line betwe<':n the ind ivid. 
ual and SOC;et)' Ucomes blurred, as some!imes it does, is Ihe line blurred be-
rwe<:n ground ren' and orher disnibuti,'e shn~, An example ,,'ould Ix when • 
priv.!e uliliq', prote<':ted wilh a public franchisc:, dc:v<'lops a utilil), nelwork to 
improve ils own l. nds, In such instane<':s, il is necessary 10 hll back on Mi Jxx 
analpis of the terms of nch simation in order to m.ke m(':lningful disrinnioflS. 
It become. esse:miall)' a problem in determining "'h ich developmental functions 
f.ll on ,he priVOfe lmdholde" .nd which on the public , T hose which f:..n on the 
individual landholder should nor he reguded ' 5 enhancing l.nd v.lues, but :os 
exploiting latent v. lues which he is in a position 10 develop. Those which the 
public supplies . re exogenous to the individual and contribute to the value of 
land as such, 
If we take a large ove,.".ie,,', even thosc: land values which seem to be Cl'C;1led 
b)' hum. n design :Ue seen to be ,ather the exploitation of natu,al potcntiahtics, 
If a municipalit), or counl)', for enmple, enh.nccs the value of priv." parcds 
within its ju,isdiction b)' suppl)' ing improved waler service or roads al a COSI 
below the v.lu" of the service, it is simply exploiting an opportunity inherent 
in rhe ((rri,ory il monopolizes, jUst .5 rhe parcel holder exploits his position b)' 
building a housc: or planting an orchard. 
Lo"l government "'p,esents landholders colle<':tively, and is the medium 
through which ,h,,), mU\( aCt to suppl)' Iheir parcels with certain kinds of collec· 
nve improvements. Failure of local governmem to suppl)' an op'imal level and 
mix of services repfCserm a failure of landholders to improve the natura l op-
porruni,ies which rhey conrroL The <rue blem potential rem of lands i$ that 
which "'ould obtain if loal government as ,,'ell 15 the individual bndholdet be-
haved optimally, 
As we proceed up ,he hierarchy of levels of go"emment ,he numher of im· 
pond=blcs increases, but the same basic principle holds, If we iden tify 'he bnd· 
holder with the local government, then public imptovements that raise parcel 
ren,s are simpl)' uking advant2ge of a natunl opportunity ' ppUflenanr to 'he 
land, If .... e regard governmenr as alien to the landholders, then it is even = 
ob"ious that the individual landholder can take nO credit for the increased rents 
due ro public efforr. 
DiJI;ng.,iJhing grD,,,,d rtIIl from Ibt ina;mt of otd imprrn;m/m1J 
The "unimproved value of land", 15 rhe Australians call i" is ,he ",Iue a 
site would have without the present improvements, Of course, thi s docs flO( 
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mean a value based on use without an)' improve menu. Unimproved value is 
rather what one ""ould bid in amicipll(ion of improving the land anew; and 
gtoun<i rem is ,he anrieipared net income on whkh such a bid ,,"ould be based. 
It is nOt n~cssar)' 10 go back to the (":Ive men. rherefote, to find bare land. 
Ir is a concept that looks to the future, not the pas!. for its meaning. In a 
dynamic societ), there is continual supersession of yesterday's optimal use by 
tomorrow's. witb conSC<juent obsolescence of improvements and need to rebuild 
in ... hole or pan. Bare land value thus comes to Iigll! with each teneo;nl . And 
it may be cst;maral at any time. for appnisal or asscumenr, by contemplation 
of rhe prospective CO$IS and benefits of renewal from the ground up. 
We are accus.omed to thin king of ground .ent as determined residually. 
although economists now r~ogni~e this as simply a convention. In imputUion 
of income between land and old improvementS, il is a poor convention. The old 
improvements usually have no appreciable salvage value, rhat is (Q say no op-
portuni ty COSt. But the land does. Irs opportunity COSt is ilS marginal net pI'Q-
d UClivily in its highest furure use. if is necessary for old uses 10 impure th)( 
ampUnl to the land 10 justify their continued tenure:. 
Land pla)'s a unique role in the demolition and replacemenl <i«ision be· 
(":Iuse of land's unique amibute o f permanence. Ordinarily, almost the only 
thing of value (Q be nlV1lgcd from an old building is the site beneath it. The 
sticks and StOnes are junk, whose opportunity COSt is far below theit present 
value in place. Almost the onl)' rC1lS0n for demolishing an old building is to 
salvage Ihe site for a higher alternative use. 
It is the old improvements, therefore, which must lx V1Ilued r(Sidw.lly . Theit 
hislori(":ll COSt is irrelevant; any depreCiation schedule based on it is, too. Their 
only value is ,he excess of the joint yidd of bnd and improvements over tbe 
opponuniry cos. of the bare land. When this txceu falls (0 UfO til<: improve-
ments are wonhless. Their histofical COSt may never M.ve been recovered, but 
thaI is Spilt milk. The full opporruniry COSI must be imputed to bnd. as to every 
l"C"sou.rce, to justify keeping i, from i{s highest alternarive use. 
An interesting corollary is rhar when land ripens inro eligibility for urban 
usc, vitgin fertility loses most of its value. Thenceforth, lurle or no depJeriO<"l 
need be charged, although physical depiction will prob.>.bly ~cceleme. This will 
temporarily increase the net ground rent flom farm use, and to some extent 
lhere:by tend to postpone urbanizarion. 
None of .hat is 10 imply that land should never be valued residually. In de> 
termining rhe furore value, for example, this is u.su.a1I)' the mOSt practical mens. 
[t is the furore rate of in{crest that is extetnally "given". In general, thaI r.:-
$Ource should be valued residually whose opportunity cost is more difficult to 
define and measure. In respect {O bnd and old improvements, Ihar is the old im· 
provements. It is land whose opportunity COSt is easier to define. 
The problml. of purring a value on land in the infinite series of future li5CS-
what fOr(StCl"$ call "soil expecn.tion nlue"-poSC5 many interesting problems of 
itS own, in malhemariq and Ihe rrcarmen{ of divergenl expectations. I will not 
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get IntO any detail on this. other than to nOtC that there is 1 good dol of it, 
$Orne of which I have \fied my hand oJ elsc",·here." If anyone should alrc to 
allege [hat mo~ needs to be done I would have to 'grl'c. But 1 do believe ,his 
is the most promising approach to the qUCl;tion. 
Insulation of ",afkm and 1m meaning 4 "oppommif)' roil." 
The "opporluniq' COSt" 0( land may be a, differen' levels depending OIl 
what problem onc is anal}'zing. There are barriers k«ping !and from what OIh,","-
wise would be ils highcs! use. If we aceep! those barriers as "gi"en" in a Jnr' 
ticuhr :lnal}'sis, then (he ,devanr opponunily COS! is the highest use possible 
within those cefism.ims. 
In our ClIf»ciry U consul,"nts on farm managemen' .... ·c agriculrunl «on· 
omisls a«cp' m~ny uneconomic~1 constraints, and advi~ farmers how as in-
dividuals to optimile .... ithin those constr:l.inrs. Ttu, is perfe.:tl)' proper-provid<:d 
we do no, let ,h~ attitudes engendet~d in ,hat wOtk come '0 dominate all our 
thinking and emasculate uS as social scientists. For it is also our function to ad-
vise citizens ho"" in their "'p-"d,y as voters, they an crcate social institutions 
mOSt conducive to economic welf:ae. 
In our capacity as soci.l scientis's and consultants to governments .... e can 
raise our sights to higher oppottunity COStS fot land that emerge when we con-
sider breaking barriers to optimal allocation of resources. Such a barnet might 
be, for example, a poorly conceived zoning p .. ttern. An analogous one, to which 
the later pat( of this paper is devoted, is unequal access to credit, which oftm 
prevents the higheSt opportunity COSt, viewed as an annual ground rent, from 
finding e"pression 1fl a commensur.ltely high bid for ,he bnd tide. 
The highes' ground ren', afrer all undesirable market barriers h.ve been 
breached, is. concept which may be called the " latent" ground rent. Ideally 
this rent would be charged against all land uscs so as to eliminate . 11 marginal 
extensions of land-holding, in space as well as time, whose marginal product 
does nOt cover the COSt . 
Generally, a go. I of social policy should be to see thar alllatld uses meet 
this test at the margins, both spatial and temporal. But in eVil luating the man-
agement plans for individuals, within those constraints that muSt be accept<:d, 
land use is rather to be judged on the basis of those opporronit)· COSts ttut make 
themselves felt to the individual. which are often somewtut lower. They are by 
no means, howe"er, alwo.ys.s low as the residually imputed rent in the current 
use, and ""hen that is so, the deficit must be imputed to the manager" a nega-
Q"e profit. We (",InnOt blame the land for its own mismanagement, for land is 
passi"e and unresponsible. The land should be imputed its opportunity COSt and 
the managers ge' blame or credit. as the case rna)" be, for deficits below Or sur-
pluses .bo,-e that. 
' ~'Conc<P" off;. .. "'i1I ~I>'uri<r of TImbo,_" A.E. Inlo. 5« ... No. 62. ~.c. Su .. ColI<s<. ' In] pnd lm. 
]>t<uio<I.19<1O) . 
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If " 'e ~gin " 'i!b fixed complemenu of bbor and depreci.ble capi •• l (i .•. 
orber rb.n I.nd), .nd increase tbe land input, tbe .ve""ge and muginal products 
of l.nd rise and then (aJ] in a pmern witb wbicb we arc all f:lmili.r, tbe mar-
gin.l curve intersecting the .venge curve 11 tbe I.<ler', muimum. We ran ap-
ply ,his analytical .col ro ground ren, by leuing ,be complements incmls¢ .Iong 
,,·irh .be land. cboosing that .pplicuion of tbe complements whicb would IlC' 
oPfinut (or ~b ocreage considered. Subtncting rhe a''CI"l&' complemenwy rosa 
froll) tbe avenge gross product lelves us "'ith the avenge ne< producf of !he 
bnd. or gro\lnd rent. Tbe Curve will rise to 1 maximum .nd fall. jus< as does 
tbe simple .ver~gc producr curve. only of (ourse ,,·;.h a less It~p gradie'lt. The 
poi", is illusfnted in Figures 1A and lB. 
Aven&, net product (ANP) is tbe difference betWCCn AGP and ACC in 
Fig. 1A. I, is graphed scp1l"l.ely on Fig. lB. Note tbe dWlIcrcristic lens.sh1pt::. 
Hning the :lVenge net product curve, I m .. ginal ncr product curve ml)' be 
constructed to iI, .dared JUSt as in .be simple casco This is the MNP curve of 
Figure lB. It cln .Iso be construcrcd u margin.1 groSl product len m.rgin'l 
complementary (OilS. 
In long run equilibrium, nurgin.I, and average r.:m would be eq\lal. How· 
C\'Cr. long run equilibrium ;5 1 r.:molC wiJt-o-tbc.wisp dUI! economic for.:n pur. 
slle ..,ithoul often maining. In p1rticul .. , in times ""ben the op!im.l seale of 
forming bu dlanged ... pidly. as over .he last CVo'ent)" )"C"1I1, I1C<;cssil2ring • pain· 
ful r.:grouping of rural spatial r~lations, !b~ number of &rms of op!im.1 si ze is 
few. Diverg~nce of ave ... g~ and marginal renr is the rule. 
Added to Ibis, even in petiods of ualic tcchnologiral optima, inadequare 
financi.l re~rcC$ for bnd putcbasc bold many units in tbe s!a~ of incrtUing 
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aver:age returns (0 land, .... here they manage 10 survive by imputing less than 
Ihe marginal COSI 10 a brge bloc of their 1$5I:u-$1y the o .... ned plus the first 
mortgage portion- .... hieh they gel on belter terms Ihan they could additionol 
funds. AI the othet extreme, are Ihose: wilh supenbundant asselS, telative to 
Iheir manag<:mcnl capaci ly, .... ho an and do accept lower margina l tales of r(:. 
lurn than mo.ny others in Iheir neighborhoods. These (orlunale persons .... ill IIO! 
be forced by compelil ion back to an optimal landholding. 
In an~I)'!ing Ihe allocalion of I~nd among films. il is lhe marginal renl thar 
is relevant. When Ihe op'imal acreage has risen mueriall)·. as r«<:ndy, SO tN.I 
man)' nrms find lhemselvn belo .. ' rhar oplimal size, the social opportunii)' (OIr 
of land in olher holdings is 10 be reckoned II Ihe marginal !Cnt. which is higher 
Ihan rhe ave"'g<:. It is possible for expanding filrmers [0 pal' more fOI malginal 
a((es. eilher as rcnt or purchase price, Ihan (he), cou.ld pay for rhe avenge acn: 
of their farms. " will pay many less aggressive fa rmers 10 pa rtition theil hold· 
ings among their expansive rleighbors at such high prien. This is pan of lhe 
pulling and hauling involved in Ihe awkward transition from onc avcnge aen:· 
ag<: 10 another. But woe be unlo that individual, or 1hal people. who mistake 
lhese high prkn for Ihose .... hieh the market an S\lSrain! 
Another elemenl of instabi lity in the (ransilion to a larger avenge fann 
acrcag<: is the sp«uiati'"C exp«Iarion of continued rising land prica Ihl may be 
engendered by I long period of actual incre:lSl:. By and large, and not .... ithstand· 
ing many exceptions. it is larger land holders .... ilh grealCr financi u SlIengl!> .... ho 
all: able 10 pUi the higher present ""Iue on these fuNrc eXpc<lations. This factOr 
add! s!leng th to anmhe! SOrt of "economy 6f scale", derived from financi~l !Ither 
than lechnological condirions. And so ~ move loward farm enlargement may 
f~d, (0 an extent. on ilself. as expcclllions of rising land prien stit up spewla. 
rive detrulnd ""hieh fulfills Ind reinforcn the expectation. 
In the last I"=ty )'C:I.1l, our profeuion has dirttted ics crucia' barbs:against 
Ihe farmer ""he renuined 100 small, although much of his inertia mighr be ".. 
([onaliIed as an effort to recover parr of Ihe unexhlu$led valun of old improve-
menu. By eontr:u l we have been g<:nrle .... ilh him who rcm1ined or b-ed.mc 100 
large. II is al$O po$sible, however, 10 opcnl!c tOO m:lny acres with roo lillie man· 
ag<:mcnr. bbor. bui ldings and equipmenl, and move to the righl o f Ihe Optimal 
point of ID2ximum averag<: n:nt. 
In Ihis evenl, Ihe marginu nel prodUCI or marginal renl of land is Ie$! than 
ils avcrag<: value. As Figull: IB ind icarcs, lhe marginal Il:nt ralls to zero , while 
the avcragc is onl)' a link below irs mll!imum. This means rhat loch farllll an 
dispense .... irh bnd al smul m1tginal reductionl of OUtpUl. Experience .... ith ac~ 
1ge con'rol programs, .... here many farmers with lillie difficulty main rained OUI-
put after larg<: acreage reducdons, IUgsCSrs thai rhis situation is not so U!\(Qrn-
mono The essential discconomy of holding surplus. underu ti l i~ed acres is con-
cealed when land prices arc rising by a good pe«cn(age each )·ear. This "apit:al. 
gain", mag nified by iu p!lrtial exemption from income Ill!, conSli~r(:s 1 SOrt of 
" 
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revC1>ue from bods olhctwi$e unproduah<c and $«fJl5 to obviate an}' dO$l," tton· 
om)' of the land rtSOur« by the affiuenl , Bur when IWO dea.cks of annual pri« 
increments have bro ... ght land values '0 1 high plale:au from which further in-
crements arc unlikdr, but on which bnc nxes and imerest and depiction" be· 
gin to hurn evcn the "StrOngcH hands," \\'C move into 1 rime of vcry different 
reckonings when fundamental reconsidc,-"rions of our ideas about economies of 
sc~le lire due. 
Tn.nry "nd Ik «mmJJl ~f II11"lil",/"1111 
Tenan,), is an irlSlirurion " 'here-by those who hold ride to surplus land to 
""hieh they no ilPpure little muginal rem lend it 10 alhers with ride to 100 
little bod 10 round O\l! an optimal unit. The «onomie pressure IC1Iding to 
Icnan~' is the difference Ix''''«n the marginal rcntS, nor the avenge ones, im· 
pured b)' those "'jth tOO much md tOO littie lind, Th., iverage renn. in faCl. 
mighr be the »me. Avenge rent might even be higher on the larger holding, 
(although this is unlikely,) and it still be economical to lease land to a soulier 
one. 
S"b-mlll "1. u·&Jk "";' /TIm 
The on:linuy moning of rent is as applied to a .... holo: eronomic unil like a 
160 acre farm. Within the unit, ho ... ·C"'Cr. Ihere is an internal sparial organization 
.... hich putS ~ higher premium on some space, l.g. in and around .he fumsrad., 
chan on other, t.g. the baek forty_ In his use of land ,he farmer shoulrl. Ihere-
:"ore. recognize sub-rents. and economize accordingly. And in buying Or selling 
bnd to e~pand Or contnc! his acre:age he should price it by how it filS into his 
scheme of things. nOt as In entire ly homogeneous inpul. In respect 10 location. 
every inch of ground is unique. and in adding land to an enterprise, addi,iorul 
acres are l il:d~' to be muginal nOt JUSt in quantil)' but in location as well. 
Dtdlmitm of agml t»J/J 
When bnd is lo.sed, tenant·landlord .darions consume a good deal of at· 
tention, as Dr. Hurlburt's paper shows. This is expensive, and if ,he landlord 
employs an agent will be mo.surabk in a monetary excess of what the tenant 
pays over what rhe landlord receives. It is arbi[lary whether we define ground 
renl as what .he tenant pa)·s. or the lesser amount that the landlord receives, 
ner of agent cosu. In this study. I will follow the lute! definition: ground rem 
is ... 'hl! the landlord rccei,"CS, net of agen. COStS- This definition has Ihe advan· 
tage thu this is the ground rent on which an absenlee landlru-d W(luld hue his 
bid for a land tide. It is also the ner social Vlllue of the bnd under tenancy. agent 
CO$I being de:ad loss. 
"A' hi&b<r I&nd ....... <be ptopo<tion of."'po soil ~ /, II ~ «> d<pl«< to .. d«liI><od .. ol>t 
yo!". 01. catri~ 01 tOpOOilloa> ri ..... lot"", 01 "'" vio-po btiJiqo loa> "t>c<o«oo .".,.."....bI • . Hip..,.,.. .. 
plorion <twvo. >nd hial><r <O/UonO>tMn o.wro. ",.." \oof<t ........... 
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DIFFERENTIAL CAPITALIZATION AN D T H E ALLOCATI ON OF 
LAND AMONG O WNER·OPERATORS 
This audience requir~s no d~monsua t ion that land ide:ally should move to 
the firm prepared to impute it the highest marginal rent (net revenue product). 
Th" is the de:ar implication of basic economic analysis, subject onl}' to sp«ia1 
reservations and 9uibbks rhat do not challenge the underlying priflcipb of 
~conom1Zlng. 
Our insdrntions raise many sp«ific barriers to lhis goal, items roo numerous 
to derain us here. But one b,urier is so universal, SO transcendent of specific ages 
and culrures, as to warran t our artenrion as a general problem of economic 
thror),. That is the barrier between borrowers and lenders lfl Ihe markers for 
mon~)' and credit. 
I.(t us suppose, to make the point, that leasing land has been ourla,.,ed: 
operators mwt be owners, and owners operators. In this wodd of owner>()per.!" 
tors, land would mo"e (0 the tenure of the highest bidder. Bu, this bidder would 
nor necessarily be he who would impute the la nd Ihe maximum marginal rent, 
Capitaliza tion rares are of co-equal weight In determining bids, and Ihese rateS 
vary among individuals. 
Individuals differ widell' in rhe relation of Ihe assers they (omrrund to their 
capacity 10 manage Ihem productively, SO rhere is no tendenc), for marginal pro-
du(!ivities of assets ,0 be equal as among individuals. II is " 'iddy assumed in 
our profession th.t money and (redit markers mdioreare this condition, but, al 
best , our financial institutions lea,'~ a wide gap between rhe high inreresr rares 
the), ask and the low ones they pal' : necessarily so if the), are ro supporr them_ 
seh'es, and, often, a good de:al more .so because they are sheltered from competi. 
non. 
But that is the beSt view of it. There is room for deMIC whether financw 
inst itudons on balance tend at all in the dire<:rion of equating the financ;..l 
sn~ngth of individuals, inasmuch as the overriding criterion of !ending is coila· 
tereal suurit)", To a high degree , therefore, financial Institutions are media via 
which mone), runS uphill, thn is from depositors of mooereate means, who need 
the liquidit), thar financial institutions con provide ,hem, to borro"'crs with 
abundant collateral security. Thus financial power lends ro cluster about est:lb-
lished nuclei , n lhe! than spread itself .bour equirrurginally 
Land economists are familiu with this phenomenon, and with the .... rious 
t:lrionai izations of it, Many economists are more s)'mpathetic with those fltional· 
i ~ arions than I, and if ,his paper were to be twice as long. the addirionalhalf 
would deal with rhese issues. For brevity'S sake I am declaring them beyond the 
scope of <his paper, hoping that Section V, which discusses ho"- we mar shorr· 
circuit the money markers, will obviate ,he larger pall of such a discussion my" 
, '1':20)'. 
"Financial menSth" is a concept of severeal dimensions. For exposito£)· 
brevi!)' we may sum them up in i, the illteresl rare internal to the firm, and this 
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paper ... ill follow !ha! prace;ce henccfor!h, Thi, i is a very simple conccp!, yet 
in my experience often ClIIlh up ,II manner of irreleV2.m and evCn mystic con, 
no!atioru, SO leI us d."dl On it for a momem, II is premised On thc id~ that 
cuh individlUl and firm is an is!Jnd, so to speak, in resp«t to credit, separated 
from orher islands by rhe COStS of rraruferring funds, On each island there is 
struck I 5Cparate suppl}'..::Iemand balance which determines a scparate insular in, 
rcI'CSt rue, ;, This insular I is the joint product of aU the factors contributing to 
the individual's suppl}' and demand. and doet nOI depend on or imply an)' par-
ticular dogma about intereS{. " is ,he obvious and immedia'e re~u l l of Ihe sim-
ple fact thu il costs monel' to lend mane)', and rhese lending COSts vary with 
Ihe borrower, 
In order to avoid confusion betwttn Ihis concept and various others, and 10 
signali~ ,he insub r analogy, leI me chrisrcn it ,he "insular" inrerest nte of tl\( 
individual or firm, The insular individual in{erest olle is the inlernal rale esrab. 
Hshed by the b:r.Jancc of supplr and demand ... ithin the parriall), insulated ccon· 
om)' of the individual, Those have 10 ... insular interest rates whose owned ll$SI:U 
and credir linC$ are large reluive to their ability and indination to administer 
rhae a~rs; and those have high insular interest ralC$ whose ability and inclina· 
tion to put mone), to productive use are high relative 10 the assetS n their dis-
posal. 
A low.; firm can bid land away from a high-i firm if the muginll rem of 
the lind is the same to bolh, This in itself is not a serious diseconom)', but tl\( 
10 ... ·; firm can now expand, and the orher must contraCl. unti l a linal equilibrium 
in "'hieh the mHginal rent is materially lower to the low-; firm than '0 the 
other. At this poin! the marginal renu of the cwo firms will be:u the same pro. 
poreion 1 5 their intcrest rales. This is the problem of differential Clpitalizacion. 
The problem i, eX:lCC.b:r.tcO when the.e prevails a general expectation Ihac. 
renu will rise in the future. Suppose, for :il simple example, that rems are (](-
p«ted to rise in a geometric progression of J96 per )nr. The apitaliz:nion form· 
ula b«omC$ 
v;; -!..... 
i . d 
(I) 
Subtracting" from; in (he denominator addslevenge 10 i. In Ihe simple 
epitll iution formula; is ct.·equally importlnt with tI; bur hCIC i is more im-
portant. 
. Consider a numcriCiI example. If the insular interest rates, i , of tWO firms 
are ~ and 4Sf:, and constant furur~ (enn; arc expect~d. the twO firms will adjust 
their marginal landholdings until the marginal rerus oor the ratio of 8% 1049&, 
or ""0 to one. But if the)' expcct fucure rentS to rise ar 2% yearly the ratio be· 
comes .08 •. 02 ~ or ,hrc<: to one . 
. ()4 • .{)2 .02 
Let us puc it in ICIIllS of marginal COSt. Assuming for the present no lUes, 
the marginal COSt of holding tide to land for one year equals V x i, where V is 
land value and i is .he firm's insular intefCst ra te. Thus the marginal COSt of 
RES~ARCH BULLETIN 810 
holding tide for one year ""ries dir«t1y with ~ firm's f. As the firm e<ju~,es!TW' 
ginal (OSt with marginal net rev~nue pro.ducr (marginal rent), the margins of re. 
rurn to which different firms ~xtend their land·holdings vary directly with i, d>e 
symbol which epitomizes their financial mength. 
Now, within this fr~mework again, let there prevail a genc~l expecution 
'mil ren,s will riS( in rhe furure. The incre>sed levefllg<: of, may Ix demOllStflI1ro 
almosr as simply as in our first enmple, and much more generall)" 
The rising expectarions reach back [0 [he present and manifest themselves 
in tWO "''''ys, immediately_ One is a higher present land value, V; rhe other is an 
annwl increment to land value. dV, as Ihe higher expectations of things to come 
move each )'ear closer to Ihe present, The higher land price, V, raises the mar· 
ginal annua l COSt of holding lide in proportion to ,he internal interest rale, i; 
"'hite ,he annual price increment, dV. may be reprded as i deduction from mar· 
ginal COSt (or an addition 10 marginal revenue, as one prefers). 
Thus. Ihe anticip:llion of rising fu,ure rentS has t"'O effeclS which afe mm-
ually offsetting. The antiCipated price increment promprs ill firms to expand 
their landholdings, while the higher land price aJre>dy re:ali~ed consrfllins thrnl 
.11 10 conlTaCt. BUI Ihe joint forces will nonetheless have :IJl impon:lJl[ net dre« 
because Iheir impact is uneven as among different firms_ Annual price incre. 
ments affect. ll firms similarly." But the impacl of higher land prices is propor-
lion.1 to rhe insular interest r-a les, i, of different firm s, 
The lever-age of i is now increased in twO ways First , the base on which in· 
terest is re<koned has risen. Second, Ihe annual increment to land value, dV, a 
constant as .mong different firms, is to be SUbll1lCled from the inrerest COSt, Ihus 
magnifying rhe reluive effe<ls of given differences in intercsl COSt. 
Let uS repeat this reasoning in symbolic form. The equation of marginal 
COSI and m~ginal revenue in the land mark~t requires basically that marginal 
rent ( MR) equal interesl COS[, Vi: 
MR = Vi (') 
Bu, with rising rentS expecled w~ must change (2) by subtfllcring ,he annU.:II 
price increment, dV, from interest cosr. 
MR=Vi.dV (3) 
This may be alled ,he "dynamic equilibrium condition" of th~ market for land 
rides. 
The lcver-age of i is brought OUI mos. markedly when "'e divide through by 
The rightmost expression, dV IV, is the annual rise of land value expressed as a 
percentage .. If Ih~ figure is say 2%. Ihe const~ining force of a 3% insular inremt 
flIte, i, is cut down co 1%. The force of a 6% insular mrereSt Ute is CUI down 
"Un<l<f 0." pee"'" ' .""mp,i ... , ,~" i •. In I"Kti« "I""""ioII> of i""",,,,,"" ,,,.,. wi,~ iod;vido>!<, 
pos;"g .. addi,""'1 probl<m "'" ,,,,,-,«I Ott •. l<;, >I", piob>bl< "", (T<d;, -~-..k in,di,;du>l$ <aM'" 1""' m"," 
v:ol ..... i",,,,,,,,,,,,, .",il oI>o,d, b<fot< ,I>< d, .. of ><N>l n>h ",Ii.""",,, 
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rel~rivd~ leSS. to 4%. Th~ r.tio of (h~ (wo conlfr. intl is cur from .06/.03. Or 
twO to one. dO"'n to .04/.01. or four ro one. 
The n~t result of rising expect~tions then is In incre~sed I""er>ge for inter. 
est differentia ls, t~nding ton'ards gre.,cr disp.rities of margin.l rems bet"'een 
low·i and high.i landholdings Holding land complet'd)" idle under new red:una· 
rion projects, Or in suburban uen. is the c~treme manifestation of rhis . Where 
price incremems a'" rapid, they alone rna}" be enough ro offset ,he COSt of hold· 
ing tirle and jusrify (to ,he individual at le.st) holding land "'hose marginal 
",venue produci is zero. 
[s it no, plausible that rhe s.me force. in mild .. form. h.s been working in 
the hrm re;ll estare morket in rhe lasr 'wemy years) A recent stud), alleges th., 
increme",s to f.rm land values have consri,uted half the net incom~ of . gricul. 
ture in reeem )·e"5. bur regardless of the exaCt figur~, thes~ increments haw: 
clearl)' been • major force to reckon with. 
Our profession has neglected to make rhis r~ckoning. wi,h the resull thar 
our .n.lysis of trends in land 'enure gives undue. at limes il seems exdusi"". 
emph.sis to technological f.ctors. For example, recent analysis of trends in firm 
size has focussed on ,he rise of mon acruge per farm, with technological forces 
receiving almost all ,he responsibilit),. MC'-n"me, we have shur Our eres '0 an 
e<Juallr striking acre.ge trend, tha, is the increasing disp<:rsion of farm si,es 
. round the mono or ,he drift 'oward ex'reme cont!'llStS between large ~nd small 
filrms. This is e:lSiest me:uured in the Lorenz Concent!'ll,ion R:.tio, .n ~xpression 
of the bend in • Lor,nz curve. The La",nz Concem!'lltion R:.rio for the distribu· 
tion of firm land ~mong holdings of differem sizes ha.s been rising !'lIpidly. 
This aspect of recent trends would seem to defy and den)' ,he rechnologiol 
imper:l!ive th .. is usu.lIr invoked to exorcise demons of doubt over .the wdfare 
implic~rions of farm consolidations. For technologicaJ f.etor! alone would ,end 
to force forms ,oward m~an op,im.l sizes. lnstead, ho"'"""", filrms are becoming 
ever mo", dispa!':lre in size. This trend is more consistent with ~ thesis based on 
increased relative impon~nce of the problem of fin:mcing title to land that i$ .,.. 
pensive tod:.y and expected '0 be moreso 'omonow. This is no, a rhesis 'lur Cll!l 
be demonsr"'lCd wi,h experimenral data borrowed from the Department of ... gri. 
culru!'lll Engineering. It is a job for fresh re$C1rch by land cconomisrs, and one 
which we have !l('gl<'(red overlong. 
But, for rhe presen, paper. we ue primarily concerned with the conclusion 
th.t the allocarion of I.nd among owner-0p'r.uors ,5 powerfull)' inHuenced by 
C'-pitali21tion !'lites which vary among individu.ls: ~nd ,hat ,hese individual di£. 
ferences take on m.gnified imporrance in • rising market. These: conclusions give 
us some insight into the economic force5 le.ading ,owards tenancy, which we 
take up next. 
THE FUNCTION O F TENANCY 
S!x,rf.arr:lliting fix mcn.y marMfS 
Temncy is a means for r!'llnsfcrring m.n~gement control nf lalld from rhose 
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" ""ith surplus to thox ""ith shortage of both land md the final\(Ci,1 strength 10 
buy mOrl:. It accommoda(es the 9.'a.kly financed who prefer to bu)' dUr:l.blc in· 
puts :IS they do others, one )·a! at a time, and avoid the financial burden of in· 
"dli,lg in a casll)' present claim on remote fuwtc valud. If substitutes the hoc· 
ro""ing of land for (ne borrowing of moner. 
Tenancy is thercby 1 means to mcliOr:l.tc tne problcm that would obtain in 
I ""orld of owner--opentors, the problem of widely divergent marginal rents of 
land on large and small holdings: high rents on urKknized, o,·entdfed holdings; 
and low ones on ovenimi, rdativdy undermanned holdings. 
The funcrion of ten:mcy, as often expressed, is to Je, landlords help tenants 
bJ' b(aring for thcm Inc financial burden of holding rille. Tnis imerprl:udon 
strikes a change of nuance tha, is mislading. It seems to presume that the high 
price of bnd is an inducr:l.ble burden imposed by Naturl:, a "given" with which 
man hilS no choice but to cope as best he can: 
From ,he small individual viewpoint, it is truc, tflc market level of land 
prices is fi~ed cx(ernally. Bur to transpose this vic .... point ro 1 social andylls 
constilutcs 1 splendid example of thc fallacy of composirion. Landlords coliC(. 
rively do not suppl)' land. Nature and public works l:argely monopolilc tlul 
function. L:andlords colkcdvely r:l.lher bid up the prices of ritlcs to this land, 
abo,'C tM =h of Imanu. Thus Ihc}' collectively Cl'l:lIte the need that as individ· 
uals they fulfill. 
Individual usefulncss coupled with collectivc dispensability is (he eternal 
ambivalence, iron)" and tragedy of ,he landlord elm. W e arc ill equipped to un· 
derstand and cope .... ith .... orldwide land rdorm movements, likcwise the resist· 
ance 10 Ihem, .... ithoul an applccillion of bolh sides of this paradox. To urn· 
bute renancy solely 10 the financial wC::lkness of tC1U.nrs ';s fO hold, al last im-
plicitly, an unforgivably naive COI\(Cep< of the origin and do:tcrminarion of land 
\'1Ilucs. Tenmcy springs u much from (he financial slrength of bndkmb u from 
the 'Na.lrness of tenanrs. It is the conlnSI of the 1"""0, not lhe absolute level of 
eilher ..... hich is css~nriaJ. Any policy recommendation is doomed 10 fru!t"lion 
that ignores this basic rl:lllionship. 
Land 1'1. OIINr dllr"bU inp"ll 
Why is leasing SO much more common with bnd than with, for eHmpk, 
Ir:l.CtOrs? Because land is much more dunblc, so that irs price-arnings I1l1io is 
much higher than for t~tDrS-s:ay 20 as compared to Ihra- or so. Bur mere is I 
difference of kind as 'Ncll as degl"tt, because U1CIDrS ""o.r OUt ... ·nile Ihe ground 
is rl:12tively perm:anenl, and often even better thlll that, appreciating. So rractor 
priccs must be reckoned low enough, normally. that imputable cuningJ will re-
turn bolh a yield and rhe inirial ouday within the machine's brief lik span. The 
machine is 1 self.liquidating i nv~stment, bUI lahd i$ priced so as never ro rerum 
lhe inilial ouday, only a yield on il. Amortization of purchase must come from 
olher funds. 
For these and related reasons the inletal burden of holding: title 10 I.and is 
much havicr Ihan the intercsl burden of financing less durable inputs. The 
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financial (0$1 of keeping 1 U'lIe,or is lugely depreciation. In ifS laler ye:l.r5 espe-
cially. in!crest is ncgli,giblc. The financial COSt of holding land is almos! all in_ 
teresI, Therefore the imcrcs. -dli{icir)" of demand for land is much higher than 
for less durable in"esrmcms. The si>«aum of in!creS( I'lUd; operates sekcti ydy_ 
Lo-oJ.j firms :&11: pushed imo Ill'Kl invcsrmcms; high-i firms OlU of ,hem. Th.o: coo-
(rlllII Cre2.ICS the n~ for !enancy of lands. ' 
Thl inadtquacy of ImaflCY 
While tenancy melion!.:s ,he differential upilaliurion problem b)' shorr-
circuilin& t~ money rmtkcls. if is 11 best 1 )nuul solurion 10 ,he ecooomizill8 
problem rhus posed. As landholdings·sto .... I ... get than one rmn nn h1l'Wllc. = 
course (O lC':I.sing somewhat defers the advent of diminishing marginal r(turns 
to land, by vinue of decemralizing management. Bllt the overpreued landlord 
cannOt thllS unbllrden himself of 111 partidp'''ion in management, nOt if he 
wishl!$ to $«urc much income from his land. and maimain its physical com!i· 
rion. In I\w:r, recollf'$C to t~ancy CR':lIte:l new management probkms tlut do no< 
exist before: the tmant·landlord reluionships. and ofren the srill more comple>< 
renant'agcnr,landlord relttiGnships . So. while a landlord m~y put off the penalty 
of diminishing reNrns \0 scak of management. he cannot do SO indefinitely. 
If landlord.. senerally were energetie about administering aU their 1$$CU, and 
put littk value on thejt o .... n ri~ and taknt, .he)' eould collect rent from and 
0~t$U qlliu: a few tmants without suffering seriousl)' diminishing nurgina! reo 
turns. No dOllbt there are those .... ho do. Bur, in general, landlords have many 
demands on. their time. including the proper enjoyment of their remal incomes. 
The very reason for becoming and remaining a landlord is ro s~re a fairly =. 
tain income from sllrplus in"estable funds without having to malee a career of 
administering them. Exhortation to landlords to dedicate more careful :mention 
to tental coml":lcn. thereforc, is largd)' shouting into thc ,,·ind. Administflni..: 
energy and takm are scarce and cosd)' rl!$Ources, not to be alloc1!ed to the de-
tails of landlord·renant relations without recompense. 
Till thcor), recogni~es an "excess burden" from indirect 11xes. which COSt 
taxpayers more than the)' g:Lin the fisc. Rem theory needs to recognize an 
analogolls excess burden in lc:uing. The tenant somCl"iml!$ f'\'Ys more than me 
landlord reaives. the difference being impuubk ~ "agern COSt~. 1be tenant also 
sllffers other costs that are nOt revenues to the landlord, as his mort term Ie= 
precludes the long-term production planning that is .:ssenrial ro optimal im-
provement and use. These and related "excess bUNens" of tenancy insure thar 
k~ing anOOt enrirely solve the problem posed by differential capitaliza.ion. A 
bndlord cannot as a rule $«UrC from Jesse<! land a tlCt rerum ~ high as the mar· 
gina l rent which his tenant could impute to the land were he, the tenam, its 
ownet-operator.'· And so a gap remains between the marginal rents impu,ed ro 
und on undersized and oversized owner-operation$, a gap roughly commensurate: 
,...",. pp ~ ..,. ......... c"W ... p«>o6o«. "'" ....,. I>< ~tr <kIo<d ;f..,. .....- ~Ioo_ 
,I>< land an<! .... pa-. _ ""lin in--.... .. It ... Ilk ....... ~ ~ A. C. -... " r4-... p. U'_ 
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with the-exctss burdens of tenancy. And rhe lands which are consigned to the 
perils of opention by non·owners suffer under all the ffumarions of the land. 
lord·rerum rduionship. 
A.."'J ALTERNATIVE TO TEN ANCY: T HE EFFECTS OF 
AD VALOREM REAL ESTATE TAXES ON THE 
ALLOCATION OF LAND 
It is widely recognize<llhat leuing and lending are means to help move 
land assets from rhe tenure of those wilh more than they can manage effectivdy 
10 lhe n:nure of those with less. It is not SO widdy recognized, hence Ihe more 
impotT.lnt to Stress, tlut here is in our institutional haW8C a rhird means to dlC 
same end. Thn is the lUi "..J(/,.,,,, land [a~ component of the genenJ property 
tax. 
The ad ","0,.,,,, land ra~ is a fi~ed annual charge on land, Nsed, ISluming 
the asseSlor does his job, on Ihe maximum latent rent , or opponunity cost, of 
eo.ch site, withoul regard to pruent use, user. or owner. II is, in the lawyers' 
expression, ;11 ,.,,,, and nOI ill ptTUII."" which is 10 say il is based solely on 
qualities of the land and nOl on qualilies of individuals o .... ning or opera ling it 
Regzding it 15 a cost of holding title to land, il comnSI5 shorply with inr=, 
since Ihe l,mer charge varies among individuals and so ([('lites the ploblems ""e 
have been discussing. 
There is a lendency to regard taxes as an additional burden heaped on lOp 
of other$. adding 10 the lotal cost of ho.lding tide to land. From an individual 
and short Nn vie .... point this is true enough. B UI 10 Innspose this lItirude to 
social analysis of the effect of land taxes, as is ollimes cardessJy done, is again 
a fallacy of composition betraying either innocence o r amnesia of the principles 
of taX npitalization. As ad va/f)"'''' land llX riteS rise. land values tend 10 fall, 
(mms parihllJ). The land tlX burden is therdore nOI piled on lOp of the im=t 
burden. Ralher il tends to displace it as tbe plime COS t of boiding tide to land. 
The disp!:acement of an intaest eharge Ihal ba..., on different individuili 
unequally by a I2X dwge tlut is indifferent 10 individU1l crniit ratings is going 
to luve quite lfl imp"t on lhe allocllion of land among firms. This subsTitu-
tion makeJ it costlier for low-i landlords 10 hold land, and cheaper for high.i 
tenan(s. and for others with pOOl credit. It reduces the capit~1 bartier 10 land-
ownership and displaces il with a more dire(t test of marginal producl ivity, to 
wit, the .... iIIingness to pay an explicit annual charge. Thus il lendS to ra!locare 
bod &om the: bellu.1Uunced to the land.hungry .... ho impure 10 land a high mat-
ginal tent. 
The point is illustrated numerically in Tables l A and lB. Table IA shows 
the effe(l on land price, V, of a constant annual :ad valorem land tlX of rale (, 
according to the formula 
M\$SOUIlI AOIlICUL1'l1IlAl ExPEIlIMI1I-'T STAnON 
v. _ ,_ !<, 
i + I 
This;s Ihe Slandud lexlbook concepl of IV: capitalization. Table lA sho .... s the 
process of clpitalintion at se'·el"1.l different intCrtSl ~tes. Nore rhal capitaliu· 
l ion pr~5 fur ... at lower ;ntere5t 1"1.1es. 
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Table 1B shows the reallOCition of land that <xcuo as tax roHes rise. Where· 
as Table IA assume$ an annual marginal r~nt (",," in formula #4) of $1 for all 
parties, Table IB aS5umes that ;;'ksm. 2~, 4%, and 8% ha"e, for rhe site in ques--
tion, marginal rentS of $3. $4. and $' respectively. With no taxes, Mr. 2% is 
easi ly the highest bidder. but as tax t:ltes rise the bid shifts to Mr. 4% and finally 
10 Mr. 8%. Thus land taXes tend to reallocate land from "strong hands'"-those 
with financial surpluses-into more proouctive hands. 
It follows from this analysis that society may shorr-circuit both the money 
Il12rkers and the losing markets by havy use of"" ""Iemn land taxation. squeez· 
ing much of the value from land titles and substituting ta.~ cosrs for intnest 
COSts . This method has th" adv:l/mge over losing and lending of lading row:i!ds 
a complete e<J.uating of marginal rents among different firms, with no residual 
inter·firm barriers such as those that characterize the money and the rental mar· 
kelSo 
The adv:mtage of he:l.v)" taxation is grelter in the event of 1 gener.ll exp:<tlt-
tion of rising prices for land titles. Let us rerum to Eqn. 3a (p. 41), wherein "''C 
analyzed the effect on land markets of anticipated price increments. The yearly 
tax t:lte, (t), fits into the e<J.uation as an addition to the tight side: 
MR=i_dV+t (') 
V V 
The firm adci5 land to its holdings until it reaches rhe marginal equilibrium con-
dition dut the last unit yields interest and taxes, Jess the perCl!:ntage price incre. 
ment (complementary COStS having ~en alrady netted out in finding MRl. 
Note thn the leverage of i is increased by dV IV, but reduced by t. Note 
further that the illacati"e impact of t varies directly ",ith dV/ V, and inversdy 
with i. The sk~plical reader ma), confirm this by cOnstructing numerical exun· 
pies on the paltern of the paragraph following Equation (3a), p. 41. 
Land tuation has a rdated bUI additional adVilntagt' of r~lasing for higher 
uses the resourc~s otherwise devoted 10 ~ngin~ring such loans as do ra ke place 
for land purchase. The legal, administrative and appraisal talent and training that 
go into arranging land purchase loans ... ·ould be largely obviat~d. It need nOt go 
un~mplo)"ed, ho",ever, as the need for shott and inrermediate credit to the new 
tide·holden "'ould expand. 
The for~going analysis applies, of course, only to so much of the general 
property lax as falls on land," and that is asseS5ed in pt:lcrice ~ the 13w directS, 
on the latent productivity or opportunity COSt of land. The part that hils on 
improvementS ( ... ·hieh includes that ",hieh is nominail)" levied on land but 
aCluall)' is increased ",hen land is improved) has less ",holesome "ffects, since 
the form and durability of improvem~nts are altuabJe by Ih~ men ",ho create 
and maintain them, and certainly ",ill be altered ",ith a vie'" to avoiding taxes. 
T he ~ffect of such tU~S on the characrer and quantity of improvementS makes 
"Abo on "uly 1'<""""'"" imptO'"<mont> like "'"'" J.o"J·fdl$- I, wooM moko s-I """" 040 <0 ... thco<. 
J>fO"iokd (0) <boy"", ""'r iod<.<N<tibk. L">d (b) ,I>< ;,..,."ci .... '" ~ m= of!b<m is ,<Wned br op<>h<y 
of «>mp<ns.,inS !be p,,,,h"' .... 0< ,hei, .. ~gn«s kit 'he ri!'>t <0 ax """" 
" 
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an imccaling srudy. We arc here concerned, ho""cvtt. soldy wilh the effects OIl 
the allocation of land. 
T u:cs on improvements as a rule add morc 10 the COStS of those who use 
bnd morc in{cnsivdy. md so lend to dull the edge of the markel'S allO(llive 
incemives. T he difference bcl·, .. ~n hiSh and low muginal renn imputed by 
more ,mel less intensive users of land is diminished by these rues. 
It is nor rKCCSSar}' for a sptt"ific acre 10 be improved to suffer from d iscrimi· 
nation of Ihis son. Suppose an acre is sold from a VaClnt holding 10 another 
wilh an ade<ju:llc (umstod. The assessor lends to judge hlms as un;rs, and 50 
10 speak sprod the fum buildings over the lands they serve. In d ue course, the 
new ane will in theory be assessed at a higher r:l.IC on account of having bcm 
rhus "improvtd." In ptl<;tice. ,his may account in pan for the tencKncy in some 
jurisdiCtions toward ~blivc o\-er·asseS:llncnt of smaller holdings. . 
T hus , ad ~.I,"", I':I.xes on reat estate improvements add one more 10 the 
b~rriers obstructing an equimarginal ali()CI.tion of land among firms. T he over' 
all dfC<:t of gener:lll propen)' taxes 1$ levied in most American juri$dictions t(>. 
day is therefore mixed. Taxes on the land <omponenl improve allocuion; taxes 
on improvemenu worsen it. Whether the net effect is £»Si tive or negative is not 
immediately obvious. . 
There is some rnson to believe that the positive effects out,,-eigh the nega· 
tive, sina the highest development of land is genenll)· found in regions that 
rei)' heavily on property taxation. Some s"i king COnltl5tS are to be made ~ 
t"'~n for example the Anglo-Saxon colonial countries and the Spanish, betw~ 
the Midwest and the Southeast of thc United StatC$; between Denmark and 
England; and bet ... ·een the Irrigation Districts and the land and catde baronies 
of our WC$lern Stues. These comnsrs sugg<'"St thar property taxation is nOl rile 
curse one would garher ftom the lenor of many rcferel.lCes 10 it, and that me 
benefits of i15 land·rax componem ourweigh Ihe undesirable damages infl icted by 
the tax on improvemcnts. 
SUM.MARY AND CO N CLUSIONS 
It is possible 10 dislinguish ground rent hom other dis{riburive shares so 
long as one approaches the problem .... ilh some sympathy, and wilh pati~ Iior 
del~i1, which is 10 say so long as one {ally W2J1 IS 10. It is na:esury for indi,·id· 
uals to do so in order 10 alJ()CI.le land wilh predsion 10 iu highest u~. 
That necessary condition is not sufficient, however, fOr once ground tem is 
identified there yet remain other barriers {o the conveyance of land cirles to chc 
hands of those .... ho would PUt the lands to Iheir highest u~. The most general 
such bartier is the insului ty of individ ual interest rues, and the differen t ial 
capio:alizuion Ihat !<'"SuIts. 
Leasing of surplus lands is .. mans whereby individuals nn by.pass {he 
moner-markcl$ and shift some lands into higher uses, but {here ~re heavy a · 
cess b urdens in (he landlord_tenant relationship that keep leased lands frorn 
teach ing their higheSt devdopmenc. Society may, however, by.pass both the 
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money market and the leasing market by rdying heavily on ad fllll()rtlll land 
toIxes , 
DISCUSSION, GROUND RENT AND THE 
ALLOCATION OF LAND AMONG FIRMSt8 
uurd D. Lofug:.l.m 
N orrh Dakou Stare U nivers ity 
Gaffney's anal ysis of "ground rem and the a!!ocation 0( land among firms" 
is a thought provoking discourse of many related, but seemingly insufficiendy 
developed, premises. Adequate t{eatmem of this subject in its entirety wouk! 
have been impossible within the time limitation provided. Although Gaffney has 
touched on many important facers of land allocation, I would have preferred a 
more exhaustive analys is of one or tWO of his major headings such as "Some 
problems in defining and imputing ground rent"', Also, it would have been more 
imeresting to me if a doser tieup between theoreticd ideas and empirical bases 
had been made. Gaffney has given a lucid exposition of acapted theoretiCli ideas 
but Iitde, if any, attempt was made ro expose either the imperfe<:tions of rem 
theory or the difficulties m using this theory to explain the allocation of land 
among firms , In particular, some recognition of risk and uncertaimy would = 
necessary. 
h appears from the first few pages of Gaffne)"'s paper that valid analyses of 
g round rent rests on a careful imputation of returns to land, Yet , his definition 
of ground tCnt-"gross produCt less the COSts of making the ground prodUCtive" 
-infers that ground rem is a residual return after all other factors have been 
pid their nurket COSts. Although this contradiction is a bit vague and has been 
partially qualified, it adds confusion to the conceptual framework developed later 
on, particularly because of the havy emphasis on optinul rem being the highest 
avetolge ncr product which is computed as a residua l return. In other words, JUSt 
exacrly how does one determine the opportunity COSt or future marginal pro-
ductivity of land? Is it a tesidu:.tl value or an imputed value, Ot does it depend 
on the p;uticular siru1tion being ana lyzed' G:lffney infers that it is the latter. How-
ever, this implies that one should impute a rent to land if possible, otherwise a 
residual value will suffice, If land is allocated on the basis of its marginal value 
produCtivity, this framework creates much doubt as to its validity because it is 
doubiful that land is allocated according to our abilities and tools for dw~rmin­
ing its marginal value product. 
"I'rc.cmcd" <II< UCLTC xmillu on Rm, Theo<y tr.d J>rutioo. Aprit Il, 15>61 . 
MISSOUll AGI.ICULTUL\L ExPfRII.U.''T STATION 
Throughout the paper. there "'-:15 ~ lack of explicidr d~6ning ... ·het~r.~ 
conceptual ~ndy5CS ~pplicd 10 Ihe indi"idual 6rm or to 5OCiet,·. Although tho: 
goab of both mun boo: identinl in lelms of maximllm "'dfare or a 50Cial opti. 
mum. the diversit)" of their go~ls or conllicu musc be reckoned ""ith ""hen C~· 
plaining or analping C!.U$C$ Ihat allOCIte land. The variel)' of prcc~p'S regarding 
land is the major difficuhy in de.ermining bolh the allocation of land and land 
use. Thus. if oplim.l fum size is represented b)' highest ave"ge net prodllCl. 
how dOC$ one include the non·p«uniaI)' bcne61$ tMt an indi"idual ma)" deri~ 
from land) One nn hudl)· discoum these bcnc6rs as being suf6cientl)· unim· 
potl.nr to not include them. The emphasis which our weier)" has pll«d on 
"famil)" litm thcor)'" indiC!.tC$ th.t the net prodUCI from land used for .,rku]. 
lural purposes musl contain some in"ngibles_eaJi])' included in •• heon:lia.1 
flame""ork bUI nearly imponibk to handk in an empirical an"lysis Ihat en· 
deavors ro imputt • return 10 land or detelmine ils m1rgin~1 value product. In 
f.CI, one ma)" eVen ,d"ance an argum~nt here th.t land to 5OCietj" is b«oming 
relad"ely less important than non·land resources and thai the allontion ot boo 
i$ highly dependent on the suppl)' price of non.land factor services. This doa 
noc imply rhat .he muginal rent of land is nOt important. Innnd, it sug~ 
thar the class;nl ideologies reyrding .he economie rent :and alJOClItion of land 
do IlOl sufficiently recogniZe che degree of complementarity among 1"CSOUf(e fac· 
tors. Anal),si. based on marginal value product of One factor is a necesnl)' but 
not sufficient condition fOI explaining economic phenom~n •. Accordingl)·. the 
.llocation of land is not explained by determining simply the magnirude of its 
marSinal value product. In faCt. ilS immobile chancreri!rics mak~ the .nalysis 
more complex (or. IX'rhaps. kn simplt) than that for optimallr allQC':lting non· 
land r.iIO\lftt &CCOf'S: 
B}' using a residual return as Ihe a,"erage nel produc< of land, Ga/fney de-
scribed alld illustntcd Ihar IonS 'Un equilibrium occurs ""hen aVCr::lge net pro-
duct and margind net product arc equal. Accordingly, optimum farm ,ize can 
be de6nc:d as (he acreage "'hieh yields the highest ave"ge ncr product: ro land 
U~ng this anal)"sis. I qucsrion his in tcrprct~<ion of acreage (on.rol prosnm' as 
ellposing ,he level of marginal rem. He indic"es rhat because output ;5 nn tly 
maintained after an aernge comrol prog"m has gone imo e/fo:c •. rhe marginal 
rent on Ihis land mUSt have been leu than aveftgc rem Or the optimal rem 
paint. And the reason thiJ is so is because so much land had been op:r.ucd prior 
to the program ,hal i15 marginal value product had been driven bclo ... · the opti· 
mal paim. My di$lg«<ment "~rh this rnsonin, is that: I . product pria:thangcs 
that accompany :Krage control prognms largely explain ""h)' QutPUt has been 
nuintained. ".her (han the notion .ha, &rms ... -ere 100 large; 2. "cry "pid ad· 
vances in Icchnolog)' coupled ""ith ,he fan that thc lo,,·~t production acres 
have been idk docs not allow valid comparisons inferred in the above aruolysiJ. 
That is. all bnd is nOt homogeneous in terms of produclive ability and tech· 
nolog)' has nOt remained unchanged ... ·hile ,hesc measurements of output were 
mule. The problem of &nnl being tOO large is of minor significance, 11 least, 1$ 
)·CI. 
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While I ~m not prone ~lwap to agree with rhe varying emphases in our 
profession, ( am r<lucant to share G~ffney's views that our profession has /lOt 
reckoned with the trend in dispersion of farm size. He states th:1f ,he Lorenz 
concentration mio for the distribution of filfm land holdings of dlfferenr Siles 
has bttn rising. Con:>e<juendy, he cites a need for corresponding analysis in terms 
of trends 10 land tenure. H owever, this dispersion of farm size may not be a 
general event throughout the country. For example. a recendy completed srudy 
b)' ARS alleged that (or the 10 Great Plains states, rhere was essentially riD in· 
crease in concenm.tion of bnd ownership for the 13 year period from 194~ ro 
1958. Although this study concerns only land ownership, it has a definite bear· 
ing on dispersion of farm size. 
A sd10larly treatment of capi talization Utes and effects of ad ,·alflrtm taxes 
has b~n m~de in the paper JUSt given. The imporunce of variations in bod! 
has been iIluslfued quite effectively. I chose to treat these very lightl)· because 
th= still remains much doubt in my mind regwing rhe oper:ttioml significance 
of interest !":Ites "'hen determining land values and the allocation of land. Theil' 
is repened evidence tN.t rhe textbook example of the capitalization method for 
determining land v:llues is, at best. only a conceprual guide for explaining forc.-s 
at work in the land marker. Orher facrors such as aesthetic values, technology, 
risk ~nd so on :Ire of major signifiance both for determining land values and al· 
location of land. 
In regard to ad 11~ taxes, Gaffney points our that the effects of rhis taX 
are opposite on land versus improvements. And sarisfactory separarion of the 
twO for tax purposes would seem quire remote. 
This discussion has lOuched on onl)' a few points in Gaffney's paper. In 
general, I believe he has broughr to our attention may stimul~t;ng views OIl 
this topic. Although I would have pref~rred a less esoteric and more oper1tiorul 
treatment of the subject matter, Gaff"ney has done a comm~ndable job of expos-
ing areas of inquiry that should nO! be treated lightly by the researchers in our 
field. 
OBSTACLES TO ECONOMIC DETER.MINATION 
OF FARM RENTS 
Maurice M. Kelso 
University of Arizona 
Two papers ha'"C preceded this one; each has advanced a theoretical analysis 
of a single facet of landlord.tenant .elations. One of the papers has bid OUt a 
normative theory of optimum rental determination within the farm fum; the 
other has presented the theoretical basis, partly explanatory, pardy no.tM.ti~"C, 
of the operation of the farm rental market. 
MISSOURI AGRICULTU RAL EXPERI)'(E.."'T STATION 
There ue Cwo kinds of theory fro m " .. hich deduced hypotheses may be 
drawn. The first or expl=atory rheor)' pennits deduction of hypotheses that pre-
dict whac will occur or what one will find in the teal world when he goes look-
ing. The se<:ond or normui,'e theor), permits the deducr ion of hypotheses of 
whar ought to occur or what ought to be made to OCCUr in order to "nin eer-
uin goals or norms. Explanatory theory as the name implies expbins why one 
finds what One docs in the re.l world, or what one con expect to find in the 
future. Such rheory deprts from reality onl)' to the extent rhar man's finite 
knowledge and limited mental capabilirics force him to use fewer v:lriabks ,h:m 
exist in the real ",'orld and to work with many assumptions which ""ill be, at 
le.st in pan. "unte.I." Normative theory on rhe other hand expresses what 
"ought to be" in the t'<'al world if ecn.in .ssumed goals Or nOrms are fO be .r_ 
rained. Such rheory departs necessarily from the conditions of the real world, for 
its very nature is to portray what changes in that world ought to be introduced 
if the desited go.ls are to be reached. It is an ideal construct based on certain 
value and goo.! par:l.mecets. 
The topic assigned to me is to discuss obsrac!es to economic determination 
of farm renrs. The very term "obstacles" implies that I should approach my 
topic from within che conteXt of normative ideals advanced by [he [wo preced-
ing authors, There can be no "obstacles" to the rwi •• tion of the predictions of 
expunacor)' theories. Explanator)' theories predict either rightly or wrongly; Ih~' 
con onl)" be adjudged to be inadequate if unrealized in face; they cannot be P[e-
vented of rnJization by obstacles. 
The reaJiution of the predictions derived from normative theory can be, of 
course, prevcnred b), obstacles of one SOrt Or .. nother. Men can be prevented from 
amining th"'ir goals. 
The onl)' ........ y in which the topic assigned to me could be discussed within 
the COnteXt of an explanatory theory aciv:lnced by either of the preceding authors 
would be in the sense thaI Ihe rhcory advanced by bim mighr be "in.1d~'1uate," 
tOO unrC"~1 ro be ~cceptable, as ~ result of which his theory docs not describe 
reality, nOt because there ~re things preventing our secing what the theory pre_ 
scribes, bur because the theory really is nOt explan~lOry but JUSt masquen.des as 
sucb. 
I do not believe the preceding is che intention of Ihe tide assigned to me, 
so I am going fO phn.sc my discussion within the (Ontext of the normative 
theory of renral determination within the f.um finn and the normative theory of 
the fatm renlal market both of which are derived from the conventionol eco-
nomic theory of farm firm efficienc)' maximization and perfect competition in 
the mnker. 
Such a nonnative theory of f:um rental determination embroces the follow-
ing twO aspects: (I) l\hnagement decisions relarive to production choices (in 
[he case of landlord-tenant firms these mUSt ne<:essuily be joint management de-
cisions) directed to the goal of maximiud rerums 10 the farm firm over variable 
oudays, and (2) bargaining between the parcies co the agreement (Iandlord:md 
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tenam) over sharing arrangements in the net income lhal "'ill resull from me 
managemem decisions n:2Chcd. 
MAXIMIZh~G RETUR:.,"S OVER VARIABLE COSTS 
Convemional nomutiv<: theory spccilia gencnlly tint the production choices 
to Ix r~hcd by the landlord and tenam joindy should be such as to maximize 
the "farm firm" net income over rime through the classic procC$s of mlrgin:tJ 
equllitie$ appropri~tcly adjusted for uncertainty and time prekrence. Necessarily 
involved will be knowledge of marginal producfivitie$, expected prices of inputS 
and outputs. and the whole strucrure of f2<tor-fa<ror, factor·product, ~nd product. 
product marginal value product relarionships. The goal of these minagemcru 
decisions will Ix to maximilc nCt rerum ovcr variable COSt to the Illrm firm and 
not to maximize the net return over variable COSt to the landlotd on the one 
hand nor to the tenant on the Other. 
BARGAIN ING O VER SH ARES I N THE N ET 
After management decisions have been agreed upon, which under thc usual 
normative U$umptiOl\$ will maximize net income over variable COSt to the &rm 
firm , the $CCond phase of the problem faced by the landlord and tCnlnt is \0 
bargain ovcr sharing arrangemems in the net in some context of cqualityof 
bar8'lining power so th~t the shares will be equitable in some acccptlible sense. 
Normadvc theory on this poim usually assumes that the bugaining mU$[ be 
done under conditions approaching perfect competition in the land title, land 
remal, and capital markefS_ Competitive market conditions imply equal and full 
knowledge of the conditions of the m:uker on the pan of both parties and equal 
and accessible dtern3livcs available to both. 
Ae«prinA the conventional assumptions implicit in the above formubdons, 
land, bbor, OIpiraJ, and m:uu~ent would combine within laru!Iord-rcnant firms 
in the economically "mOSt efficient" combinations and the distribution of the: 
l'C'Ward$ (net income ova variable COStS) I(cruing co the finn would :accord .... im 
imputed comributioru to ~.,}ue prod",ct by C'.Ich partY. Under soch conventioml 
uswnptioru, ''Crm woIlld Ix a "fair price," and tenants and landlords wO\lld meet, 
bU9in, Ind decide as <:<:Jual$. 
but they don't b~r8'lin as <:<:Juals and rentS aren't "fair prices" in the :above 
scnsc. Why? Obstacles to the ~ttainment of this EI)'$ian state intrude. What are 
these obstacles lIld how do they prevent utainment of this nomurive ideal? 
O BSTACLES TO ATTAIN l-.fENT O F 
IDEAL REN TS AND RELATIONS 
Obsucles rooted in the mind s o f the partia [0 t he lease: 
I. C¥Jl4dtJ ~td in nwom. Rote, rule-of rn",mb decision-nuking will OIUSC renlS 
and relations to devilte from the conventional ideals of normative theory. The 
management plan agret<! upon by the partics may not acru2l!y anain nwcUnwn 
net income over variable cosu benusc the production plan rcsu on C\lStomary 
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pncrkei. This mly l><' rhe outCOme in owner,open,ed farms. also. But i, may l><' 
the cllSe frequend~' in bndlord.,en.m negotiations 'hat customary phnS:lK 
made because they mitisate the complications of in,riCll,e plans and the dif· 
ficulties of "'orking OUt equi"ble sharing aHangements. So customary f .. mins 
srs'ems =y l><' followed. Neither may 'he sh.ring ornngements l><' in line with 
equitable rents l><'cause the shares mar be in keeping "'ith customary shoring 
pncd= nther th.n wi[h the ideal of proportionality to ,he shares in fi:\Cd COSts. 
The problems growing our of cus'omarr decision.m.king are . cccntua,ed 
in times of npid technological and economic change such as are now l><'ing ex· 
perienced. When technology and economk conditions do no! change over long 
periods. customuy ways of deciding and acling snduall)' gnvime to the "heSt" 
.nd "fair," But "'hen technology and economk circumsrances change rapidl~' 
and drastic:tllr, the dicflltes of custom rapidl)' get out of line with ,he fun attain· 
ment of norm.tive goals, 
Shorr·term leases as a customary agreement h<o:tween landlords and "namS 
prtvent [he att.inment of max,mum ne, incomes and equifllble sharing bec:tuse 
of ,he shorr planning horizons that are implicit in such leases. Short planning 
horizons result in maximized nct incomes over short periods of time under cir· 
cums,ances where. if longer terms were considered, incomes would l><' enhanced 
and systems of production would be differenc. Under these circumm,nces shor, 
term leases resul, in less than maximum net incomes over variable COSts over 
rime (result in less than full "social efficienc)",' in production) and in something 
less ,han full \' equi ... ble shares in the firm's net, I"'rticul,,!ly when the shortness 
of the term is more fa"orable to one ,han to ,he other of the ""'0 bargainers_ 
2. Obstarks r(xiltd;n la(~ 0/ ~nou:kdg(. The normative ideal of rem determination 
so clearl)" oudined b)' Dr, Hurlbur! reStS on full knowledge of the erudite meth· 
ods of economic analysis of income maximization by rhe farm firm and full 
knowledge of ,he kinds and quantifications of ~mpirical da!1l. required to clothe 
and quantify the conceptual structure outlined in his paper, In order to main 
this ideal of rentS and rela'ionships. borh parties [0 the agrument mUSt know 
equ.lly and all about the value of ma'ginal products, the "cosr" .or inputs, the 
productivity of .dditional units of input, rhe degree of uncertainty implicit in 
,be inputs, and how to treat such uncertaint), in the akulations. NO! only mUSt 
both parties understand fully and equally rhe conceprual srrucrore and processes 
implicit in rhis formulation, but also the)" must have full and equal knowledge 
of the empiric:tl faCtS pertaining to all alternatives that rhey might consider, 
There art few, if an)" highly tuined profesSional analysts who have such full 
knowledge; it is dubious if .n)· landlords or tenants do. To wharever ex,em they 
do not. of course. the renrs and rela,ions the)' will reach will deviate from ,hat 
ideal. 
No, only mUSr both puties have full knowledge of the conceptS and magni· 
tudes implicit in the above formulation, but their understanding mUSt be equal 
if this normative ideal is ro be: reached. Ir must nor be uncommon that one parry 
has a duper grasp of ,he concep,ual needs and a greater familiarity with the 
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" ~mpiriol dat2. involved than does th~ oth~r concerning such things as the value 
of nurginll productS that may 1I0w from ditr~rcnt alternarives. Neither ":ould it 
be surprising if they had ditrer~nt judgments as to th~ com of the inpll ts par. 
ti cularly as to the imputed "allles o f the fixed inpu ts that arc conttibllted by 
~ach part)'. Also. mey "'ill ha,"C different notions of IInccm.int)' and ho ... · uncer· 
tainry should be U'Oted. Insofar as one of the ~rries is a stronger barga.i~ th:an 
the other, or insafti as h~ nesoriates from pCllter knowkd,ge:md &miliuiry ",im 
conditions, he may be able ro disron the arrangemenrs in his f.tvor. For exam' 
pie. he rna)' be able to put the valu~ of the land input high tclati,'c to the value 
of the management and labor input. Ot vice vcru-or he may be able to obfllin 
an agreement on an ~nt~rprise combination that is in his best inrerest. In any 
event, such ne,godatioru and a8KCments gto"'ing Out of unequal kno",lcd,ge will 
di ston the renulaml.n8Cm~ntS a"'ay from rhOlC presumed by the conventional 
ideal. 
~. O6JI<ltw r()()lui in 1M tTlldibD",,1 /I"bm Df 1M CIIII",.,. The partiCipants in the 
landlord· tenant insti tution arc creatures of t h~ culture in which they live. It is 
noc surprising then tlut some of th~ ob$rad~s to the attainment of th~ ronvO'l' 
tionll norlTUtiv~ ideal of r~ntal Illt~s and reluions obstacles thar exptc" d~ 
mentalities of the flesh and blood panicipanu Ilte derived from the CIlium with. 
in which they live. 
The tIlldirion of th~ ~d~mocratic creed" is one of these. Under this creed, 
the culture, p"-rricularly the rurd culture , has a serong bias toward freedom of 
choice and action for the individual. This billS is frequently expressed in such 
goals.s "being one's own boss ," or in th~ pte$Cription against "ennlngling dli· 
ances," On the landlord's side this cr~ed is r~inforced b)' the tradition of the 
" rights" that attach to private properry, the "ownership creed," as thu creed is 
embedded in th~ "enrerpri$c ereed." Th~ o .... n~r .... ill not easily "bargain lway" 
hi' rigbts to profit from any ~xl~rnal economies thu may come his " "::IY, or to 
profit from :any opporruniry to sell, or to ptOlit from superior bargaining sllalgth 
that hu o .... n~rship of property may placc on him. And socicry does IIOt l00ir 
with n.vor upon Icgisladvc propouls tmt might fora: him to do anyonc of mac 
things. 
Landlord·tenant relationships, paniculady under the conventional nomutivt: 
ideal, a.e 1 kind of parmcrship or business U$Odation in which twO people joint· 
ly pbn, manag~, and shue th~ income fro m I fllm but these twO tnditional 
values of freedom and ownership rightS prevent the attainment of this partner· 
ship-liRe ideal . Under th~ restriCtions of these values, me pmnership goal can· 
not be reached lnd to thi$ eXt~n t the relation does nOt ~tt:lin full maximization 
of net income to the farm firm nor a sharing of the £ruiu thereof in relation to 
the plttkipant's contributions. 
Furthermore, the m1dit ional values of Ib~ culture embrace Other goals th:ln 
net incom~ maximization. Such other ps will obviously be 2pt to (lOU$C plan. 
ning and shlring 10 dc-v:iate from Wt dict::lted by assumptions normuivc in tn· 
ditional economic theory alone. But of more interesl here i$ thll the gOO, Imt 
" 
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one of the [\\'() panics may have may be divergent from those of the other, and 
both may diverge from some llbs.ru. social ~l of"firm diidency." The land· 
lord, being also the "wneT. rna)' have a goal and imcrest in speculation in bnd 
and thus wish to manage his J>fopeny so as to profil from specularive incra.$CS 
in irs vliluc. Or he mal' have ~ "Il'2d<:r" psychology and be inlcrared in buying 
and selling farms for profit or pleasure. Or his imerest in the fum he ""ms 
may be as an investmtnr hed~ ag:l.inst inflation "'ther than an expression of in· 
tereSI in fuming as such. In any of these cases, t he intcrest the landlord .... i1l 
weant co muimiu " 'ill be diffe-rem from that of the tenant .... ho is a brm oper:a. 
tor, nOt:ln investor. or spc<:ulamr. or tndeT in properly. The inrerC'5U of [he 
landlord in speculuion, in lrading. certainl)' .... ill lad him 10 avoid ~ntan8lin8 
alliances wirh ,he tenant in thc form of long-run agm:mcnts or an)' firm in-
sistence on how the farm shall be opentcd. If he is intcr~sto:d in it :u an invest_ 
mcnt, h~ will Want to muimize his returnS from thc f:um and nuinuin ils pro-
duclive value unimpaired. 
From the tenant'S standpoinr, who is a fum opeNtOr, his inrcrest ma)' in-
clude a "drj"e lo",'ud owncnhip" which mans that his interest in the parlicubr 
[enant &em is [nnsilOl)' and short-run beause he is looking to thc limc when 
hc ""ill become an owner and la"e [his StatC of t(1Uncy. Be,'OU'S( of the 
circumstances under which rhe tenant opct'I[es he ,,"'ill be intcrested in shOCi-run 
gains and consequently in muimizing sholHun earnings, in comrl$t fO the 
prob.abJe interest of the landlord in maximizing long-run C2rnings, esp«ialJy if 
the landlord's goal is that of inveSlmcnt. And the renanl will not be iMe,csled 
in maintaining the long-run productivity of the prope")' which ma), be direcd)' 
eomnry [0 thc landlord's imerest in doing so, 
Very likel)' wru.t is optimum for Ihe landlord's "firm'· ""ilI be different from 
truot which is optimum for the renre,'s; funhermore, il is also likely thai wruot 
is optimum for either of the panies will also be diff~r~nr from what is OPlimwn 
for lhe ·'farm firm":u an abstnet itkal of social dliciCflC)'_ This can obviously be 
the elSe wher.: the landlord is represented by an agent who is ncgorilling rencal 
o f the farm from som~ siandpoim of muimizcd income from himself and his 
principal as compared to when rhe landlord is himself personally handling the 
ncgotiation, In this connection, one of th~ fruilful soucces of diff~rencc in wha< 
is optimum for either pany restS in the faci that they will be faced by differing 
degrees of unc:crtainry and by unequ.al degrees of apiral ntioning. BU! wruotcver 
{he reasons-uneqU1! ulI(ercainlY, apical rationing, planning horizon or what-
nOf-it "''ill be more Iban likely tbat Ih~ optimum (or cilhcr party will be l dif. 
ferent optimum fi:om {h.! for the other, And there is ron =ry rason to be-
lieve, even if th~ir optima were to coincide, that thi$ would be Ihc samc opti-
mum as lru.. for .hc idcal of .bstract social efficiency, 
Indeed, why should we posit rhat such coindd~na: s/x;utdb~ id~a1? To do 
so ncc~$Sarily impJi~s a particular valu~ iudgmenl-one which w~ catcgorically 
discard in th~ United SllteS in most comparabJ~ cirC\!ffiStances. It may very well 
be thtl Ihlt SlfUClure of production and marketing which would maximize in-
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comes 5Cpantcly fO the produce~ of fced stuffs, to rhe producers of feeder cmk, 
10 (he c:lrrk fccde~, and fO the ljvestock processors would nOl correspond to the 
ideal of maximum social efficiency obrainable if the "beef economy" were inre-
gnted under Ihe cenln[ management of a single "firm." Bur we diSc:lrd ,he [af-
ter goal of maximized "firm" efficienC)' because of a value judgment favoring 
"smaller," independent firms oper:lting under conditions of competition. 
Why then should we attempl to disord the maximiurion of [andlord in-
comes ~iJ-a· ~is the maximization of tenant incomes in favor of a goal of maxi· 
mize<! farm firm efficiency? More appropriate "."ou[d be fO improve the landlord· 
tenant instirution so that il would funCtion more "cquirab[y" in Ihe bargaining 
sense and accept such divergence from maximi~e<! farm firm efficiency as flU)" be 
implicit in it. 
OBST ACLES ROOTED IN THE ENVIRONMENT OF 
SOCIAL ST RUCT URE AND PROCESS 
Increasing scarcities of opportunides to farm 
Under the impact of modem technology. farms are npid[y enlarging. This 
ICllds to the renting by owner·operators of "addition;.!" fields or of whole farms 
or to the renting by tenams of two or more farms ftom different [andlords or of 
larger units from one landlord. Whatever the reason, rhe result is a de{(ClIse in 
numbers of farms ava ilable, and lflCf"1SC in competition for [and, an increase in 
land COstS. This increase in demand for farm land 10 rem enhances the landlord's 
'"bargaining power." 
Increasing cap;ol requi~ments [Q farm 
Not only are land prices, and hence COStS, increasing due to rhe increasing 
demand for farm rentals , but due to [he impact of toxhnology, there is a sre:adily 
increasing need fot opeming and nonland capiral in agriculture as well. The in· 
creasing need for operating and nonland (apilal presses on the f2lm operawr. 
The result is an incrCllsed demand for "borro"."ed"' capiral by farm owner and 
lenam operators alike which may very well include incre2scd "borrowing" of 
farms which, of course, is another way of referring to tenancy. Nevertheless, lhe: 
result is to add furthet to the increasing demand for land to rem. 
Both of the above obstacles IClld to increased demand for f.orm rentals. An 
increase in demand enhan(es the bargaining strength of the land·owner and 
would do $0 even if rhere were perfe<:dy competitive land remal markels. If the 
[and rental markets were perfectly competitive, it would nOt be argued that 
these rwo facto~ are obstacles to the attainment of efficient rent, because it is 00 
deviation from efficiency and equity for rhe conuolJer of 2 supply to profit from 
an increased demand for hlS resource. However, as we shall see below, because 
the f:lIm remal market is less than perfectly competitive, this growing bargain-
ing Strength of the landlord persistently distorts the rentS and rebtions aWllY 
from conventional normative idnls. 
" 
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undlords who 3tC repusented by agents 
A considerable quantity of agricultura l land operated by tenams is in {he 
hands of esutes, jOlfl! renanci<"S, Or Institutional landlords whO" by rhe very narun: 
of (he ownership, and b)' the fact that {her have 10 operatt through agents to 
represent chern prevent rhe development of "partnership" bella,-ior which is so 
important in :l.uaining mOlximum efficiency and «juity in ,he Jand lord·renam reo 
lation. By his "CT}' natu re, thc agent of a landlord cannot be an oper:lcing part-
ner with another. 
It is also probable, the agent'S status rdative to the landlord 's being of this 
charcaclcr. (Iu! the resul! will be a short-Ierm plannmg horizon h)' the landlord 
as ,",'ell as by the lenanl. Here is an illuSll11tion wheno the (i"um~tanees Sur· 
(Ounding the bargaining rransan;on so far as both panies 3re eoneerned m~y 
eoineide-in this case in a shoH·term eomran. But this ,,,ill be out·of.line with 
the long·run id"l of abstract social efficienc)'. Conse<jucnd)", when ,he bndlord 
is nOt a natural ~rson it will add '0 the divergance of 'he oureome of the land. 
lord-tenant relation from that desired by the con""'ntionai normative ideal. 
It is possible ,hat, as an offset to this obstade, agent management of a land· 
lord's proper!'}' may result in more kno'O:ledgable mma~menr plans in the dire<:-
tion of maximizing net returns to the fa,m than might otherwise be the case. It 
is likely that such agems will be mo,e experienced fum managers and more ex· 
perieneed in directing the planning and management of farms ,han a landlord 
might be himself, In this event, the landlord, tn the person of his a~nt, may be 
the more dominant personalit}' in the decision over management plans and hence 
develop plans more benefieial to the landlord than to the tenant and ,hus diverge 
from the ideal goal; or the plans fostered by the agent may be more in keeping 
with the maximization of net income in line "'ith !arm firm efficiency_ 
T he imperfeccly competitive struCtUre of the rental market 
A lease is the resUll of a barg.tining between a landlord Or his agent and a 
tenant. If the bargaining transaetion is to allocate income fairly between the 
pan iI's in relation to the contributions made, it is necessary that there be full 
and equal knowledge on the pan of each and that each luve equal and equally 
acce!'sible relative alternatives, In the absence of such equ.:l.iities, one or the Other 
of the parries to the negotiation has unequal b.:Irgaining strength This may re-
sult from unequal knowledge of the marginal valu~ products from alternativ~ 
inputs and enterprises, or it mly be th ~t the alternatives avaibble ~re unequally 
known by either part)' and U~ of un~qual accessibility_ In either eVent the Inr-
gain reached ""ill diverge from that which would be expected under conditions 
of full md equal b:ugaining power_ 
In addition, there is no "rentll mlrket" where information concerning de· 
mand and supply condi'ions in the muket ean be broadly based, nor to which 
any prospective bargainer in the market ean turn for information concerning 
rental alternatives or information coneerning the level of prevailing rents. Be-
C"~use the character of the commodity bargained over-the farm-and the eondi· 
RES.EARCI'1 BUU.tT[N 810 
" [ions sunounding the landlord on [he one hand and [he tellant on the odltt Itt 
50 different and 50 individual [0 ea.ch cue, a bt();tdl)' buro ffi2Ckct for rhe opm. 
tion of supply and dellY.l.nd on rental price1 is moSt difficult to achieve. But in 
the absence of ic, whether ;t is difficulf to xhieve or not , the result is unequ:al 
bugaining strength be<wttn the twO pmie1. Of CO\ICSC, circumst:lnces will dictate 
in individual cues which of the parties will have the upper hand in rhat par. 
ticubr barg~ining t!1lnsurion. It is reuonable ro speculate. although I have 110 
empirical proof, thar currenti)' rhe landlord usually will have the upper hand in 
the (lan5acrion due to the incteasing demand for fum bnd. the reduction in 
number of farms to rent. the "surplus" of ~ople looking (or fil.fming opportuni. 
ties , [he: inerening capital requircments and CQnse<juent greater degrec of upiral 
rationing. the more accessible alrcrnati~es ouuide thc relltal marker available to 
tht' bndlord, [he al>scnce of alternativcs within farming available to the Icnant. 
and the much less accessible alrernarives 10 the renant outside of farming ; ;&!I 
these circumstances .... ould seem to l~d in the direction of an incroscd ckgrtt 
of Inrgaining srrcngth on rhe p:m of IhI: bndlord. If 50, the rental rates :and r('. 
btions may be distorted from rhe social optimum in ti>c dircuion of rhe bnd· 
lord's "optimum" and to"'anl enhancement of the landlord's share in the farm's 
"net." 
Legal form of the "pannership" 
[t is impliCit in the ideal landlord'lcnant relation that thc relation should 
be akin to the "partnership." namely. IWQ peuons joining fOtces, each contrib-
uting o~ra[ing and capital inpulS to Ihe joint venture, sharing in m~nagcmel1! 
decision.making, and sharing in the returns from the Venture comparllble [(I 
their contributions. However, under the bndlord-tenant reladon a tlue lepl 
pmnership is not formed prolnbly because the prnnership binds e2(:h partner 
individually ro Ihe repaymem of all debu of ti>c pannership and gives C3(h pan. 
nCT full power ro commil the partnership_ So long :as Ihi$ I~gal condition ellis!$, 
it is doublful whelher the landlord·tenam rclation an be COnVCTtro imo tNC 
pannersbip farming. In rhe absence of a formal and trll<: partnership 1lTlnge-
ment on the pan of ti>c p:!niC$, il is hudly possible to exp«t them to operale 
aCllully as if they were pa.nners in the full sense calle<! for by the conventional 
normative ideal of IIDdlord·tellant relations. Anything that prevents the landlord· 
tenant relation from behaving like a fuJI and Irue partnCTship will, more Ih1Ul 
likdy, cause the rclarion and th~ rent 10 deville from the con"entional norma· 
ti ve ideal. 
Government prognms 
GO"ernment programs of all kinds but particularly rho!;C that effect prices 
take the blame for a lor of "distortions" when the norms against "'hich they 
Ite m(':lSllre<! arc ick1ls of productive efficiency, and of ai5tribuuve justice based 
on '·equality." So it .... ould be easy to uy Ihal some of the obstacles that pre-
Vent equirabk landlord-tellant relations and mlt U( du~ 10 the iniquities of gov-
ernment program aCtivity. And, in fact, so far as landlord-tenant rclalions Itt 
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concerned. it can be said that price suppol'{ activities an cnh:lJlce the landlord's 
harpining slrcngrh rduive to the lenanc's due 10 the tendency of increases in 
prices uod inro~ to be capitllized into laml values. thus 5efling in motion I~I 
whole string of fcsl,Ilts th.1 flow from higher bnd cost!, highu capiul require-
mentS, etc., discussed above. 
Anmher disturbing clemen, in the landlo rd·tenanc market to(.by is dIe pos_ 
sibility thll whol.: farms rna}' be: placed in the conscrv:l.rion reserve [hus (Jim;-
M.(ing the retUne entir,ly from ICnlnt-Q!'<'r.lted limns. This surd)' "" ilI incrc:asc 
the lenant's feeling of "uncerninIY" before the farm is PUt in the r~rvc, and 
will incrase the remaining landlords' bargaining nTcngrh rcbrivc to leMn!$ 
afler fums la,'c been placed in the conservation reserve. The con5en'uion ~. 
lervt . .... hen whole farms Ire placed in ii, resul(s in still further reducrion in 
number of farms available which. in the absence of a compn-able reduction of 
tenanlS !iCCking farms. adds to the bargaining strenglh on the landlords' side. 
One importam problem concerning knowledge relative to gO\'ernmem pro-
grams drserves bringing up al this poim. Ho .... do landlords and tenantS slut(; in 
conservation reserve payments when less than whok f:ums th,( are (enant 
opcnred arc PUI into lhe reserve? How lhey rhtJllid be handled unda Ihe nomu· 
rive plan ad"anced by Dr. H urlburt is deu. but is the queslion of how they 
rlxntld do it IIl1tUn'oot/ b)' landlords and renantS gencra.lly? I doubt if it is! If the 
ref1.lms from the conservuion le$(rve are shared bct1lo'ecn 11I1dlorJ and tenanl in 
amounn comparable (0 regubr income from the f:.lrm, then J expect the ten:tnt 
is profiting at the landlord's expense. If the landlord t:lkes it all on the argument 
thu it is a form of rent for land th:.lt is not paid by the tenant, then I am sua: 
th:.it the landlord is profiling 21 the expense of the tenanL ! wonder to what ex· 
(en! adequate information has been generally cirCl,llued IS !O whal the proper 
economic approach to ,he sharing of the ronservuion reserve payments should 
"'" Society's lack of concern with the landlord' lenant p roblem 
Undcdrin~nd surrounding all of the obsrades discussed above is the gen. 
eral obstacle of society'S lack of concern over the problem and hence its lack of 
interest in doing anything about it. This lack of concern is rooted in (he $/Xu.! 
values of Ihe enterprise creed. rhe otlmcrship ideal and the work ethic. 
The enterprise creed and the ""ork ethic say thar the operations of business 
fums and the negotiations bctwccn the parties thereto should be frcc lfId unin-
hibited by go"emmen121 aCtion. The ownership crttd. S2.ys that the rights of pri-
vuc propertr ue sacros.anct and arc not co be interftte<! .... ith by government 
except as a laSt resort ~nd under extreme provocation. These .... idel)· held and 
decpl)' SClIted soci~1 values which exist not on1)' in che minds of landlords and 
tenants but in the minds of most Americans lead (0 several difficulties in the 
atcainmenr of the normacive ideals of renr! and renral a:lations: 1. the absence 
of in}' social progr:r.m of education specifically directed to"OlUd the solution of 
the landlord·tenant problem and the enhancement of knowledge on the pan: of 
bndlOfds and tenants concerning desir:r.b!c and appropriate methods of negoW.t. 
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2, the lbsencc of legl1 laion by the 511tC 2nd other govemmenn to lmelior::ite 
imperfections in the rentill m1rket in order to enh1nce the equalilY of bargain. 
ing po""er between the p:mies; .nd 3. the lbsence of governmem aaions and 
programs to redress inC<jUllities in the accessibility of litcmuives .v:ailable to 
tenants as compared 10 IhO$C aVlilable 10 landlords (currently). 
HOW TO OVERCOME THESE OBSTACLES 
Overcoming mOSI, af{ainly the most importlnt, among these obstacles is 1 
mltter of considerilile difficulty beausc mlny of them are deeply SCl\t(d in socia.! 
v:alues and pis "''ell beyond the tC1Ch of ordinary cdUC1t~1 and govemmem:al 
action. It is all very well to say thl[ failure to :anllyze the landlord·tenant rela-
tion within 1 sufficient economic fnmework is the C1use of the inefficiencies and 
inC<juiries thu chmaerize it and thl1 if only people were bater informed con-
cerning the anal)'ric techniques 2nd the data necessary they would lrrive at tentS 
'Ifld relltions in line with the normariye ideal. But it is obvious that eduClrion 
in how to be objectively r:ltional would solve the problem because, 10 a con· 
sidcr:able extent, the problem exists nOi bcc:ause of irntiorulity lnd lack of ob-
je"iviry, but bcc:ause the ntiooality lnd obj-ectivit)" is channekd in different di· 
rections and to differem ends. American society is shot through lnd through by 
values and goals that are mutually contradictory, 50 it is flOrhins peculiar to find 
mlt the normarive idals of landlord·tenam relations are not aHained bcc::I.usc of 
contradictory goals toward which they arc "riving. 
However, there are a few actions th:al mighl be raken to alleviate tM sitw.· 
tion somcwhumd to move to .... ard ITUximization of income lnd C<juity of rela· 
tions between landlord and tenant. 
First to come to mind, of course, is thl1 gtnl catchall called "cduC1tion~. 
The content of the cduC1ltion .... e are tal king lboUI here, of course, .... ill be de· 
signed better to acquaint l~ ndlords and ten~nts alike with the analytial fl"'lmC· 
.... ork of economic m~lysis and with the quantitl1ive datl to clolhe Ihlt fnme· 
.... ork in order better to derermine equitable rents and relationships as outlined 
in Dr. Hurlbun's paper. As more landlords and tenlnts undersnnd these pm-
cesses and as more technicians .... ho .... ork with them in county agents' offices 
and elsewhere underslWd them bettet also, much improvement will tesult in tM 
landlord-Ienanl rclation. But education cannot be expected to change the tradi. 
tional values of the culrure-freedom of choice for the individual, the sanctity 
of the rights of ptiv"te property-nor can it change the fact thlt the interests of 
Ihe parties to the landlord'lenant rclu ion frcquendy diverge from each otna 
and that both of them probably diverge from the abstract idal of the social ef· 
ficiency of the firm. If it is possible for the management of the f,rm's a$$Cts to 
attain Ihe idal of abstrut social effiCiency only if it is operated as a firm, then 
it is obvious that the management of the firm must be held in a single hand 
eLth« in th:at of the owner or of a corporation Ot of a true partn«ship. This is 
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tnothtr wa)' of $3)·;ng [hal the: bndiord'icnani relation n~ ... er an for Ihesc rea-
sons be relied upon 10 attain the optimum position of maximized cfficitncy of 
reSOl,w:e U~ and o:<Juiry of irn::omc distriburion in ,he farm as a firm. Educ::ation. 
like til edua.rion, may {(men-t somt of the diflicullies in Ihe landlord·tm:uu re-
lation. bur Clnnol dear them aU away. The long slo'" C'Volurion of soc;,! values 
and beliefs ,rid Ihe rcsultant insrilurional changes chal will cemer aU rcsoultt 
mm,g;ng decisions in the Fum as a firm muSt {:Ike pla(t before significanr 
chang<: an occur in the bndlord-tCMnt tcluion as a whole. 
There are cerrain social anions also li12! can be taken to amelion!c rhe 
situa tion 10 a degree. For example. the ide:/. of "homesteads in reverse" migh! be 
applied. This is a dC'Vice for assiscing surplus (um people to di,'est themsel,-es of 
their investmcnl$ in farm opital in order thar the)' may migrate to other 0p-
portunity else",·herc. Insofar a5 this program indudes assisnnce in migt:uion to 
ocher opportunity it can be a way of helping reduce the number of pcrsoos seek-
ing firms in a ItUrker in ""hich the numbers of farms are shrinking. Going along 
with this. of CO\lI'jC. must be social prog1'1lms designed to increase the knQ,r.·ledgc 
b)' tenanrs. ar last. of alternative opponunities ""irhin agriculture. such as the 
location and character of o ther farms available for rent. and to enhance their 
knO""lcdgc of alternative opportunities outside of 2gricultur., in the way of ai-
Icmative emplo)'mem opponuniries available. Such a program must also include 
assistance of both a directive and fimncial kind 10 their attaining of these alter· 
natives. These aaions incrase the renams' aheml!ives to m:a,ke them more ncar-
ly companb!e (O those avaibble to the landlord and also by helping reduce the 
number of persons seeking farms in rhe face of a shrinking rennl farm supply. 
Another form of social action should be to make readily and easily available to 
farm operators adequate supplies of operating capital with a minimum of o.pital 
rationing. One of the difficulties in the present Fum rental situation is the l~ 
and incrcuing volume of capi tal necessary for operating and nonreal eSlate pur-
poses ""hieh vcr)' likely will incre:ue the demand for farm rentals in order 10 
conserve opcntor's capinl. If this puticular obsnclt is to be ameliorated by 
social wion, some form of public opcradng-c:apital supply seems dcsinble. 
Another form of soci2l action-a legal undertaking-might be to rd"orm the 
partnership or the corporation insritution in Such a way that it will facilitate 
landlord· tenant relationShips and rent determination in a morc truly pannership 
atmosphere. This mighr require something in the form of a modified corpora-
rion type arrangement in which the parries exchange their fixed capital inpuls 
for shares of stock in the firm and their fixed service inputs for " contracu," in 
which they joiml)' must arrive ar cerrain general managrn1cor decisions as [0 the 
~board of directors" of rhe corporation. One of the parties u ~n officer of the 
corporation could coter into opcnting obligations and the assetS of the particubr 
firm .... ould be all that arc liable for the parment of such obligations. 
It is obvious thar in the foregoing di$Cuuion there are no wodd_shaking 
suggntiOfls thu will overcome the obstacles to the :l!tairuncnt of normuivc idc:Us 
of landlord·renant relations in rem5 and rcluionships. I am nOT hopeful dur 
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gn!'at strides in overcoming such obst:l.cles :l.r~ ponible. Sundy. Ihe more thu is 
done to increa,e underst:l.nding on the part of technician!. farm advisers. ",00 
bndlords and ten ann themselves ;lS to ,he proper procedures for optimizing net 
returns in ,he farm firm and for sharing them cqu,uhI.\· betwttn th(' tWO p:mies 
is all to the good. It should contribute some ad,·an,<.·,. Bur it wil l nm amin the 
millenium . 
DISCUSSION, OBSTACLES TO 
ECO N OMIC DETERMIN ATION OF FARM RENTS 
J ohn C. f rey 
Pennsylvania S U Ie Uni\'ersity 
Mr. Kelso setS the .luge for his anal)"sis by defining an obStac!.:: as some--
thing that prevents the rC1li zation of predictions derived from normative theory. 
To link obstaclc:s with e~ plan1tory theory. he Jt2tes. wouLd be of no consequence 
since this uSC" of economic theory predicts eirher rightly or wrongl)' and annor 
be prevented of ro.lization. It is along this line of formu!1[ion thaI one might 
in<juire inro Ihe n21ure and purpose of wendfic deliber:atlon in the field of ec0-
nomics, especiall~' » it applies to a betrer undCf1tanding of farm rena. 
A proposal might be m",de that positive and normative economics :Ire not 
separ:ate provinces al 311, but simply successive methodological su·ps in a pml 
paltern of sciemific in<juiry. If this be true, then normative analysiS is nOt illl end 
produCt in ilself. but a transition21 step that leads to an even more conclusil"C 
phase of economic corullt\lction. For lack of a beller expression. Ihis rhird Stage 
might be nlled "economic engineering." It is characterized by modes of open.· 
tion that will dirC« a system of functionally relued vatiabl~ to,,""1rd anJ' one of 
a "",riel}' of O\.lICOmes thlt individuals. groups Of" society in general might desi~. 
An obsr:aek if viewed in Ihis brend fr:lme"'ork, rakes on a som""h1[ differenl 
meaning. 
Norm~rive analysis is the application of some princip!.:: of sdection 10'" 
pre.determined SCt of functional relationships. Ml ximiution (minimizalion) is 
the selector mon often used in economics. although other principles may also 
be appropriate. By applying such a principle of selection the a!Ulrst dcri\'cs In 
"optimum" Vlllue or SCt of values for each of the variables in rhe functional 
eomplcx-oprimum, of course, in rhe sense rhat IhC}' are quantitari\'dy consiStenr 
wirh the end·in·vie ... of rhe selecror. Thus, tbe anaI)"st conCe1\'es of an "'ide:al"" 
arrangement of economic magnitudes in a nuse-and·effC« linkage. 
This whole construction is the source of so much ronIIOver5)' in economics 
thar some digression ",;th regard 10 in purpose certainl)" sC'Cms in order, Fin! 
of all . ir should be clear that an economic norm deals "'ith a whole sysrem of 
economic variables in ordered rda tionship. A norm nnnot be fully understood 
if tbe s)'stem is 1'101 complete. If poSitive (explanatory) economics has no t yet 
empirically verified the V$.rious components of the sJ'Stem. there i!m't much point 
in trying to proceed with normat ive applications, It is possible in theory to 
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derive such formuLl.tions, but suffice to say, this kind of theory may be getting 
far ahe;ld of an)' worbble understmdings of the re:tl world. 
The point under consideration has special appliotion to the sub~ect matter 
of rent. If abilit), to predict is the test of whether or nOt explanatory economics 
is complete and normative ~nalysis can procecd, where docs the economist st::lnd 
on matters ~rtaining TO farm rents' un the economist, one might ask ... <:null)' 
predict what farm rents will be? If he can, all is well. If he cannot, he might 
have to bKk up and give more consideration to empiriol explanations. 
Secondly, the purpose of normative analysis is not to dictate $<Xi .. l ethics. 
It is to order inquiry into wa),s and m(':lns of changing the values of the v:uious 
determinann in the s)'stem. It sets the stage for a study of "practices" that 
society on use to bring abOut prefeHed results. Its formulation of ~ different 
outcome. as tom pared with the existent, diteos the investigator mto a seHch 
for second·stage expian .. tiOos and predictions that might be used TO help regulate 
or COntrol. More simpl)', a normative framework is only a research tool. 
In essence. then. it matters nOt at all to the economic scientist what people 
should want. There is nm reason for the economist to set himself up as a pro-
ponent of a particular methodological scheme, such as maximiution, or even to 
try to demonstrate that all people with intellect strive to abide by such a prin-
cipk Economic science ~ks only to help people atrain what they Want to ar-
nino reg:udless of the righteousness of their motlves or objectives. 
[n the case of maximization, anyone who can tell people how to regulate 
economic quant ities to maximize also can tell them how to achieve something 
less. T here is little question about the usefu lness of rhe principle in guiding and 
directing normative inquiry, but learning how to regulate the values of the 
various determinants in the system is the objecllve-not to conver! sociery co a 
mass of maximum outcomes. 
All this is to say that the nmion of a "6.ir rent" or .. n "equitable lease" un-
det the theory of the firm is a misnomer 11"1 the re~l world. These expressions 
imply reotal arrangements that are morally or ethicdly sound. Such matters 
clearly ~re outside the realm of economic science. The applied economist should 
not make the mistake of trying to superimpose the theoretical models of research 
on societ}" as it now stands. To do so makes him a reformer, nOt an economic 
$ClemISt. 
Returning then to the subje(l of obstacles, they can have a meaning which 
is nOt linked completdy with the hypotheses of normative theory. In the world 
of pt;l.ctiol atf~irs, they are physical, economic and insrilUtional conditions that 
obstruct the use of known regulatory procedures in the attainment of ends 
actually desired by people. St~ted with more sophistication, rhey are second. 
srage variables which take on values that tend to be inconsistent with a desired 
outcome. Obstacles, so defined. are very much a subject of further scientific in-
vestigation. Further, prediction in science is the only way that measures for over· 
coming these obst;l.cles can ever be determined. 
Whether or not this ana lysis is in disagreement wirh the framework :uI. 
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v:anccd by Mr. Kelso is difficult to say. f rom time to rime his p:tper suggests 
thu he conceives of ob$tlcles in the same light, yet tho:rc: is sufficient ambigui[)' 
10 Disc: question about the mailer. The tide is "Obstacles ro Economic Detc-rmi-
nation of f arm RentS'", ",hich could be interp.etw to mean obstacles encOW1lCJ-
W by economic researchers, or possibl)' obsrlcles 10 a determination of all the 
v:afiables associated ",ith rem prediCTion. The inrroduClory discussion suggcscs 
obstacles to the ac~ realiution of rents. bur it "OIho Discs qucsrions concaning 
rhe kind of rem under consideration. To rhe cxrent rhar Mr. Kelso interprea 
~prcdi«ions from normarive rhcory" to mcan what has been co"em:! in this dis-
cussion, there is no diugreemenr. On the other hand. rhere truly is room for 
discussion if the "OInalysis is aim¢:! at rosons why peopk are not am.ining rClltil 
rewards that coincide with the theoretical optima of margifUl analysis. The argu-
mentS againsr this formu la tion arc rhar explanllory theory neerls {O be grounded 
in rcalicy before a study of obs!OcJes C1.n be made. and th~[ the scientist is OUt 
of order if he scck$ to make society conform to the dietl tes of a normative ec0-
nomic modeL 
If one is content ro pul l5ide th~ philosophical argumentS. he fin.n in me 
main body of Mr. Kelso's paper an excellent dUcussion of socw phcnomcn:a rhat 
mighr have a boring on &rm rents. The forces and conditions thar he dcscribc::s 
mighr be c:a.llrd common-scnsc variables. They reRect a broad psp of the " 'orld 
of prtCticalaffairs Ind the inter·play of a wide variery of disciplines. Clarly. he 
seems to recognize thar the whok subjcct of rent cannot be wrapped up in one 
near litde p"-ckage. One can only wonder why m~nr of ,he conditioning fo= 
that he described have nOt found their wly into customafY rent doctrine. Con· 
sidering rhe whole Mllery of "exogeneous" variables. whar has made the em. 
nomics of farm rent such a righf linle compartment? for "01 complete srory. it 
mighl be wisc to U"y an imer·disdplinary approach and nor charge off many of 
thc!c dow'HG-C1f1:h ~dons as non·cconomic "obstacles". 
While it is impossible fO assess the fl:b,ive s.igni6cancc of {he various "01:>-
Slacles" presenrcd-they are posed only 1$ hypotheses-one still might make 
judgmen1S 15 to which holds ,he most promise of iJluminlling the rent dctermi. 
nadon process. To one who belie"~ thar rentS in all walks of life arc ISsociated 
with bugaining and the processes of exchange rhere ccrtainly is something to 
bt' "id for the structure of the fum remal markec which Mr. Kelso describes. Mr. 
Hudbo.ut aJJudu to this under the tide of "negociation", 2nd ir cCfuinly is an 
intcgr:&l p:trt of Mr. G:lffnc(s genelal ground rent afUlysis, but it is primarily 
Mr. Kelso who gives it t<!ual weight "';ch production economics in rhe anal)"sis 
of individw.i contf2Cling l.ff:l.ngemcncs. 
Landlords and "nants encer imo rentll con,n"s becausc their upintions 
are unatr:l.inable through rheir own unaided effortS. This inter.dependen" in a 
competiTive society is a necessary b15is (or cooperation if they are '0 r~1ize thell 
objectives. Coopcr:&tion. on the other hand, depends on agre<emen, as to the C/)(I. 
ditions of cooper:&rion, lind these conditions in I free society are resolved by the 
pt()Ct$$ o( bargaining. Each seeks to .. ~k OUt an agreement which is advanl1lSC' 
"u.' '"~ I,,~ "" n 1111<· ... " 1,;. 
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The final terms of a [ennl contract arc delc:rminal by I~ bugaining power 
of ,he landlord and the barg:lining power of the Tenant. Each has a certain 
amoum of ability 10.:freel agrecmcTlIs on his 0,",'0 ICTITlS. and Ihis in turn is gov. 
erned by [he direction and imensi!)' of his drives :md his knowledge of how 10 
manipubte his posilion of snrcity and interdependence. No doubt income reali-
urion is part of the aspif1ltion pattern. bur values 3Ssoci:m~d wilh consumplion 
(the fHm house and other prerequisites), work satisfaction. prcHig(, and the 
«(hic of hit play or help [0 someone who needs a career ccruinly arc other con· 
comitant motives. The final agreement may (:Ill (:iT short of maximum firm ef· 
fi cier"y wilh fixed COStS, variable COSfS and rerurns shared in equal proportions 
-and who is 10 say Ih:ll Ihe terms of the ~greemem ~re wrong ' Not onl)' in 
temncy but ~Iso in ocher subjecc maner al'C2$, studies of bacgaining stnce!)' and 
decision.malcing are beginning to shed light on economic processes. Ptrhaps the 
time ""ill come ""hco experts on bargaining in limn c(flance will o11er their own 
theory of rent and ,,·ill r.::gard production Up«IS of th.:: firm as "obstacles" 10 
the atninm(flc of perfea Ie:uc:s. 
If one looks for addirions 10 Mr. Kebo'$ discussion, Ihere is som.::thing 10 
be said for a more comple!':: .:::uminatioo of household·firm rebtionships. Hou$e-
hold decisions t.::nd to hay.:: considerable impact on farm business organization 
and anooc be ignored in an industrial economy. 
The tenlnt who an find a job in industry normally wishes to reduce his 
inputs of bbor and management in the farm firm. With two incom.:: flows (on· 
farm and off·farm incom.::) th.::r.:: is much to be gained by e<ju~ting margifl21 net 
incomes from both sources. Gen~lJy this means ~ cut·back in &rm production 
if nutginal net rerurns from the ~grieultural plant are diminishing. Similarily, 
members of the tenant's family might have an incem;"e to take jobs in indUStry. 
rather rlwl wmk on dte &rm. In essence, the incomc objective of the howehold 
tlkes prece~ over the income objective of the rum business.. The ner e11ea 
on f:um effici~ and ~ts dcpcru.Is on the mobility of fCSOUJces and the relativc 
bargaining po"'..:r of the l~ndlord ~nd the tenam. 
Under Mr. Hurlburt's formubtion of neauaty conditions, substitution and 
scale adjustmentS would take place within the farm firm to achieve within·fil'Tr\ 
efficiency, but ohen thae is sufficienl immobility 10 keep this from happening. 
Moreo-:er, the lcoant may be: in a position to perpetuate the rcnt~1 amngcment 
because other tenants do not compete. They, 100, an: on the markel for off·farm 
employment. 
Secondly, on.: might encourage further consideration of the "obsncles" tm! 
exisl in the balance sheetS of l~ndlords and tcnann. Mr, Kelso comments on the 
lenglh of the planning horizons, Ihe "tf1;der psychology" o f some landlords and 
the legal form of the partnership, but docs not cmphasiu rhe bct Imt the land· 
Lord.tenant firm has no b~bnce $h«t of ir$ own. It is a strange economic or· 
ganism without an)' assets, any debt struCture and any liquidiry preference. 
MO$r generally unda lasing arnngements, the 6,,0:1 inputs of the bnd10td 
and the 6xo:l inputs of the tenanr are entries in twO entirely different naworth 
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StatementS. Independently each part)" makes decisions to protect hi , as~t·dcbr· 
prdcrenee suu(\ure. The nUUIl: of rhesc d«isions nn affecr the quantil)' of in· 
pur, avai],ble 10 Ihe farm firm and rhe shuing of rerurns. In r<:lllit)", one ... -on. 
ders if either part)" can ~ eKpecled ro ... ork for maximum farm income ... ilh· 
oul !l:gard for his ncr worth position. 
Whtre farm land is shifrin,!! into a hi,!!het u~ or is being held for minenl 
rightS, the annual renl from agriculture rna)' be incidemal !O Ihe landlord. 'The 
C1Ip«tcd appreciation in sale value or the mineral rems may be of sufficiem 
magnitude to JUStifY a holding of a5~IS in the form of land c,'en though rerums 
from fanning arc lIpprru.ching lero. Whi le this does not pr«lude Inrgaining for 
high agricultunl rem. e:rt.:l.mplC$ can be cited where land hn bccrl made available 
rent frcc JUSt to maintain itS appctt:lnce. Similarly. Ihe ""iIlingness of the tenanl 
to contribute inpUIS and to negotiate for high re"'ards will ~ conditioned by 
his exposr and eXlnte investment decisions. If for no other reason, Ihe liquidity· 
preferences of Ihe lenanl. !"iIther than his cre<lit limiralion. rna)" keep him from 
SClring up an efficienl farm opc!"ildng unit . As in lilt n$C of Ihe hou$Coold. thot 
in\"t ... rment d«i<ion m:rr rak~ rm.·,-d,·'"1(",· "Hr th~ rrll.lu .. ti"n d~.:i ... ",. 
Mr. K elso s<:ems 10 have some difficulty ... ith Ihe subj«r of "ho ... to over· 
come obstacles". This is to be expected beaus<: of the Inck ... ·ardness of empiriCl.l 
studies and the nature of the f!"ilme ... ork in which the "obs[";lclC$" arc conceivtd. 
If economic science were suffidently ... ·ell.grounded to make a srud)' of obSI2Clcs. 
there "'auld be liule difficulty in formulating hypothetiCl.I solutions. As mattel"$ 
mnd, one is nOI COmplelely certain [hat he W:lntS to brid~ the normative "gap" 
Ihat he Ius u$Cd 10 guide his analysis. 
Of Ihe su~lions rhal he does offer, sevenl appear 10 ha,"C merir from rbe 
standpoint of bringing aboul "desired" «onomic adjustments in agriculture 
These are "homesreads in revel"$e". gr<:lller kno .... ledge of alterna tives ... ilhin and 
ouuide of agriculture, and reform of rhe partnership Of corporare inStirution. All 
arc aimed at rhe concemration of agricultural land re$OurcC$ in Ihe hands of 
k"'er people. What one doesn't kno ..... ho .... ever, is .... hat eff«t these land re-
distribution measures .... iI1 have on the rights of individuals in sociely. Will the 
"non·landed" gent r)' be given equivalenl social and politiCll po .... er .... ith those 
k .... ""ho remain 10 carl)' on a profitable agriculr ure~ Clearly morc research is 
nceded concerning these possible conSC<juences. 
EVALUATION AND DISCUSSION 
OF SEMINAR PAPERS 
Don R. K1Ido~ 
Iowa Sute U niversity 
The specilll problems of concern at this seminar have an imporram reblion 
to the larger problems of «onomie imlnlance in the farm industl)'. The capaci ry 
of agriC\Llrure to lIdapI ilS resource STruCtUre and organiurion under conditions 
of economic progrC$s is closely bound up .... ith rhe process of enluaring facror 
" 
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rerums and with .be functioning of ,he factor rnukc.s. Rent det~rminuion ~nd 
land rnarkels 1r~ an ;mr<:81.1 p:m of rhi$ complex. 
Professor Hurlburt'S p"~r focu~ on the nomutivc "pee's of rem <kttrmi. 
lUc ian "';Ihin rhe fum firm. He pte$Cmed a s!!ong ~ for greuer usc of 1he 
theory of the firm ;n determining the lerms and condirions for land ~ql ar_ 
r:angcments. The <hcory or profit maximization by ,he firm is used as a nomu· 
rive model pr~cribing desirable «onomic behavior. In Ihis sen;ng, .he "idol" 
lease is onc Ihal provides I'l:sourcc owners ",jIb the incentives to fulfill the con· 
dilion, for pratil maximiurion. If firm profits are 10 be maximiud, the leas.: 
mUSE encourage .erw>! and landlord '0 act in ...... ys .hat penni, each ro maximize 
his own position ",thin til .. constraint of maximum film pmfiu. [n ,he idal 
lease, rhis is accomplished b)' m~king re .... ards a function of thc marsinal value: 
product! of thc resourccs conHibuted .nd by insurins proportiondity bet .... em 
input and output sh.ucs. 
The $OCial justification for profit maximizing behavior, of course, rests on 
its poslibtc contribution to allocative efficiency. Under competitive conditions, 
profit maximization by.11 firms automatically utisfiet the conditions for the 
optimum allocation of rcsources in production. When these condi tions ptc .... a, 
the subsrin.ltion of "idell" leases for other lco.les would incrase national income 
and make it possible fot everybody to be beller off_a la Pareto. If competition 
is imperfect, this conclusion do<:s not necessarily (ollow, ho ... 'C'VCf. YCt . there is a 
sHons pretumption that even in our ptes.ent imperfecdy competitive economy 
the adoption of"idcal"lclICS .... ould mlke l significant cofuribution to the na· 
tional produc!. 
It is perhaps worth noting tha, nch of the pallies to a letsing 1fl'llngcmcnt 
.... hich dlxs nOt meet the [CSt of an "i00:21" Icut could gain by adopting:ll1 
~ideal" lease. This dlxs not mon thac the subst itution of an "ideal" leafoC would 
automatieally make both the tenant and landlord bettcr off incomewise. In many 
instances, the uSC of an "ideal" tease is likely to make one of the pallieS .... Or$( 
off. What it docs mco.n is that there ... ·ilI be some distributions of firm net in-
come tlut could make all parties better off. 
Suppa$' there is a 1000ns arn.nSC1nCnt in which the division of firm nc:r in· 
come between landlord anc:! tcnam is such that the Landlord obtains I smaccr reo 
rurn than he would if the parties adopted an "ideal" le15e. In these circum. 
stances, presumably the landlord .... ould oppose the adoption of an "ideal" lease, 
"'hert'lis the renant would favor ilS adoption. Sino: the combined ncr income of 
both pattics (finn ncr incomc) .... ould be larger with the "idol" lco.s.e, it would 
be possible for thc tenant to bribe thc landlord into accepting it. T he ten:ll1t 
could overcompensatc the landlord for his loss and still be bettcr off'than he 
W1$ under ,he old lease. 
The compensation principle miSht be usc.:! to encourage ,he adoption of 
"ideal" lases in C1SC$ .... here both plrties " .. ill nol automatically bencfit. If com· 
pensat ion were paid, both parties _ould be better off and presumably bod! 
would faVOt adop'ing the "idco.l" lea$C. Howcver, some people miSht obj= ro 
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comptnS2tion on grounds of distributivc justicc. If thc bndlord happened to be 
rich and the ten~nt poor, rhe que!1ion might be f1Iised as to why the landlord 
should be compensated when hc alrcady has so much ar>d thc temnt Ius so litdc. 
The altcrnative to compensation in such cases is to revamp le:lsc law and lcp.lly 
require renantS and landlords to meet the terms of the "ide:ll" It'"1se. All this, of 
coursc, assumes that the empirical content of the "ide:ll" le:lse can be specified 
under different rental ar!""l.ngemcnts. 
Much of Professor Hurlburt's stimulating ?'oper is dcvotcd to the applica· 
tion of the concept of thc "ideal" leasc to vuious rcntal 1tf1lngemenu. As hc 
recognizes, this involves exttemely difficult estimation problems. In the absence 
of dircct estimates of margInal value products, he proposes that under a share 
leasc foetor incomc should be allO(atro bet,,·een bndlord and tenant in propor· 
don to their respective contributions to total fixro COSt. The COSt of each re· 
source contribution would be evaluated in tcrms of its altem~tive or opporruniry 
COSt price. HowevCf, this proccdure does nOt seem to meet the rcquirements of 
thc "idcal" le:lse except in thc special a.sc whcre the firm is maximizing profitS. 
In thc "ide:ll" le:lse, the tenant and landlord would be paid on the basis of 
the m1tginal valuc product of the resources they contributc_ If the &'ctor inconu: 
10 the firm is divided between the part ies in ptopotrion to thc share of fixed 
cosrs, the requirement that rewards be bascd on marginal value products will 
be met only if opportunity COSt prices are proportional to marginal value pro-
ductS. If the firm is maximizing profits, this condition will be satisficd. How_ 
ever, when the firm's resource combination or product mix is OUt 01 line, pro-
portionality between marginal value products and opportunity COSt ptices will 
nOt bc uniform for all inputs and for all productS. As a consequence, rhe division 
of factor income on the basis of opportunity cosr prices will not give a result 
equivalent to th~t based on marginal value produCts. An example may clarifY 
thc point_ 
Suppose thc t:l.tio of land to Jabor and apital on a givcn tUm is tOO low to 
produce OUtpUt at minimum resource COSt. In other words, the le:lst COSt combi· 
nation at cxisting opportunity COSt prices for rcsources involves more land in 
relation to l~bor ~nd capital. Undcr these conditions, the marginal value pro-
ducts of labor and apiuJ would tend to be rdatively low in relation to their 
opporrunity COSt prices, where:l$ the marginal value product of bnd would lend 
to be relatively high in relation to itS opportunity COSt price. If the division of 
factor income Wetc made on the basis of opportunity COSt prices, tOO much in· 
conu: would bc allocatro to labor and apital and nOI enough would be allocued 
to land to meet the requirements of an "ideal" lase. As a result, thc inccntives 
to adjUSt the rCWurce combination in line with the least COSt combin~tion ,,·ould 
be distorted. 
This docs not na:ess:rrily mean, however, that the distortion would be great· 
er than unda current leasing practices. It might bc gre:ltcr or it might be less 
dcpending in part on how closely the opportunity COSt prices used in estimating 
fixed COSI$ approximated.thc marginal value producl$. It might bc expteted that 
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on farms "'here ,he r($(Iurec combination is badly 01,11 of gar rhe disl0nion 
,,-ould ~ brge. It is tikd)" 10 ~ quire small on " 'ell organized unilS. The onl)" 
5O!ufion I Clln s« 10 rhis problem is to impro\'e OUt methodology for (sdmaling 
nurginal \"~luc produc!s ... ·i rh in the farm firm. In principle. opportunity (OS! 
prices could be expected 10 do a good job onl)" if ,he firm is utilizing The opri. 
mum combinaTion of resources. 
impro"emems in 11frn Technology arc seldom ficTQr neulr:al. Typir::lU )" the)' 
shifl the rdari,'c ph)'sic:Jl productivi.ics of diKetcm inpulS- If a nev.· I«hnolog)' 
raiSC'$ the marginal physical product of o pilal in rel-uian TO ,til l for land, rbe 
marginal value product of capila l ,1$0 " .Ll! inncase in reialion co rhar for land. 
W ith an ·'i<kat'· leue, rhe «(\1m [0 the owner of Clpial "" ould in~ in ~la · 
tion to the rC!urn '0 ,he o",'ner o f land. HO""evCf, if the division of firm nC1 in-
rome" ""ere ba~ on opportunity COSt prices. !here " .. ould be no necessuy Idjust· 
ment in the ~IIOCltion of income. since oppollunit), COSI prices ml)' not be If. 
f«lcd signifiCintly by the lechnologial change. Apparemly, existing remll pr::ic-
(iCel suffer from Ihis limitation also. 
The thcoretiol arguments against Ihe usc of opporrunilY cost Pfices in de-
termining contracrual renl lie SUbslllnlillL Neverrheless, Professor Hurlbur!"s 
propos.als should noc be dismissed so lightly. What is nttdcd arc: some empirial 
scudies 10 delermine .. -her her Ihe dislor<ion to incentives under his proposals 
"'ould be smaller or grNter Ihan under existing pr1ctices. Even if his p,ocedures 
do nOI fuU)" mect ,he theoretical 'es, . 'hey still could result in ~ improvement 
in leasing ,.,. ... ngcmenu. . 
Professor Kelso's pa]X'r deall wi,h ,he obstacles to ach ieving 'he "ideal" 
lase in p",clice_ In the opening section, he properly recognized the normative 
nalure of his auignment, Most of !he ideas he presented appear to be highl)" 
pcrtin~nl ux! gcncnaJly consistent ... -ilh profcssionsl belie& about the facts. I 1I'U 
surprised. ho""CVer, Ihll he made no reference to any empirical studies evaluat-
ing the efficiency of COntemporary letsing pr1oices. 
Ho'" importlln! is nch obS!llc!e in explaining departures from mlximum 
firm net income? Arc all obstacles C<1ually amendable to corrective acrion? Ans-
wels to Ihese quest ions seem essential if public and plivate effortS to eliminafC 
the obsudes ue to be effective and efficienl. 
Professor Kelso appc1rs to llssocil!C incomes paid on the basis of marginal 
,-al ... e prod ... cU ",-i,h di stributive justice and equity. Of cou~, it is po$$ibk to 
define disrrib ... t; ve justice so that it mcan, a d ist t ibution of income based on 
marginal VlII~ proc!u.cts. » ... t how mlIlY people would accept such a definition 
under In)' 1fld all ci!'C\lmStanca? If the distribution of resou.rcc o""nership i$ not 
too unequal . mlln)" people might go along ""ith , ... eh a definition. But if the~ 
arc man)" ,,-ide di fferences in resource o""ncrship, fe'" people are likel)' to accept 
;1. 
As [ \lflders'V1d the concept of the "ideal" l(J.se, it is "'holly the prodllCt of 
e!fidencr crileria. It implies noth ing llhaut disuibutivc j ... sticc. II simply $.Ct$ 
forth Ihe leasing conditions which arc consistent with maximiZ3 rion of firm ncr 
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income, When th~ conditions are not mer. it is 11\\'1)'5 possible to inc!"C',I5e the 
income of both tenant lind landlord by adjusting lea~ terms. 
Lih",i~. there is nothing in the perfect competition model which implies 
that the distribution of personal income " .. hich it genen,tes will be flir or ~uit· 
lble. The model assumes an initial distribution of resourU o,vnership. HO"'e~, 
the conditions for long_run equilibrium on be satisfi.-d with lIn~' number of dif· 
ferent distributions. In long'run compe,itive O!<luiIibrium. the di~tribution 0( per· 
sonal income is determined by the distribution of resource ownership and bctor 
prices which are equ1! to marginal value products 
Unqutstionably. distributive justice and other goals do inHuence lease terms. 
And as a result. the usual requIrements for the "ideal" le:I~ rna)' not be ,.,isfied 
Professor Kelso has m.de this point de". But i, may be questioned whether 
these other goals should be viewed as obstu:les. Perhaps the theor), of the '·ide.1" 
lease should be broadened to take account of non-income goals. This miSht be 
done either by substituting utilit}· maxImization for profi, maximiution or by 
subjecting profit muimiution to cenain non·income constnints. In either ase, 
it "'Quid imply that the J>1I1ies to the lel~ reach some 'gr~ment on the order· 
ing of joint goals. 
Professor Kelso's use of the rerm "blrgaining po::>wer" has left me some<>.'hat 
confused. At one point in his paper. he spoke about an increllSe in ,he demand 
for land a5 enhancing the landlord's bargaining power. At other poinrs, he :1$. 
SOClated the term with muk~t imperfections. It is nOt clear to mc JUSt how :ill 
increase in the demand for land would enhance the hndlord's bargaining pow ... 
in the absence of market imperfections. 
! ,horoughl)' asree with his vie'" that tenant·bndlord problems involve 
consider.ltions that So beyond the functioning of the bnd rental and land title 
markcts. Imperfections in (he opit:u marker lnd patticubrly in rhe labor nurket 
play an elCccedingl)' impomnt tole in elCpbining the kinds of competitive pr~ 
sures ,har play on rhe land rental marker. 
In the dosins section of his paper, Professor Kelso made, n\lmhcr of suS' 
gestions for bringing current leasing pNctices mote into line with the "idear' 
lease. His view of what might be accomplished strikes me as reasonably UCU!'lte 
and pto'Vides a sobering offset to the more optimistic elCpecmions of P,ofessor 
Hulburt'S paper. The emphasis on education and information is certainly jusri· 
fied. His commenrs on the need for social aerion to assist the mnsfer of surplus 
farm labor impressed me 1S particularlr 1ppropriate in vie", of the interrelation· 
ships among the futor nurkev;. 
Professor Gaffney's papet focused on the relations bttv,'('Cfl g,ound !'tnt a"" 
the allocation of bnd among farm firms. In diseussing rhe problem of diStin-
guishing beru'ccn gro\lnd rent and income to impto\'emencs, it appears he rna)' 
h.ve missed one fundamental poin._.h1' investment in land improvement 
changes the productivity of bnd and makes bnd without improvement an im· 
perfect s\lb.!itu.e for land with improvement. Th\lS, for purposes of economic 
akularion they h",,'e to be considered different facrors of production. With the 
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s:\me input of other factors, the dd'fcrcncc bt-twc~n thc margin:al value product 
of the land with improvcment and that without improvemem measures the con· 
tribution of thc improvement. This contribution may IX" grc:tta ,han. equal to. 
Or less than the wsr of ,he improvemem. To say that Ihe human comribution 
can neva IX" more than its COSt seems to imply that the economic syslem must 
alwa)'s IX" in 3 mite of general equilibrium. 
Pro~sor Gaffne)' prescnted a number of uscful insights into ,h~ concept of 
opportuni,y coS( as applied to land. Unfortunately. few agricultural economistS 
who have expressed opinions on land retiremenl prognms secm to bc familiar 
with the underlYing ide::l.s discussed b)' Professor Gaffney. Land economists have 
~n obligation to acquaint the public with the m<:aning and impli"dons of the 
concept of opportunity COSt as applied 10 land. 
I agree w;1h the view thar some of Our fums mar be tOO large to produce 
OUtput at mimmum resOurce coS(. But I disagree with 1he implica tion that this 
problem is a5 serious as Ihe ptoblem of tOO many small farms. Experience with 
conttol programs could provide some evidence on this ?Oint, but I am nOt 
aware of an)' such slumes and Professor Gaffnev does not refer to an)'. 
Professor Gaffney's analysis of the effects of differential capitalization <k, 
~rves intensive study-far more lhan I have h~d a chance to give il. As I inter· 
pret the language of his paper, he sa),s that Ihe ownetship of land gravitatcs 
tow:ard firms with a 10'" internal rale and away from firms with a high intermll 
"'te. By internal t:lte, he apparently me::l.ns the marginal return on investment, 
Given the marginal value product of a traCt of bnd, the firm with the low in· 
lernal tate will capitalize its value at a higher figure than the firm with the high 
imernal tate. Consequently. the low rate firm will outbid the high rate firm, 
Wha, is no! dear is "'hy firms should always capitalize on the basis of theil 
intern~l t:ltes, 
T here muu be some ?Oint in ,he expansion of the l~nd base of a given 
farm where the intern ~l be<:omes less than the external "'Ie-the t:lte offered by 
ahem~live investments outside the firm. At this p;Jint, the external "'te be<:omes 
the relevant "'te in considering further expansion in ,he contexr of maximiling 
lotal return, Up to this point. expansion should continue in order 10 bring the 
intern21 nte "'to line with the external tate. 
It is undoubtedly true Ih~1 f:!.rms with rebtively low internal NteS are bet· 
ler financed than farms ,,'ith rclanvely high internal "'tCS But unless the internal 
"'te is higher than the cxtern~l nte. why should these better fin2nced falms con· 
cinue to add 10 their bnd base? If ,hey were to expand when the 'nretnal nte 
is belo'" the extern21 rate, they would bc sacrificing more att"'ctive :alternativ<"$. 
Thereforc. Ihey would nO{ IX" maximiling their to",1 rC1lJm. 
Also, farms with relatively low internal rates would tend 10 bc un its in 
which the resource mix better approximates the le2s1 cost combination. Con· 
sequendy, Ihe marginal v21uc product of land would 'end to be lower Ihan on 
farms wilh relatively high internal rates. If the capacity to finance additional 
I2nd were equal, which it is not likely to bc, high "'te farms wuld afford to pay 
more for the land than low ntc farms. 
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If is my suspicion that differential capacity to finance additional land in_ 
vestment is by all odds a more signifi"nt f:1ctor in exphining chl'nges in (he 
peatlern of land ownership than differential (l'te! of capi(aliution. And I would 
argue tlut, even though the corrdanon between the OIpllCiry to finance additional 
land and the ability to manage assets may not be high, the t"·O ue nOt in· 
dependent phenomena. 
As Prof~sor Gaffney points OUt, there are mmy imperfect ions in the Olpiral 
market. Whi le I have no axe to grind for the bankers, it mUSt he recosnilcd 
that not all these imperfections are the result of monopolistic activities on the 
part of financial institutions. Some are inevitable beause of the existence of un· 
certainty. It OIn be usued, for example, that the he..vy emphasis which bmkinS 
institutions place on colhtenl security is in large part a reflection of ,.,.nous 
kinds of economic uncertainty. 
Unquestionably, agricultural economists have slipped up in failing to give 
adequate attention to the role of capital appreciation in analyling the land mu-
ket ;Ifld the economic position of farm people. While this probably has been a 
significant &'((or in explaining the shift ing pattern of land ownership and fann 
size in recent years, it seems to me that technological and factor price develop-
ments have been ht more important ovet the longet pull. 
REJOINDER TO DISCUSSAN TS' COMMENTS 
Maurice M . Kelso 
University of Arizona 
I im in full :1<:cord with the excellent StatementS offered by both Drs. Frey 
and Kaldor concerning my paper. Each of them where they imply criticism or 
ques!ioning of the centnl position taken in it argues exactly as I myself, 
would argue. The implied criticism in their temarks atises from a misinterpret:l-
tion of how I had formulated my discussion. I tried to make my approach dar 
in the opening seerion of my sratement but failed of so doing. 
I took the topic as assigned to me-"Obstacle! to &onomic Determination 
of Farm Rents"-and argued that this topic necesmily implies that conventional 
maximiution theory of farm firm efficiency constitu tes the "ide:.ll" of rem de-
termination and that, consequently, my tisk was to discuss why this "Elysian" 
sute is not attained in this "vale of te:.l'S and suffering." 
My intent, ,hen, was to point up those many &.nors in the re:.ll world from 
which ",,"ximi~ed firm efficiency theory is ibsm.cted and which are of such large 
importance md SO pervasive of our farm rental markets that they (an~o( be ignored 
by simplifying assumptions if one is interested in prescribing for ,he a!!ainm~nt 
of any recognizable goals of Aesh and blood people. 
Consequently, my intent actually was to s:ty what my reviewers have sill 
about the shortcomings of efficiency criteria as goal measures in farm rennl 
analysis. I did not make deir, apparently, that the "model" of farm firm ef· 
ficiency maximization I set up was nOt "my" model but that usually offered by 
economic analysts and praeritioners in this area. 
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One further obscrv~lion by Dr. Kaldor n«<is co/Ui<!ention. Ht conf~ 
to bting " somewhu confusc-d" over my use of the ttrm ~barg:lining power." 
H,s confusion is undentandable ~~usc I now thinle my use of the term was a 
bit confused. I agree with him Ih:n increase in the demand for or decrt:lsc in 
tht supply of wms to rent does not conslitute increasc in Ihe landlord's barvin-
ins po,,·er. Increase in bargaining power elIn come abouI, of course. only from a 
change in circumstancC1 thu diytrge still further (rom the conditions of "per-
fe n competition."' Increase in demand or dtcrease in supp!)' of ren!al f.trms 
might at timC1 and under cerrain circumSlancC1 lead to lC1s thin perfectly com-
peti ti"e condirions but it would bt Ihe iatttr not tht former. that had enhln«d 
!Ix, I:mdloro's bugaining po,,·er. This Cliticism b)' Kaldor and m)' confession of 
error eliminatc the lint tWO "obslades" I have liSted under the heading "()b. 
St~c les Rooted in the Environment of Social Structure and Process." The second 
p~ragraph under point #2 indicates quite clearly my own $ubconS(ious feeling 
when I wrote these paragraphs that somehow they didn't quite "hold water." 
GRO UND REN T AND THE ALLOCATION OF 
LAN D AMONG FIRMS: A REPLY 
M. Mason Gaffney 
Un iversity o f Mi~sou ri 
I "'eleome rhe opportunity to expand on tht points nised by ProfClSQrS 
Kaldor and wftsgard. Thor comments remind me Sharply that barriers in com-
muniation are as serious I problem as barrien in tht credit markets. Hopefully 
tilt commW1icnion barria- may bt breached by the givt'aM.rake of discussion, 
repl)" Ind rejoinder. I will btgin with Professor Kaldor's commenn. 
I do not believe it is quite accunte of Profeuor K2ldor to say thl( I "missed" 
the point thu "bnd improvement chlnges the productiviry of land." That is a 
litt le bit like saying that one has but to he'H the sra tement to agree ",ith it. My 
position is nther that land has a latent opportunity COSt, based on the best 
future use, which i5 indeptndent of the present use and present improvemen($. 
I cannot even claim origiruliry for that idea. While often honored in lhe b<eac:h, 
it is basic to i>tI t"allmm propertY tall2tion in the Unircd StatC1, and may be f'ound 
in lhe opinions of many judges denying relief 10 landowners suing to be r:axcxl 
on the basis of actUal ralher than potencial use. 
There is no question thaI improving land can ina-ease the gross yields from 
it. That is a truism ",hich I do nOt conlest. The issue is ralher whether econ-
omisrs should conceive of land rent as the residual erumbs which remain ro be 
impured 10 the bnd input under inefficient or overextended management; Or 
lhe highesl rent which could be paid by an alternat ive efficient oc underemployed 
managCffitnt. Again, the i$Sue is whether land rem is the small net renun rea1-
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" ileG under an old. ob$Ol.:te building. or the higher rent (hat could be paid by 
the optimal sueae<!ing build ing. 
The residual apprwch to imputing land rene is deeply rooted in <:I:onomists' 
thinking, and will not give ""2y easily. But it is my position til2t we should let 
the claims of the land input be more importuru.te. Under the residual apprttxh 
we in .:ffec! rationalize management .... hich is iO(flicient ""ith respo;t 10 land: 
whatcver is left over tiler other COSIS is the rent of the bnd, and so .... hatever 
piltana management imputes to land is enough. 
It is perhaps Ihis residual approach Ihar lends plausibility to the idea ex· 
plessed by Profcssor Kaldor that "Jmd improvement changes Ihe proouctiviry 
of land." It is only a short step from Ihat to arrogatinA: the rem of land to ttot 
(reGit of the npir:1I inpuls that, under that imerpreullon, render it productive. 
It wouid make as much sense to impute Ihe returns of npilal ro the bnd dllt 
renders the ,,-pinJ produclive, or Ihe labor thlt tenders both productive. Any 
such approach is contrary to the whole spirit of marginal analysis and impura· 
non. 
The fuNle·a1ternative approach rerommended in my paper regards improve. 
mems not as changing .the pro<iloLCtivity of land, bUI IS exploiting prodl,lCli¥( 
potentialilies latem in the bnd. To the extent dut Ihat is m~ quibbling ovtr 
wording I apologize for il. BUI beneath rhe queslion of wording there is a sub-
slam;" e issue o f impornnce. so that il behooves loLl to watch our lerminology 
and weed. oul ambiguities. 
Under the fullll"e·allernalive apprweh, the imputed tcnl of land would often 
be higher til2n the rem currendy imputed as a rcsidual. We are aCalsromcd to 
think of oppoctunity COS[$ as being inferior to present rerums, but thac 1S$Ume$ 
perfccc ItW"kcts, an assumption conspicuously untrue of credit and Imd marketS. 
If the full rent were charged against land.prodigal encerprise, it would show ncr: 
losses. Those losses are properly imputed to the land maru.ger-not to the land 
- as neVtive wa~s·of.mlnagement. Full.equity landholders can absorb such 
losses because their equity gives them a comfornble cusbion. Some of them 
have superfluous funds to finance such Wastc. The residual appr01ch imputeS 
those: WUtes and lost oppommities to the land. But the land. is blameless. M1n. 
is in command, and ",';!h authority goes te$ponsibility. The future-aharu.t;¥( 1p-
proach follows the spitit of Winston Churchill's diCTUm: The wure of apiralism 
is nOt in making profits. but fail ing to make profits. 
Professor Kaldor intimates that I allege that land without improvement is a 
perfect subSONIC for land wilh improvement. That a + b does not CCjuall is an· 
other truism char 1 .... i11 flOt dispute. What I did say is that it is possible at any time 
10 impuce rcrums to., the land, despite the pre$<:f"I(e of IJ, :an old building on the 
land, b}' contemplation of the net productivity of. in its besl future use. Tht 
is indeed. in pncrisc the ""21 00( docs decide .... hen to clc:molish an old buiWing 
and renew a site. It is also at all limes a way of appr:aising the sile without cefer· 
ence to ilS ptCSCnt improvemenu. 
I must disagtee .... ith Professor KaJdor's sraterru:nt thaI "the difference be· 
" 
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Iwttn ,he ID2rg,nal nlue produCt of the land widl improvemen. mol thai ""ith. 
oul improvement measures the contribut ion of the improvement." In mmy cir· 
cumstances. the marginal v:&lUl: product of good land without any improvement 
""ould b,:, zero, yet we do not impute nothing to one inpUI JUSt beaus.: another 
inpul is limitational. !..:and is also limitational; so is bbor, and prob1bly $Orne 
subclasses of labor and (Ipitd which one might define. 
[ susp«r .hat Professor Kaldol had in mind somerhing more complex :tnd 
more defensible ~hind [hat sralcm .. 'lt, but I will nO{ coniecture. Perhaps he 
will clabor:m: .he rhou.ght lOt uS in a rejoinder. 
As 10 In.: l:lSI sentence of Professor KaJdor's pangr:r.ph ending 1f the top of 
page 7l,ha. is simply t. misqoot:ation. My ~Xt .ads "The huoun comribucion can 
~ no mo'" than the COSt of the open.ion, and lucr the COSt of duplicat ing ito" I 
do not den)- thac improvements can apprcciate after b<:ing buiil. As 1 rule I 
think rim technologiCl.I advanc~ rend progre$Sively ro lo".-er duplicuion COSts 
over rime. Qortainly that is conspicuously true of all eanh-moving optl1l.!ions 
in r!!Cem )'nrs. for example. Neither of those implies that the economy is al-
wlys in genen.l e<juilibrium. 
J 19ree wi.h Professor K>oldor (hat imemal or, as I ha~ dubbed them, "in-
sular" ime<e$( [lites are influencf'd by external rues. I seck in v:Lin through my 
tex. for any S[lItemcm to rhe contrary. M)' pointS "'ere that "financial instiru-
tions leave a ... ·idc g:ap between (he high interest t1Ircs r~ ask and (hc knY ones 
they par," and "money runs uphill, thar is from depoSitors of mode[llte mnns 
... to borro ... ·ers ""ith abundant collateral security." 
I hasten ro correct the impression which my language evidently gave Pro-
fessor K2.ldor, that my paper is directed against bankers. Bankers do dabble in 
remicrive P[llCt1SC$, as do many economic groups, Ind that undoub(edly aggn.-
v:n~ the problems of making I free economy .... ork. But my text (cads that 
financial institutions lcave a wide g:ap hcrween depositors' [lites and borraWC1'll' 
[lIres: "necessarily so if they arc ro support themsel~s_ and of.en a good dcaJ 
moreso because they 1Ie sheltered from compcticion:' The wnrer imended ro 
emphasile the first phl'lSC: the reader's eye caught the 5CCond. Thank goodl\esll 
for diseussion and replies to r¢C1ify my misleading exposition. 
I TCg:l.rd lending COSIS i nd colJa!en.1 securiry as ineluc[llble in a credir systan 
thaI is OO!!O f:all victim to every Billie Sol Est~.' 1 M)' proposal is [lither to by-
pass the credit s)'srem, delUring land prices by mcans of hcavy "" ~";~"m bnd 
fiXes so (hac land Ir:lnsfers do nor cn[llil hct.vy financing bu(dens. 
I did OOIC Ihn In ill(iden!3l benefit of thll "'ould be to rdcase for higher 
uses much of rhc ldminiSllltivc and Icgal talem no"" devoted to negotiating 
mortgage 10<lns- Thac might be COll5trued as hostile to bankers, bUI tl'!c assump-
lion of higher alternative uses for their (alcnu i$ nor- f:aceriou5. Hcary land taxes 
would make of land a much morc commcrcial articic than no"'_ Today_ land's 
relative freedom from raxCI, and ils permancnce, givc it an heirloom qualiry that 
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discoun.ges commerce; and the high equity of mos! landhold~ makes then in-
~nsitive to all but gross changes in the optima! use to \I.'hich lands should be 
PUt, and permits of long lags between altered demllnd stimuli and supply reo 
sponse, With high [and taxes. lenders should make up in volume of transfers 
much of \I.'ha! lhey lose in value per transfer, wilh the nel social gain of a much 
more sensilivc land market. Wilh land movin~ IIl()I'e easily 10 the most produc-
tive hands, the volume of building. regn.ssing, renewing orchards. ele., should 
incr."se, thereby providing an addilion:L! outlet fOf [enders. That would be even 
more emphatically Irue if \I.'e took adnntage of the hi,gher land taxes 10 permit 
JO"'ering Ihe taxes on houses and olher buildings and improvements, thereby un-
leashing a vast invcJlmem potemial now abeyant.'" 
Professor ~Jdor susp«u that "differenti,l capacity 10 6nancc addiliaN! 
land in~tmmt is by :L!I odds , more Significam naor ... than diffe«mw nte:s 
of capin.Jization." I suspeCt, rather, that those are tWO different expressions of 
the same idea. Differential capitalization is simply a tool of abbreviatM el<posl' 
tion. As I wrote, " 'Financial strength' 's II (COncept of several dimensions. For 
expository brevity we may sum them up in i, ... " Generally. tOO, I think it is 
preferable to express economic phenomena in w:r.ys thlt «rognize a fuH Spectnufl 
of possibilities. Professor ~ldor'$ phra.sing seems 10 suggeSt that he visualizes 
each individual with a ration of ({Mit u a 6xed interest nue. That slrikes me as 
being more absolute and inflexible than our credit institulions. cmi6ed Though 
they may be. actually are. One an alw.ys borrow morc '1 a higher inlerest l"Iue, 
as William (20*) Zed:endorf of Webb and Knapp. and Owen Cheatham of 
Georgia.Paci6c Lumber. so dramatically ilIustrale in the large, and a million 
6nan(e comJnny cusromers illustrate in the smalL Thus, the differenTial·i con-
cepI nOl only sub$u!TK$ the credil rationin~ concepT. but allows for more di· 
mensions of re:olity. 
In his laSt sentence. il seems to me Ihn Professor Kaldor does nothing but 
$Iate m opinion, with no gesture toward meeting my argument that technologi· 
c.l faCtors would lend co push farms toward mean sizes, while in fact the move--
ment h:.u been taw;lrd extremes, small as well as large. 
BUI the SIatement thaI disrurb$ me moS[ is Ihat "farms wilh reluively low 
in ternal nu:s would tend fO be uniu in which ,he resouKe mix better approxi-
mates the [euf-cosf combination." T hat Kerns to imply that there is I "least· 
coS! combirtttion" that i, somehow independent o f Ihe COSt of credit. What 
basis is Ihere for 15suming thar Ihe factor· mix thaI appe. ts optimal to those 
who are relatively free of the imercsI constrainr is socially superior to Thl! of 
those who lave 10 economize on crt'dit, md hence Iuvc little or no land? ~Lem· 
COSI H here seems to mean least per man, or per mKhine. without tegud to ,he 
" If ,1>< ..... "". S~.IIOO ....... , .... (,..... • .-.1 ..... ' ..... "" , ........... , 10<.) "'" $)00. f '" "" .. 010 
t·(l.~l ... ) ...... , rh<i, ptOO<1I' ",I .. " ,. ;, $)00 m .. SlOII • 11.1 .. $8600. Of <.I!l of ,I>< ;n;,w .. r.. price. 
TI», .. q"i«. botti<, io< , ..... r>« lQ ,..i .. t.ct-." b.ilda-. ..... bu,..n. ,lit m'I'IOY>l of "hkh ~.".,Icl opm" 
lu&< .. """pp«! klcl or in ... ,_", 0-..<1., ... . IMOS< "1 ... "" '-';vabl. ><, of fNblk poIic)" 'Od.,. 
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sodal COS! of land. It is Ihis habit of thought, SO d<!eply rooted thaI ""C are 
sencel)' .... 'are of it. against which my pl~r is targelr directed. 
Professor Kaldor has Impuled fa m<! h~r .. si<,s> where I pkad orthodoxy. 
Turning now 10 Professor Lof!sgard's diKu$sion. he imputes orthoda,,)' '''here I 
pleld heresy. Would that the id<!lS I expounded were indeed alread), "accepted!" 
The use of marginal ncr .(venu,", to bnd 15 an aJlocl1;vc norm is. SO far as I ~ 
aWlre, quile alien '0 the spirit of roday's received doctrines , .. hich emphui:ze 
the benefits of spreading rhe overhead of machine purchases o"cr wide acreages, 
and emphas;'e 100 !he dedining and negligible importance of the land input in 
agriculture. It is !he absence of such a balanced norm as nn rent that Ie!S many 
economiscs discuss "efficiency" almost emirely in rerms of output per machine Ot 
per man. !O overlook economy of land ~lmost emird)" and hence to manifesT a 
S)'sTemaTic bias in fa,-or 0( land-prodigal opel':lTions. I will d!Olw the curtain of 
charity o,'er ciTations of chapTer and verse, but the supply is endless. 
As to The "non-pecunia!)",' benefits that one derives from land, iT seems to 
me That among professional economisTs it should go wirhour saying TIu.T those 
can be given monetuy weights and included in the definition of "revenue." 
Re"enues and COSts . as used in my paper. ue m~sured in monet1T}' units, but 
are not limited to values that actually pass through the m:..rkerplace. The 1mcni_ 
Ties of living, which some lands offer in much higher degree than others, are 
included in revenues. Is it also necessary to spell OUt That negati'"e amenities are 
a droucTion from revenues. or an addition to COSts? 
The marginal contribution of .cre:..ge ro the amenities of family living 0b-
viously encounters diminishing returns. Indeed, the point is more evident in re-
spect ro such amenities than with respect to physiol outpUtS, ror the filmily that 
deri,"es its amenities from ten acres pretty obviously getS more marginal b.ondirs 
from the I1lh rhan a much larger farmer does from the lOOOth. And so the in-
dusion of amenities does nOt alter the general drift of the Thesis of my paper. 
[ must confess that the lopic senTence of Professor Loftsgard's second pan· 
gnph eludes me, and I will not uy ro comment on any of it but the direct <jues-
rion it cont~ins: "how does one determine the opportuniry COSt or furure mar· 
ginal productivity of land?" In the TexT I shumro this quesrion aside by referring 
to other sources, but. as long as the question comes up. let me summarize them 
briefly here. 
The future opportunity cost of b.nd is determined by converting the net land 
income anticipatro from future pl:..ns to a consnn{ annuity, tl, and of course se-
lecting the pbn yielding ,he highest anuity: 
a = i .E" {Ro(\ +i) '··] 
(I + i)' , 
where i is The ,elevant insular nte of interest; R. is the net revenue (sometimes 
negative, since it includes COSts) of year n; and I is the Terminal :..ge of the new 
,mprovement. 
One may, if he chooses, regard tl :,t.\ a SOrt of residu1i, the excess of future 
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mnu~liz~d r~venu~s ov~r future annuali~ed COltS. On~ ma)', however, equally 
,,'~11 r~prd a as rhe marginal net revenue of land·time, rhat is, the incre:ue of 
net land revenues that would result from lengthening the future use one year 
rOw:lrd the present. As in other impU12tion questions, rhe marginal nct revenue 
deri"ed direnly equals the averagc net revenue under optimal equilibrium oon· 
ditions. The marginal ~nd average figures m~)" also differ, for ex;lmple, when the 
future use's life-span is oompr~ssed by the constraint of some andcipared e:.rrly 
future change In the beSt use of the site, like urbmization. Then, marginal net 
revenue exceeds average net r!:venue. Where there is a difference. marginal net 
revenue 1S the proper guide to allocation at the margin of decision, so long as 
the corresponding a,-crage net revenue remains high enough so that the use-cyde 
is viable in irs emirety. 
It is a mistake, 1 believe. in general to regard residual 1mputltion and di-
reCt imputation as distinct or incompatible procedures. As a rule they lC:l.d to 
equinlem, or at least reconcilable, results, which fact has been duly noted and 
incorpomed imo the generally accepted body of t(onomic doctrine. In rhe con-
cept of "marginal net revenue," indeed, residual and diwt imputation are fused 
together in one pachge. 
Purely residual imputation does have an importam role in the rheory and 
practise of distribution, it seems ro me, a role ,which has been obscured by rhe 
inadeqlUtc atremion "'hich economists g ive to the time elemem in produCtion, 
Residual imputation is neces~ry when an input is fixed, in the sense thar it 
is irrevocably commirred to a use and cannot be withdra"'n. Our CUStom has 
been to treat bnd that way, because we instinctivel)' think of land as "fixed," bur 
in the sense that is relevam for distribution theory I believe that is an error. Jr. 
reversible commitment, rather th~n sparia! fixit)". is rhe ~SSentil1 quaJit)" thar 
calls for residua! imputation, 
Irreversible commitment of resources to one form or use occurs when wt 
sink resource services into sp<"cific human products. When, for example. an in-
veStOr finances the production of a pair of shoes, the resources so sunk are em· 
bodied in that form, undisseverablr, in the sense that they cannot be wirhdra"'n 
for other uses without unacceptable economic loss. Their salvage value is so far 
beneath their shoe value that for practical purposes (her have, once sunk, no OJ>-
porrumt)' COSt. 
There is a time-bg bet""een investment, the irreversible commitmtm, and 
the disclosure of irs outCOme through sale. The investor orries rhe shoes over 
rlut p~riod and re<:cives his return as a residual upon liquidation. That [erurn is 
a residual not :1.$ an arbitrary convention, or a theorist's convenience: it corf('-
sponds 10 th~ faers of life. Over the period of commitment, the lfl"eStOr is "'1th-
our alrernati,-es, without recourse. It is to th1S kind of truly residua l return tJut 
the word "profit" is vulg:.tly applied, and in this caS(' I belie"e the vulgar usage 
is a good one for economists to adopt. only being cerrain to net OUt all complt-
mentaty COSt5 more scrupulously than is CUStOmary. 
The investor's residual profit is net of not only initial COSt, but also of all 
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subsequent COStS of srorillg, 1111llsponing, seiling, etc. Ag~in, tbose COStS ~re exo-
genously fixed. The investor absorbs them and takes his return as 11. rcsidlUl, an 
t:x poil discovery. 
With buildings, the su~uem COStS gcncnlly assume grell!er rthrive pro-
portions th;ln with commodities like shoes_ Buildings also differ in that liquida-
lion is nOl the work of an inseam, but is a long slow trickle: over many year5. 
The ner value of Clch ycar 's trickk is a residu .. l :tftee current OfXr:mng COSts." 
So much is standard doctrine, or nO! far from it. The innovation I propos.: hert 
is that site rent should be rc:p.rdcd as paulld 10 current opaating com. exo-
genously fixed by its opportUnilY COS!. which is its annualized value: in ilS high· 
eSI future usc. When rhe sum of these exogenous current COStS exh~usrs rhe 
gross Income of the building, the trickle of liquidHion has dried up; there- is 
nothing more to liquidate. The building has no value and should be demolished. 
The reason that land merits this different w:atmenr is thl1 its commitment 
to a use is never irreversible. Its past services may be embodied in bui ldmg 
values, JUSt as arc: the paSt ~rvices of construction labor and other inputs. But 
unlike the orner inputs, the site under a building continues to yic:ld current servo 
ices, year by )'C'-r, without let or surcease, and these current services, and future 
services, may be " .. ithdrawn from the ptc:sent improvement through demolition, 
and the land released to supply irs services to another improvement. In that reo 
SPC:Ct, land differs from almost all the other inputs originally commined to the 
building. They are like the old shoe which. when it c=s to be a shoe, is junk. 
But second·hand bnd suffers no discount . In the larger sense, indeed, the« is no 
other kind, man having desecr:ltcd the emire planet. 10 rhes~ millenia. 
Professor Lofrsgard continues by suggesting that the "rent" conCept does 
~not sufficiently recognize the degm: of complementarity among resource m-
tors." He is dead wrong. Rem is the excess of gross yields over compk mmtary 
costs. It seems (0 me that Professor Loftsgard here misses the primary purpose 
of the "net revenue" concepts (avenge and marginal,) which purpose is to com· 
prehend all dements of revenue and complementary COSt in one inclusive ex· 
pression. I sdecr bnd inputs as the indepc:ndent variable hete because bnd is 
my present subject. One could make any other input the independent v2riable 
and not change the final conclusions. 
As to the significance: of aCTC:ag'-" reduCtions in revealing marginal rems, the 
definitive study of that question, or any study. has yet to come to m)' attention, 
and my alkgarion, consisting of on~ semen(e, was more muted than the: vigor 
of Professor Lofrsgard's refu.t~tion would suggc:$t. I do attach weight to the gen-
eral observ~rion thar aereage cutbacks are easier on large, land.prodigal farmers 
tiun on smaller, intensive farmers. Professor Loftsgard might still be proven cor· 
rect ",hen that definitive study shall have been released, but, if so, probably not 
for the rt":lsons he gives. I qu~rion if there has been historically much positive: 
"The proper tmI.rn<rI. of in •• "" in 'hio ocheme i.r roo ron",,...<ni. 1 '" develop in .hi< brid" rq>Iy. for 
pra<n. pwp<>S<S .... ""'" i. i. =~ ou •. 
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correlation betw~~n aC!'C<lse cutbacks ~nd price incrcasr-s: price supporrs have 
come tim, and lIcreaSe controh followed hter. "Advances in technolosy" is ba-
ter phrased I think as adoption of known technolosy. and adoption of bnd·S.:!v-
ing te<:hniqu.:s is an obvious conse<juence of ",rage cutlncks. nO! an exogenous 
variable. He is right , I am sure, about the sele.:tion of poorer acres to idle, and 
allowance must be made for that. In how many cases, though, are the "poorer" 
acres poorer in 1000rion relative to a large fjrmstead. r:nher than in soi l qualities) 
The hypothesis rhu the marginal net revenue produccivity, or marginal 
rent . of land tends to be lower on larger farms receives tentative support from 
twO Or three recent studies contr:lsring partiCipants and non-porticipants in the 
Soil Bank Progr:lms." These progr:lms provide an alm~t perfect testing ground 
for the hypothesis . since p2rticipation is volunrary with the landholder, and in-
voh'C'O marginal adjust menu of the land input, holding others more or less COn-
stan!. Landowners had the option of leasing cropland (W ith proper histories of 
allotment crops) to the Soil Bank for shorr terms to ho ld idle, Or to improve. 
Paymen! rates arc adjusred (with dubious precision) for qualit}' of land. Farmers 
naturaJly bank those lands whose marginal ren!. to the individual f~rmcrs. falls 
below the gO\'crnmcn! offer. 
The three studies cited found participating farmers to average significantly 
luger in acreage, and lfl cropland icreage tOO, than non-parricipants. That is 
hardly consistent with the now orthodox view that larger farmers arc the ones 
who make mOSt "efficient" use of all the resources at their disposal, including 
land. Many I"-rticipants gave such !Casons as: "needed income to pay real esr:ne 
raxes;" have tOO much land to cultivate;" "bbor is hard to get;" "land is tOO 
far away to oper:>rc;" etc" Non-participants, on the orher hand. " needed all 
their cropland 10 opcr:>te their farms efficiently."" 
It is nOt possible to evaluate the AR5 study of ten Grcat Plains St~tes which 
Professor Lof1S~rd leans on without citing. It is no! even dcar if its definition 
of "concentration" is at all the same as lorenz'. But if Professor Loftsg:ud pur-
pom to allege rhat the lorenz Concentration Ratio for U.S. farm land has nOf 
been rising. he is mistaken. I have computed the ratio from the U.S. Census of 
Agriculture from \900 to 19~0, and it rose from .)8 in 1900 to .70 in 194) and 
19)0. That is for the land in f.um opeutions (nOt ownerships.) measured in "'11:5 
(nOt doHu value.) If the acres had b~n weighted by their value, the incrosc 
would have been more striking. The value per :lere of farms of 1.000 acres and 
larger increa,w,d 4.7 times, compared to 3,4 rimes for all farms, (including the 
group of 1 ,000 ac!Cs and larger.) 
Rising Lorenz Concentration Ratios result from a rise of acreage in vay 
large farms, largely those of 1,000 acres and more; and also from a rising nllm· 
' 'THE CONSERVAT ION RESEltVE ?ROGR ... M Of THE SOIL BANK. Ai. lofo. Bull. No. 1~. 
F.E.R.O. _ A.R.5.. U50 .... Mu, h, 19)8 joh_n, K21ph 0 .. THE CONs.EltV ... nO:-< RF.SERVE PROGRAM 
IN NEBRASKA. SB410, Nobn. b A.E.$., .nd F.E.D. _ ER.S.. USD .... F<bt.w)'. 19'6.2. 
Til< Ch~.3<' Fed', ... GRICUl TURAL LETTER fo< M,y II. 1'.>!O, >100 df .. . n 10.', " udy . how'n, • 
"""" K'''&< fnt ptrtidF""" of~. , Ad """"F"">c;p<n" 21. 
' 'THE CONSERV ... nON RESERVE PROGRAM, po 10 
" .,. ';1 .. p. 20 
" 
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Nr of vny small Wms. The rechnologin! dClcrminisfs have sough. 10 circum· 
vem rhis lateer difficult )· by defining Ihe growing num~u of miniuurc farms 
oul of ,,,ilir"nee. ThC}' are "nOI imponmr", beause Ihey produce so liute. The:y 
arc no! "[nll)' farms." bUI "·othrf garden plolS. aUI [hal is indefensible. The 
less lhe)' produce. Ihe more eloquent " .. ;[ness .hey bear of (hI" une9ual dimibu· 
lion of farm land. "'hieh is ailer all the 9uestioru before us. Small blms have 
~l" .. ays ~n pnHime fums. probably al""IYs ",·ill be, and have played In im. 
porf2nl and conspicuous ,ok throughout economic hislor)', For [hal mauer, 
rruon)' of rhe largest farms nc :lIso p:m rime. Their o"mcrs are bankers, congress-
men, raiJr<»ds. oit companies. international pll)'bo)'s, and a hoSf of things. In 
boch a$C$ t~ non-fum intel'd's h~,·e a domirunt impxt on the individwls' be-
havior in the muket for i~rm land. and it is link else bur ",·iIlful myopia 10 ex-
clude chem and thei. non-farm interests from anal)"si, of factors determining the 
pattern of farm si~es. 
Both Professors Kaldor and Lofcsgard have been tOO haSI)', 11 seems to me. 
in rejecting concepts and propositions wi.h only superficial examination thaI 
often cnuiled confusing the incido:nraJ wilh the esSC'ntia! and have subs~ntially 
misimerpre.ro whlt .he "'riter ,",'15 struggling 10 e"pren. I pkad guilty 10 the mis-
denlC'2.flQr of inadequate. somo:rimes misleading and perhaps C"Ven inttndiary ex-
position. but inJ\OCC1lt of the ma jor felonic.'$ ch"ged. 
